Key Arguments

• Smith argues that when 'the judicial is united to the executive power, it is scarce possible that justice should not frequently be sacrificed to what is vulgarly called politics,' indicating a structural tendency for legal rights to yield to political considerations.
• He notes that even without corruption, 'The persons entrusted with the great interests of the state may even without any corrupt views, sometimes imagine it necessary to sacrifice to those interests the rights of a private man,' showing that conflicts between raison d'état and private rights arise naturally.
• He grounds the importance of impartial justice in liberty: 'upon the impartial administration of justice depends the liberty of every individual, the sense which he has of his own security,' tying judicial integrity directly to citizens' subjective and objective freedom.
• Consequently, he insists 'it is not only necessary that the judicial should be separated from the executive power, but that it should be rendered as much as possible independent of that power,' moving from mere functional separation to robust independence.
• As concrete safeguards, he specifies that 'The judge should not be liable to be removed from his office according to the caprice of that power,' and that 'The regular payment of his salary should not depend upon the good will,' implying that tenure security and non-discretionary remuneration are essential conditions of judicial independence.

Source Quotes

They universally, therefore, discharged themselves of it, by appointing a deputy, bailiff or judge. When the judicial is united to the executive power, it is scarce possible that justice should not frequently be sacrificed to what is vulgarly called politics. The persons entrusted with the great interests of the state may even without any corrupt views, sometimes imagine it necessary to sacrifice to those interests the rights of a private man.

When the judicial is united to the executive power, it is scarce possible that justice should not frequently be sacrificed to what is vulgarly called politics. The persons entrusted with the great interests of the state may even without any corrupt views, sometimes imagine it necessary to sacrifice to those interests the rights of a private man. But upon the impartial administration of justice depends the liberty of every individual, the sense which he has of his own security.

The persons entrusted with the great interests of the state may even without any corrupt views, sometimes imagine it necessary to sacrifice to those interests the rights of a private man. But upon the impartial administration of justice depends the liberty of every individual, the sense which he has of his own security. In order to make every individual feel himself perfectly secure in the possession of every right which belongs to him, it is not only necessary that the judicial should be separated from the executive power, but that it should be rendered as much as possible independent of that power.

But upon the impartial administration of justice depends the liberty of every individual, the sense which he has of his own security. In order to make every individual feel himself perfectly secure in the possession of every right which belongs to him, it is not only necessary that the judicial should be separated from the executive power, but that it should be rendered as much as possible independent of that power. The judge should not be liable to be removed from his office according to the caprice of that power.

In order to make every individual feel himself perfectly secure in the possession of every right which belongs to him, it is not only necessary that the judicial should be separated from the executive power, but that it should be rendered as much as possible independent of that power. The judge should not be liable to be removed from his office according to the caprice of that power. The regular payment of his salary should not depend upon the good will,

Key Concepts

• When the judicial is united to the executive power, it is scarce possible that justice should not frequently be sacrificed to what is vulgarly called politics.
• The persons entrusted with the great interests of the state may even without any corrupt views, sometimes imagine it necessary to sacrifice to those interests the rights of a private man.
• But upon the impartial administration of justice depends the liberty of every individual, the sense which he has of his own security.
• it is not only necessary that the judicial should be separated from the executive power, but that it should be rendered as much as possible independent of that power.
• The judge should not be liable to be removed from his office according to the caprice of that power. The regular payment of his salary should not depend upon the good will,

Context

Same section in Book V, Chapter I, Part II, immediately after describing the historical delegation of justice; Smith pivots to a normative constitutional argument about the dangers of fusing judicial and executive powers and the institutional requirements for protecting individual liberty through an independent judiciary.