Key Arguments

• He denies the existence of intelligibles wholly separate from the perceptible realm: 'But since there is nothing, it seems, that is beyond, separated from, perceptible magnitudes, it is in the perceptible forms that the intelligible objects are found—'. This grounds intelligibles in the forms of sensible things.
• He universalizes this claim to cover both abstract objects and immanent states: '—both those that are spoken of in abstraction | 432 a 5 | and those that are states and affections of perceptible things.' Thus mathematical or abstract entities and qualities or conditions of sensible things are all present in perceptible forms.
• From this he infers a strong epistemological dependence of learning on perception: 'And this is why without perceiving, no one could learn or comprehend anything', stating that perception is a necessary condition for all learning and understanding.
• He further claims that even in the most theoretical activity of contemplation, the intellect must operate together with an appearance: 'and when one contemplates, one must at the same time contemplate an appearance.'
• He characterizes appearances (phantasmata) as perception-like but immaterial: 'For appearances are like perceptions, except that t hey ar e without matter.' This explains how intellect can think forms abstracted from matter while still depending on perceptually derived images.
• By linking the necessity of appearances in contemplation to the location of intelligibles in perceptible forms, he reinforces his broader thesis that human cognition is irreducibly tied to the embodied, sensory basis supplied by perception and imagination.

Source Quotes

For the hand | 432 a 1 | is an instrument of instruments, so too the understanding is a form of forms, and a perceptual capacity a form of perceptible objects. 400 But since there is nothing, it seems, that is beyond, separated from, perceptible magnitudes, it is in the perceptible forms that the intelligible objects are found—both those that are spoken of in abstraction | 432 a 5 | and those that are states and affections of perceptible things. And this is why without perceiving, no one could learn or comprehend anything, and when one contemplates, one must at the same time contemplate an appearance.

400 But since there is nothing, it seems, that is beyond, separated from, perceptible magnitudes, it is in the perceptible forms that the intelligible objects are found—both those that are spoken of in abstraction | 432 a 5 | and those that are states and affections of perceptible things. And this is why without perceiving, no one could learn or comprehend anything, and when one contemplates, one must at the same time contemplate an appearance. For appearances are like perceptions, except that t hey ar e without matter.

And this is why without perceiving, no one could learn or comprehend anything, and when one contemplates, one must at the same time contemplate an appearance. For appearances are like perceptions, except that t hey ar e without matter. However, imagination is distinct from affirmation and | 432 a 10 | denial, since truth and falsity involve a combination of intelligible objects.

Key Concepts

• But since there is nothing, it seems, that is beyond, separated from, perceptible magnitudes, it is in the perceptible forms that the intelligible objects are found—both those that are spoken of in abstraction | 432 a 5 | and those that are states and affections of perceptible things.
• And this is why without perceiving, no one could learn or comprehend anything, and when one contemplates, one must at the same time contemplate an appearance.
• For appearances are like perceptions, except that t hey ar e without matter.

Context

Middle to later part of III.8 (around 432a1–8), where Aristotle draws ontological and epistemological consequences from his hylomorphism: intelligibles are embedded in sensible forms, so all learning and even abstract contemplation require perception and phantasmata, which are perception-like images without matter.