Key Arguments

• He gives the general, universal account: 'Speaking in universal terms about every perceptual capacity, though, we must suppose that the perceptual capacity is what can receive the {44} perceptible forms without the matter,' explicitly characterizing perception as reception of form alone.
• He illustrates this with the wax–signet analogy: 'as wax receives the seal of the signet-ring without the iron or the gold—it takes on a golden or | 424 a 20 | brazen seal, but not insofar as the seal is gold or bronze.' This shows that the form (shape) is received, not the underlying stuff (gold, bronze).
• He generalizes the point to all the special senses: 'Similarly too the perceptual capacity for each [sort of object] is affected by what has color, flavor, or sound, but not insofar as each is said to be things in question, but insofar as each is of such-and-such a sort, and in accord with the ratio. 284' This means they are affected qua having a certain formal structure (logos/ratio), not qua particular material things.
• By formulating the account 'in universal terms about every perceptual capacity' he indicates that this is not an ad hoc description of one sense but the essential definition of perception as such.

Source Quotes

II 12 Speaking in universal terms about every perceptual capacity, though, we must suppose that the perceptual capacity is what can receive the {44} perceptible forms without the matter, as wax receives the seal of the signet-ring without the iron or the gold—it takes on a golden or | 424 a 20 | brazen seal, but not insofar as the seal is gold or bronze. Similarly too the perceptual capacity for each [sort of object] is affected by what has color, flavor, or sound, but not insofar as each is said to be things in question, but insofar as each is of such-and-such a sort, and in accord with the ratio.

II 12 Speaking in universal terms about every perceptual capacity, though, we must suppose that the perceptual capacity is what can receive the {44} perceptible forms without the matter, as wax receives the seal of the signet-ring without the iron or the gold—it takes on a golden or | 424 a 20 | brazen seal, but not insofar as the seal is gold or bronze. Similarly too the perceptual capacity for each [sort of object] is affected by what has color, flavor, or sound, but not insofar as each is said to be things in question, but insofar as each is of such-and-such a sort, and in accord with the ratio. 284 The primary perceptual organ is that in which a capacity of this sort exists. It is the same [as the capacity], but the being [for it] is distinct. | 424 a 25 | For what does the perceiving would be a spatial magnitude, but surely neither the being for what is capable of perceiving nor the perceptual capacity is a spatial magnitude, but rather a sort of ratio and capacity of the former thing.

Key Concepts

• Speaking in universal terms about every perceptual capacity, though, we must suppose that the perceptual capacity is what can receive the {44} perceptible forms without the matter,
• as wax receives the seal of the signet-ring without the iron or the gold—it takes on a golden or | 424 a 20 | brazen seal, but not insofar as the seal is gold or bronze.
• Similarly too the perceptual capacity for each [sort of object] is affected by what has color, flavor, or sound, but not insofar as each is said to be things in question, but insofar as each is of such-and-such a sort, and in accord with the ratio. 284

Context

II.12 (424a17–22), where Aristotle offers a general, cross-sensory definition of perception as reception of form without matter, illustrated by the wax and signet-ring example and applied to color, flavor, and sound.