Aristotle resolves the puzzle about intellect’s receptivity by reaffirming that intellect is in a way all intelligible objects potentially, but none of them actually before it thinks, like a wax tablet on which nothing is yet written; in the case of immaterial objects, the intellect is itself intelligible in the same way its objects are, so that knower and known are numerically the same.

By Aristotle, from On the Soul

Key Arguments

  • He recalls his earlier account of being affected 'in virtue of something common' and applies it to intellect: 'On the other hand, being affected in virtue of something common has been determined before, namely, that the understanding is in a way the intelligible objects potentially, although it is none actually before it understands [them]—'. This insists that the intellect shares a common nature with its objects by being potentially them.
  • He introduces the wax‑tablet analogy to illustrate this peculiar potentiality: '—and it is potentially [these] in the same way as there is writing on a wax tablet on which there is nothing actually written. That is just how it is in the case of the understanding.' The intellect is like prepared but unwritten wax: structured to receive all characters, but actually none.
  • He then answers the question about whether intellect itself is intelligible by identifying it with its immaterial objects: 'And it is an intelligible object in just the way its intelligible objects are, since, in the case of those things that have no matter, what understands and what is understood are the same, since theoretical scientific knowledge and what is known in that way are the same.'
  • By appealing to the identity of theoretical knowledge and its object in immaterial cases, he both explains how intellect can be intelligible without composition and clarifies how it can be unaffected (in the sensory sense) yet become its objects in act.

Source Quotes

For either everything else will have understanding, if it is not by reference to something else that it itself is intelligible, and if the intelligible is something that is one in form, or it will have something mixed with it that makes it intelligible in just the way other things are. 356 On the other hand, being affected in virtue of something common has been determined before, namely, that the understanding is in a way the intelligible objects potentially, | 429 b 30 | although it is none actually before it understands [them]—and it is potentially [these] in the same way as there is writing on a wax tablet on which there is nothing actually written. 357 | 430 a 1 | That is just how it is in the case of the understanding.
356 On the other hand, being affected in virtue of something common has been determined before, namely, that the understanding is in a way the intelligible objects potentially, | 429 b 30 | although it is none actually before it understands [them]—and it is potentially [these] in the same way as there is writing on a wax tablet on which there is nothing actually written. 357 | 430 a 1 | That is just how it is in the case of the understanding. And it is an intelligible object in just the way its intelligible objects are, since, in the case of those things that have no matter, what understands and what is understood are the same, since theoretical scientific knowledge and what is known in that way are the same.
357 | 430 a 1 | That is just how it is in the case of the understanding. And it is an intelligible object in just the way its intelligible objects are, since, in the case of those things that have no matter, what understands and what is understood are the same, since theoretical scientific knowledge and what is known in that way are the same. 358 (The cause of the understanding’s not always [actively] understanding | 430 a 5 | must be investigated later.

Key Concepts

  • On the other hand, being affected in virtue of something common has been determined before, namely, that the understanding is in a way the intelligible objects potentially,
  • although it is none actually before it understands [them]—and it is potentially [these] in the same way as there is writing on a wax tablet on which there is nothing actually written.
  • That is just how it is in the case of the understanding.
  • And it is an intelligible object in just the way its intelligible objects are, since, in the case of those things that have no matter, what understands and what is understood are the same, since theoretical scientific knowledge and what is known in that way are the same.

Context

Very end of the provided III.4 passage (429b30–430a5), where Aristotle uses the wax‑tablet metaphor and the identity of knower and known in immaterial cases to solve the aporia raised about an unaffectable intellect’s capacity to understand.