Key Arguments

• Aristotle generalizes: 'All, then, define the soul by—one might almost say—three characteristics: moving, perceiving, being incorporeal. And each of these is referred back to the starting-points.', summarizing the preceding survey.
• He says 'those who define it by knowing either make it an element or composed of the elements, all speaking in somewhat similar ways as each other, except for one', referring back to Empedocles, Plato and others who use elemental or numerical structures for cognition.
• He reports their principle: 'For like, they say, is known by like. For since the | 405 b 15 | soul knows all things, they put it together from all the starting-points.', directly linking epistemology and cosmology.
• He notes a correlation: 'Hence those who say that there is one cause and one element also regard the soul as one (for example, fire or air), whereas those who speak of a plurality of starting-points also make the soul a plurality.'
• He singles out Anaxagoras: 'Anaxagoras alone says that the understanding is unaffectable and has nothing in common | 405 b 20 | with any of the other things.', an exception to the 'like by like' dogma.
• Aristotle criticizes the unexplained nature of this account: 'But how, if it is like that, it will know anything and due to what sort of cause, he does not say, nor is it evident from the things he does say.', pointing to a gap in Anaxagoras’s theory.
• He adds that those who take contraries as starting-points 'also put the soul together from contraries', and those who take one contrary (hot, cold, etc.) 'likewise | 405 b 25 | regard the soul too as one of these', even letting themselves 'be guided by the names' (e.g. 'to zên' from 'zein', 'psuchê' from 'katapsuxis').
• The linguistic etymologies—deriving 'life' from 'boiling' (heat) and 'soul' from 'cooling' (cold)—illustrate how these theorists retrofit semantic associations to their prior elemental commitments.

Source Quotes

In fact each of the four elements has found some judge in its favor, except earth. 60 For it no one declares to be soul, except those who have said that it is composed of all the elements or is all of them. | 405 b 10 | All, then, define the soul by—one might almost say—three characteristics: moving, perceiving, being incorporeal. And each of these is referred back to the starting-points. That is why those who define it by knowing either make it an element or composed of the elements, all speaking in somewhat similar ways as each other, except for one.

And each of these is referred back to the starting-points. That is why those who define it by knowing either make it an element or composed of the elements, all speaking in somewhat similar ways as each other, except for one. 61 For like, they say, is known by like. For since the | 405 b 15 | soul knows all things, they put it together from all the starting-points.

61 For like, they say, is known by like. For since the | 405 b 15 | soul knows all things, they put it together from all the starting-points. Hence those who say that there is one cause and one element also regard the soul as one (for example, fire or air), whereas those who speak of a plurality of starting-points also make the soul a plurality.

For since the | 405 b 15 | soul knows all things, they put it together from all the starting-points. Hence those who say that there is one cause and one element also regard the soul as one (for example, fire or air), whereas those who speak of a plurality of starting-points also make the soul a plurality. Anaxagoras alone says that the understanding is unaffectable and has nothing in common | 405 b 20 | with any of the other things.

Hence those who say that there is one cause and one element also regard the soul as one (for example, fire or air), whereas those who speak of a plurality of starting-points also make the soul a plurality. Anaxagoras alone says that the understanding is unaffectable and has nothing in common | 405 b 20 | with any of the other things. 62 But how, if it is like that, it will know anything and due to what sort of cause, he does not say, nor is it evident from the things he does say. Those who make pairs of contraries their starting-points also put the soul together from contraries, whereas those who make one or other of the two contraries such—for example, hot or cold, or something else of that sort—likewise | 405 b 25 | regard the soul too as one of these.

62 But how, if it is like that, it will know anything and due to what sort of cause, he does not say, nor is it evident from the things he does say. Those who make pairs of contraries their starting-points also put the soul together from contraries, whereas those who make one or other of the two contraries such—for example, hot or cold, or something else of that sort—likewise | 405 b 25 | regard the soul too as one of these. That is why they also allow themselves to be guided by the names.

That is why they also allow themselves to be guided by the names. Those who pick the hot say that it is also because of this that to zên (life) is so named [because zein means “to boil”], whereas those who pick the cold, say {9} that it is because of this—because of the process of breathing and cooling (katapsuxis)—that psuchê (soul) is so named.

Key Concepts

• All, then, define the soul by—one might almost say—three characteristics: moving, perceiving, being incorporeal. And each of these is referred back to the starting-points.
• That is why those who define it by knowing either make it an element or composed of the elements, all speaking in somewhat similar ways as each other, except for one. 61 For like, they say, is known by like.
• For since the | 405 b 15 | soul knows all things, they put it together from all the starting-points.
• Hence those who say that there is one cause and one element also regard the soul as one (for example, fire or air), whereas those who speak of a plurality of starting-points also make the soul a plurality.
• Anaxagoras alone says that the understanding is unaffectable and has nothing in common | 405 b 20 | with any of the other things. 62 But how, if it is like that, it will know anything and due to what sort of cause, he does not say, nor is it evident from the things he does say.
• Those who make pairs of contraries their starting-points also put the soul together from contraries, whereas those who make one or other of the two contraries such—for example, hot or cold, or something else of that sort—likewise | 405 b 25 | regard the soul too as one of these.
• Those who pick the hot say that it is also because of this that to zên (life) is so named [because zein means “to boil”], whereas those who pick the cold, say {9} that it is because of this—because of the process of breathing and cooling (katapsuxis)—that psuchê (soul) is so named.

Context

The concluding synthesis of I.2, where Aristotle abstracts general patterns from the surveyed doctrines, highlights 'like is known by like' as a shared principle, and criticizes Anaxagoras’s unaffected intellect as explanatorily deficient.