Key Arguments

• He explicitly assigns a kind of imagination to all animals with perception: 'Now, perceptual | 434 a 5 | imagination, as we said, also belongs to the other animals,' thereby confirming that imagination comes in at least one non‑rational form.
• He restricts 'the deliberative sort' of imagination to rationally calculative beings: 'but the deliberative sort exists [only] in the rationally calculative ones (for whether to do this or that is already a work of rational calculation;'. Deliberative imagination is thus tied to rational choice between alternatives.
• He characterizes deliberation as involving measurement by a single standard aimed at the greater good and the ability to synthesize many appearances into one: 'and we must measure by one [standard], since we are pursuing the greater [good]; and so we must be able to make one appearance that results from many). 432'. This shows deliberative imagination’s role in integrating multiple considerations into a unified evaluative presentation.
• He explains the apparent lack of belief (pistis) in non‑rational animals by their lack of this deductive, deliberative imagination: 'And this is the cause of these animals {63} seeming not to have belief, | 434 a 10 | namely, that they do not have the [imagination] that results from a deduction, but this has that. 433'. Thus belief requires an imagination shaped by deductive reasoning, not mere perceptual imagery.

Source Quotes

Or is it that just as they are moved in an indeterminate way, so too these things are present in them—but in an indeterminate way? 431 Now, perceptual | 434 a 5 | imagination, as we said, also belongs to the other animals, but the deliberative sort exists [only] in the rationally calculative ones (for whether to do this or that is already a work of rational calculation; and we must measure by one [standard], since we are pursuing the greater [good]; and so we must be able to make one appearance that results from many). 432 And this is the cause of these animals {63} seeming not to have belief, | 434 a 10 | namely, that they do not have the [imagination] that results from a deduction, but this has that. 433 That is why desire does not have the deliberative capacity, but sometimes defeats and moves wish, whereas sometimes wish does this to it, just like a ball, one desire does it to the other desire, as when lack of self-control occurs, but by nature the higher is more ruling and causes movement.

431 Now, perceptual | 434 a 5 | imagination, as we said, also belongs to the other animals, but the deliberative sort exists [only] in the rationally calculative ones (for whether to do this or that is already a work of rational calculation; and we must measure by one [standard], since we are pursuing the greater [good]; and so we must be able to make one appearance that results from many). 432 And this is the cause of these animals {63} seeming not to have belief, | 434 a 10 | namely, that they do not have the [imagination] that results from a deduction, but this has that. 433 That is why desire does not have the deliberative capacity, but sometimes defeats and moves wish, whereas sometimes wish does this to it, just like a ball, one desire does it to the other desire, as when lack of self-control occurs, but by nature the higher is more ruling and causes movement. 434 So there are already three spatial movements caused.

Key Concepts

• Now, perceptual | 434 a 5 | imagination, as we said, also belongs to the other animals, but the deliberative sort exists [only] in the rationally calculative ones (for whether to do this or that is already a work of rational calculation; and we must measure by one [standard], since we are pursuing the greater [good]; and so we must be able to make one appearance that results from many). 432
• And this is the cause of these animals {63} seeming not to have belief, | 434 a 10 | namely, that they do not have the [imagination] that results from a deduction, but this has that. 433

Context

Early to middle of III.11 (434a5–10), where Aristotle refines his taxonomy of imagination, tying a special, deliberative form to rational animals and using this to account for why only such beings can have belief grounded in deductive reasoning.