Key Arguments

• From the conclusion that 'the affections of the soul are enmattered accounts', he infers that 'their definitions will be of this sort', requiring reference to both form and matter.
• He offers a template: '“Being angry is a sort of movement of such-and-such a sort of body, or of a part or a capacity, as a result of this for the sake of that.”', where the 'movement' and 'such-and-such a sort of body' mark the material side, and 'as a result of this for the sake of that' introduces formal and final causes.
• He claims 'this is why it already belongs to the natural scientist to get a theoretical grasp on the soul, either all soul or this sort of soul', because the natural scientist studies affections 'in matter of such-and-such a sort'.
• He distinguishes two kinds of definitions for a passion such as anger: 'For a dialectician it is a desire for retaliation or something like that, whereas for a natural scientist it is a boiling of the blood and hot stuff around the heart.'
• He explains the division: 'Of these, the natural scientist gives the matter, whereas the dialectician gives the form and the account. For this is the account of the thing, although it must be in matter of such-and-such a sort if it is to exist.' Thus a complete account must integrate both.
• He illustrates the same pattern with the example of a house: 'the account is this, that it is a shelter to prevent destruction by winds, rain, and heat. But one person will say that it is stones, bricks, and timbers, and another that it is the form in them for the sake of these other things.' This parallels the material and formal accounts of psychic affections.
• He then asks 'Which of these people, then, is the natural scientist? Is it the one concerned with the matter but ignorant of the account, or the one concerned with the account alone? Or is it rather the one concerned with what is composed of both?'—suggesting that genuine natural science must consider the composite of form and matter.
• By framing the definitions in this way, he shows that psychological states, insofar as they are functions or affections of 'this sort of body and this sort of matter', fall squarely within the domain of natural science understood hylomorphically.

Source Quotes

For sometimes, though nothing frightening is occurring, people come to have the affections of a frightened person. If this is so, however, it is clear that the affections of the soul are enmattered accounts. 21 So their definitions | 403 a 25 | will be of this sort, for example: “Being angry is a sort of movement of such-and-such a sort of body, or of a part or a capacity, as a result of this for the sake of that.”

If this is so, however, it is clear that the affections of the soul are enmattered accounts. 21 So their definitions | 403 a 25 | will be of this sort, for example: “Being angry is a sort of movement of such-and-such a sort of body, or of a part or a capacity, as a result of this for the sake of that.” 22 And this is why it already belongs to the natural scientist to get a theoretical grasp on the soul, either all soul or this sort of soul.

21 So their definitions | 403 a 25 | will be of this sort, for example: “Being angry is a sort of movement of such-and-such a sort of body, or of a part or a capacity, as a result of this for the sake of that.” 22 And this is why it already belongs to the natural scientist to get a theoretical grasp on the soul, either all soul or this sort of soul. 23 But a natural scientist and a dialectician would define each of these differently—for example, what anger is.

22 And this is why it already belongs to the natural scientist to get a theoretical grasp on the soul, either all soul or this sort of soul. 23 But a natural scientist and a dialectician would define each of these differently—for example, what anger is. For a dialectician it is a desire for retaliation | 403 a 30 | or something like that, whereas for a natural scientist it is a boiling of the blood and hot stuff around the heart. 24 Of these, the natural scientist gives the matter, whereas the dialectician gives the | 403 b 1 | form and the account.

For a dialectician it is a desire for retaliation | 403 a 30 | or something like that, whereas for a natural scientist it is a boiling of the blood and hot stuff around the heart. 24 Of these, the natural scientist gives the matter, whereas the dialectician gives the | 403 b 1 | form and the account. For this is the account of the thing, although it must be in matter of such-and-such a sort if it is to exist.

24 Of these, the natural scientist gives the matter, whereas the dialectician gives the | 403 b 1 | form and the account. For this is the account of the thing, although it must be in matter of such-and-such a sort if it is to exist. And so of a house the account is this, that it is a shelter to prevent destruction by winds, rain, and heat.

For this is the account of the thing, although it must be in matter of such-and-such a sort if it is to exist. And so of a house the account is this, that it is a shelter to prevent destruction by winds, rain, and heat. But one person will say that it is stones, | 403 b 5 | bricks, and timbers, and another that it is the form in them for the sake of these other things. Which of these people, then, is the natural scientist?

Is it the one concerned with the matter but ignorant of the account, or the one concerned with the account alone? Or is it rather the one concerned with what is composed of both? Who, then, is each of the others?

Key Concepts

• If this is so, however, it is clear that the affections of the soul are enmattered accounts.
• So their definitions | 403 a 25 | will be of this sort, for example: “Being angry is a sort of movement of such-and-such a sort of body, or of a part or a capacity, as a result of this for the sake of that.”
• And this is why it already belongs to the natural scientist to get a theoretical grasp on the soul, either all soul or this sort of soul.
• a natural scientist and a dialectician would define each of these differently—for example, what anger is. For a dialectician it is a desire for retaliation | 403 a 30 | or something like that, whereas for a natural scientist it is a boiling of the blood and hot stuff around the heart.
• Of these, the natural scientist gives the matter, whereas the dialectician gives the | 403 b 1 | form and the account.
• For this is the account of the thing, although it must be in matter of such-and-such a sort if it is to exist.
• And so of a house the account is this, that it is a shelter to prevent destruction by winds, rain, and heat. But one person will say that it is stones, | 403 b 5 | bricks, and timbers, and another that it is the form in them for the sake of these other things.
• Or is it rather the one concerned with what is composed of both?

Context

Following the claim that affections of the soul are 'enmattered accounts', Aristotle develops the hylomorphic structure of their definitions and marks the different but complementary roles of dialectical and physical accounts in I.1.