Key Arguments

• We are aware that we see and hear, so either sight itself or some distinct perceptual capacity perceives that we see: 'Since we perceive that we see and hear, it must either be by sight that someone perceives that he sees or by a distinct [perceptual capacity].'
• If sight itself perceives that we see, then the same capacity will be for perceiving both sight and color, so that either there will be two capacities for perceiving the same thing (an absurd duplication) or one capacity will perceive itself: 'But in the former case the same one will be for perceiving sight and for perceiving its underlying color. So either there will be two for {47} perceiving the same thing or one will be for perceiving itself.'
• If, instead, there is another distinct capacity that perceives sight, then either we get an endless hierarchy of further capacities (each perceived by another), or at some point one capacity will have to perceive itself anyway: 'Further, if the perceptual capacity that is for perceiving sight were indeed another one, either they will go on without limit or one will be for perceiving itself.'
• Since an infinite regress of higher-order senses is unacceptable, we must 'grant this in the case of the first perceptual capacity'—i.e., accept that the primary perceptual capacity itself is self-aware in some way: 'So one should grant this in the case of the first perceptual capacity.'

Source Quotes

III 2 Since we perceive that we see and hear, it must either be by sight that someone perceives that he sees or by a distinct [perceptual capacity]. 295 But in the former case the same one will be for perceiving sight and for perceiving its underlying color.

III 2 Since we perceive that we see and hear, it must either be by sight that someone perceives that he sees or by a distinct [perceptual capacity]. 295 But in the former case the same one will be for perceiving sight and for perceiving its underlying color. So either there will be two for {47} perceiving the same thing or one will be for perceiving itself. Further, if the perceptual capacity that is for perceiving sight were indeed another one, | 425 b 15 | either they will go on without limit or one will be for perceiving itself.

So either there will be two for {47} perceiving the same thing or one will be for perceiving itself. Further, if the perceptual capacity that is for perceiving sight were indeed another one, | 425 b 15 | either they will go on without limit or one will be for perceiving itself. So one should grant this in the case of the first perceptual capacity.

Further, if the perceptual capacity that is for perceiving sight were indeed another one, | 425 b 15 | either they will go on without limit or one will be for perceiving itself. So one should grant this in the case of the first perceptual capacity. But there is a puzzle.

Key Concepts

• Since we perceive that we see and hear, it must either be by sight that someone perceives that he sees or by a distinct [perceptual capacity].
• But in the former case the same one will be for perceiving sight and for perceiving its underlying color. So either there will be two for {47} perceiving the same thing or one will be for perceiving itself.
• Further, if the perceptual capacity that is for perceiving sight were indeed another one, | 425 b 15 | either they will go on without limit or one will be for perceiving itself.
• So one should grant this in the case of the first perceptual capacity.

Context

Opening of III.2 (425b12–18), where Aristotle formulates and resolves a regress problem about how we perceive that we perceive, concluding that the primary perceptual capacity must in some sense be self-aware.