Key Arguments

• He explicitly raises the question whether flesh is the organ or a medium: 'what the perceptual organ is of what can perceive by touch, whether | 422 b 20 | it is flesh, and what is analogous to this in other beings, or whether it is not, but instead the flesh is the medium, whereas the primary perceptual organ is something else that is internal.'
• He argues that simultaneity of contact and perception is not evidence that flesh is the organ, using the membrane thought experiment: 'As to the question of whether the perceptual organ is internal, or is not internal but is instead immediately the flesh, it seems to be no indication of this that the perception comes about | 423 a 1 | at the same time as touching does. For even as things stand, if we were to make a sort of membrane and stretch it around the flesh, this would immediately on being touched report the perception in the same way. And yet it is clear that the perceptual organ is not in this membrane.'
• He notes that if such a membrane were naturally conjoined to us, perception would be even quicker, reinforcing that a naturally attached layer can still be merely medium, not organ: 'And if it were actually to become naturally conjoined [with the flesh], | 423 a 5 | the perception would pass through even more quickly.'
• He draws an explicit analogy: if air were naturally conjoined around us, we would mistakenly think we see, hear, and smell with one thing; similarly, flesh plays that role for touch: 'Hence the body that is of this sort [namely, flesh] seems to have the same character as air would have if it were naturally conjoined with us all around. For then we would have seemed to perceive sound, color, and odor with one thing, and sight, hearing, and smell would have seemed to be one perceptual capacity.'
• Later he concludes that what can perceive the tangible is internal and that flesh is the medium through which it operates: 'From which it is also clear that what can perceive the tangible is internal. For it would be just like what happens in the case of the other perceptual capacities. For we do not perceive things placed on the perceptual organ, but we do perceive what is placed on the flesh. | 423 b 25 | So the flesh is the medium of what can perceive by touch.'

Source Quotes

For if touch is not one perceptual capacity but more than one, then the objects perceptible by touch must also be of more than one sort. But there is a puzzle about whether it is more than one or one, and about what the perceptual organ is of what can perceive by touch, whether | 422 b 20 | it is flesh, and what is analogous to this in other beings, or whether it is not, but instead the flesh is the medium, whereas the primary perceptual organ is something else that is internal. For every perceptual capacity seems to deal with one pair of contraries—for example, sight with white and black, hearing with high and low pitch, and taste with bitter and sweet.

But what the one thing is that is the underlying subject for touch in the way that sound is for hearing is not clear. As to the question of whether the perceptual organ is internal, or is not internal but is instead immediately the flesh, it seems to be no indication of this that the perception comes about | 423 a 1 | at the same time as touching does. For even as things stand, if we were to make a sort of membrane and stretch it around the flesh, this would immediately on being touched report the perception in the same way.

As to the question of whether the perceptual organ is internal, or is not internal but is instead immediately the flesh, it seems to be no indication of this that the perception comes about | 423 a 1 | at the same time as touching does. For even as things stand, if we were to make a sort of membrane and stretch it around the flesh, this would immediately on being touched report the perception in the same way. And yet it is clear that the perceptual organ is not in this membrane. And if it were actually to become naturally conjoined [with the flesh], | 423 a 5 | the perception would pass through even more quickly.

And if it were actually to become naturally conjoined [with the flesh], | 423 a 5 | the perception would pass through even more quickly. Hence the body that is of this sort [namely, flesh] seems to have the same character as air would have if it were naturally conjoined with us all around. For then we would have seemed to perceive sound, color, and odor with one thing, and sight, hearing, and smell would have seemed to be one perceptual capacity.

For it would be just like what happens in the case of the other perceptual capacities. For we do not perceive things placed on the perceptual organ, but we do perceive what is placed on the flesh. | 423 b 25 | So the flesh is the medium of what can perceive by touch. It is the differentiae (diaphora) of body insofar as it is body that are objects of touch.

Key Concepts

• what the perceptual organ is of what can perceive by touch, whether | 422 b 20 | it is flesh, and what is analogous to this in other beings, or whether it is not, but instead the flesh is the medium, whereas the primary perceptual organ is something else that is internal.
• it seems to be no indication of this that the perception comes about | 423 a 1 | at the same time as touching does.
• if we were to make a sort of membrane and stretch it around the flesh, this would immediately on being touched report the perception in the same way. And yet it is clear that the perceptual organ is not in this membrane.
• Hence the body that is of this sort [namely, flesh] seems to have the same character as air would have if it were naturally conjoined with us all around.
• So the flesh is the medium of what can perceive by touch.

Context

II.11 (422b20–423a10, 423b20–25), where Aristotle uses an analogy with a hypothetical membrane and with naturally surrounding air to argue that flesh is a medium, not the primary sense organ of touch, whose organ must therefore be internal.