Key Arguments

• He introduces a general causal schema: when one thing is moved another can be moved by it, and applies this to imagination as a movement dependent on perception: 'But since when something is moved another thing can be moved by | 428 b 10 | it, and since imagination seems to be a sort of movement and seems not to take place without perception, but rather to take place in things that perceive and to be of those things of which perception is, and since it is possible for movement to come about as a result of the activity of perception, which movement must be like the perception—'
• He concludes explicitly that, given the characteristics just described, 'imagination will be a movement that comes about as a result of the activity of perception': 'If, then, imagination has no characteristics other than the aforementioned ones, | 428 b 30 | but it is what has been described, then imagination will be a movement | 429 a 1 | that comes about as a result of the activity of perception. 342'
• He explains that this movement belongs only to perceiving beings and cannot occur without perception: 'this movement could neither come about without perception nor | 428 b 15 | could it belong to non-perceiving things'
• He notes that its having the power to guide both actions and affections, and to be true or false, derives from how it stems from different levels of perception, some always true and some prone to error: 'and it is possible for what has it to do and be affected by many things in accord with it, and for it to be either true or false.'
• He immediately analyzes the three grades of perception—of special sensibles, of coincident features, and of common sensibles—and ties varying degrees of falsity to these; imagination inherits these truth-values from the movements they cause: 'Perception of the special perceptibles is true or has the least possible degree of falsity. Second, though, [there is the perception] of the coinciding of these ... Third, [there is perception] of the common perceptibles, that is, ones that follow along with the coincidental perceptibles ... And about these now it is most of all possible to be in error in accord with perception.'
• He adds that because the movements (appearances) persist and resemble perceptions, animals can act 'in accord with them', especially when understanding is absent or obscured: 'And because its objects persist and are similar to perceptions, animals do many things in accord with them, | 429 a 5 | some because they lack understanding (for example, beasts) and others because their understanding is sometimes obscured by feeling, disease, or sleep (for example, human beings). 344'

Source Quotes

326) Where understanding is concerned, since it is distinct from perceiving, and since on the one hand imagination and on the other supposition seem to belong to it, we must define the imagination before going on to discuss the other. 327 If, then, imagination is that in virtue {51} of which we say that some appearance | 428 a 1 | comes about in us, and if we are not speaking metaphorically, is there some one capacity or state of these in accord with which we discern and grasp truth or falsity? 328 Perception, belief, scientific knowledge, and understanding are of this sort.

338 Therefore imagination is not one of these things nor is it constituted from them. But since when something is moved another thing can be moved by | 428 b 10 | it, and since imagination seems to be a sort of movement and seems not to take place without perception, but rather to take place in things that perceive and to be of those things of which perception is, and since it is possible for movement to come about as a result of the activity of perception, which movement must be like the perception—this movement could neither come about without perception nor | 428 b 15 | could it belong to non-perceiving things, and it is possible for what has it to do and be affected by many things in accord with it, and for it to be either true or false. This happens because of the following things: Perception of the special perceptibles is true or has the least possible degree of falsity.

In fact, the first is true as long as the perception is present, whereas the others may be false whether it is present or absent, and especially when the perceptible object is far away. If, then, imagination has no characteristics other than the aforementioned ones, | 428 b 30 | but it is what has been described, then imagination will be a movement | 429 a 1 | that comes about as a result of the activity of perception. 342 And since sight is perception to the highest degree, imagination (phantasia) derives its name from light (phaos), because without light it is not possible to see. 343 And because its objects persist and are similar to perceptions, animals do many things in accord with them, | 429 a 5 | some because they lack understanding (for example, beasts) and others because their understanding is sometimes obscured by feeling, disease, or sleep (for example, human beings).

But since when something is moved another thing can be moved by | 428 b 10 | it, and since imagination seems to be a sort of movement and seems not to take place without perception, but rather to take place in things that perceive and to be of those things of which perception is, and since it is possible for movement to come about as a result of the activity of perception, which movement must be like the perception—this movement could neither come about without perception nor | 428 b 15 | could it belong to non-perceiving things, and it is possible for what has it to do and be affected by many things in accord with it, and for it to be either true or false. This happens because of the following things: Perception of the special perceptibles is true or has the least possible degree of falsity. Second, though, [there is the perception] of the coinciding of these, | 428 b 20 | the things that coincide with the perceptibles, and here it is now possible to be in error.

Third, [there is perception] of the common perceptibles, that is, ones that follow along with the coincidental perceptibles to which the special ones belong (I mean, for example, movement and magnitude). 340 And about these now it is most of all possible to be in error in accord with perception. 341 But the movement | 428 b 25 | that comes about as a result of the activity of perception will be different, namely, the one that results from these three sorts of perception. In fact, the first is true as long as the perception is present, whereas the others may be false whether it is present or absent, and especially when the perceptible object is far away.

342 And since sight is perception to the highest degree, imagination (phantasia) derives its name from light (phaos), because without light it is not possible to see. 343 And because its objects persist and are similar to perceptions, animals do many things in accord with them, | 429 a 5 | some because they lack understanding (for example, beasts) and others because their understanding is sometimes obscured by feeling, disease, or sleep (for example, human beings). 344

Key Concepts

• If, then, imagination is that in virtue {51} of which we say that some appearance | 428 a 1 | comes about in us,
• But since when something is moved another thing can be moved by | 428 b 10 | it, and since imagination seems to be a sort of movement and seems not to take place without perception, but rather to take place in things that perceive and to be of those things of which perception is,
• and since it is possible for movement to come about as a result of the activity of perception, which movement must be like the perception—
• If, then, imagination has no characteristics other than the aforementioned ones, | 428 b 30 | but it is what has been described, then imagination will be a movement | 429 a 1 | that comes about as a result of the activity of perception. 342
• this movement could neither come about without perception nor | 428 b 15 | could it belong to non-perceiving things,
• Perception of the special perceptibles is true or has the least possible degree of falsity.
• And about these now it is most of all possible to be in error in accord with perception. 341
• And because its objects persist and are similar to perceptions, animals do many things in accord with them, | 429 a 5 | some because they lack understanding (for example, beasts) and others because their understanding is sometimes obscured by feeling, disease, or sleep (for example, human beings). 344

Context

Later in III.3 (428b10–429a5), after ruling out rival identifications, Aristotle offers his positive definition of imagination as a movement caused by perception, structured by the truth and falsity conditions of different kinds of perceptual activity.