Key Arguments

• He summarizes the special senses: 'Each perceptual capacity, then, is of its underlying perceptible subject, is present in the perceptual organ insofar as it is a perceptual organ, and discerns the differentiae (diaphora) of the underlying perceptual subject—for example, white | 426 b 10 | and black in the case of sight, sweet and bitter in that of taste. And similarly in the case of the others.'
• He raises a new problem: by what do we perceive that the different proper sensibles of different senses are distinct from one another? 'But since we discern white and sweet and each of the perceptible objects in relation to each, by what do we perceive that they are also distinct?'
• He insists the answer must be 'by perception', since white and sweet are perceptible objects: 'It certainly must be by perception, since they are perceptible objects.'
• He uses this to argue that flesh is not the ultimate sense-organ, because the discerning subject would then have to discern whenever it itself is touched: '(From this it is clear too that flesh is not | 426 b 15 | the ultimate organ of perception, since then it would be necessary for what discerns things to discern them when it itself is touched. 305)'
• He denies that numerically separate things could discern the distinctness of white and sweet; rather, 'both must be clear to some one thing': 'Nor indeed is it possible to discern by separated things that sweet is distinct from white, but both must be clear to some one thing, since otherwise even if I perceived the one and you the other, it would be clear that they were distinct from each other.'
• He concludes that 'one thing must state that they are distinct (for sweet and white are distinct). 306 The same thing, therefore, states this; so that, as it states, so too it understands and perceives.' Thus, the same unified subject both perceives and judges the distinctness of different sensibles.

Source Quotes

303 The perceptual capacity is a ratio, and excessive things dissolve or destroy it. Each perceptual capacity, then, is of its underlying perceptible subject, is present in the perceptual organ insofar as it is a perceptual organ, and discerns the differentiae (diaphora) of the underlying perceptual subject—for example, white | 426 b 10 | and black in the case of sight, sweet and bitter in that of taste. And similarly in the case of the others.

And similarly in the case of the others. But since we discern white and sweet and each of the perceptible objects in relation to each, by what do we perceive that they are also distinct? 304 It certainly must be by perception, since they are perceptible objects. (From this it is clear too that flesh is not | 426 b 15 | the ultimate organ of perception, since then it would be necessary for what discerns things to discern them when it itself is touched.

But since we discern white and sweet and each of the perceptible objects in relation to each, by what do we perceive that they are also distinct? 304 It certainly must be by perception, since they are perceptible objects. (From this it is clear too that flesh is not | 426 b 15 | the ultimate organ of perception, since then it would be necessary for what discerns things to discern them when it itself is touched.

304 It certainly must be by perception, since they are perceptible objects. (From this it is clear too that flesh is not | 426 b 15 | the ultimate organ of perception, since then it would be necessary for what discerns things to discern them when it itself is touched. 305) Nor indeed is it possible to discern by separated things that sweet is distinct from white, but both must be clear to some one thing, since otherwise even if I perceived the one and you the other, it would be clear that they were distinct from each other. Instead, one thing must state that | 426 b 20 | they are distinct (for sweet and white are distinct).

(From this it is clear too that flesh is not | 426 b 15 | the ultimate organ of perception, since then it would be necessary for what discerns things to discern them when it itself is touched. 305) Nor indeed is it possible to discern by separated things that sweet is distinct from white, but both must be clear to some one thing, since otherwise even if I perceived the one and you the other, it would be clear that they were distinct from each other. Instead, one thing must state that | 426 b 20 | they are distinct (for sweet and white are distinct).

305) Nor indeed is it possible to discern by separated things that sweet is distinct from white, but both must be clear to some one thing, since otherwise even if I perceived the one and you the other, it would be clear that they were distinct from each other. Instead, one thing must state that | 426 b 20 | they are distinct (for sweet and white are distinct). 306 The same thing, therefore, states this; so that, as it states, so too it understands and perceives. 307 {49} It is clear, then, that it is not possible to discern separated things by separated things—and not at separated times either, as is clear from the following. For just as the same thing states that good and bad are distinct, so also when | 426 b 25 | it states that the one and the other are distinct, the “when” is not coincidental (by “coincidental” I mean, for example, when I say now that that they are distinct, but not that they are distinct now).

Key Concepts

• Each perceptual capacity, then, is of its underlying perceptible subject, is present in the perceptual organ insofar as it is a perceptual organ, and discerns the differentiae (diaphora) of the underlying perceptual subject—for example, white | 426 b 10 | and black in the case of sight, sweet and bitter in that of taste.
• But since we discern white and sweet and each of the perceptible objects in relation to each, by what do we perceive that they are also distinct? 304
• It certainly must be by perception, since they are perceptible objects.
• (From this it is clear too that flesh is not | 426 b 15 | the ultimate organ of perception, since then it would be necessary for what discerns things to discern them when it itself is touched. 305)
• Nor indeed is it possible to discern by separated things that sweet is distinct from white, but both must be clear to some one thing, since otherwise even if I perceived the one and you the other, it would be clear that they were distinct from each other.
• Instead, one thing must state that | 426 b 20 | they are distinct (for sweet and white are distinct). 306 The same thing, therefore, states this; so that, as it states, so too it understands and perceives. 307

Context

Late III.2 (426b6–21), where Aristotle moves from the account of each special sense to the problem of how we judge that different proper sensibles are distinct, implicitly gesturing toward the need for a unified 'common sense' distinct from flesh and from a mere plurality of separate sense-faculties.