Key Arguments

• He reports the doctrine: 'its supporters say that the soul is a sort of harmony. For, they say, a harmony ... is a blend and a composition of contraries, and the body consists of a combination of contraries', then immediately denies that the soul can be either a 'blend' or 'ratio' of the mixed elements.
• He insists that 'A harmony, however, is a sort of ratio or combination of the things that are mixed together, and the soul cannot possibly be either of these', directly rejecting both main ways of explicating harmony.
• Harmony 'cannot move anything, yet everyone assigns this to the soul as—one might almost say—its chief characteristic', so identifying soul with harmony contradicts the widely accepted role of soul as source of movement.
• It fits experience better 'to speak of harmony in connection with health and bodily virtues as a whole than in connection with the soul', implying that where we actually see harmonic ratios is in bodily states, not in the soul itself.
• He challenges the theory by asking us 'to assign the affections and functions of the soul to some sort of harmony, since it is difficult to make them “harmonize” with it', arguing that concrete psychic activities resist being redescribed as harmonic ratios.
• He distinguishes two senses of harmony—'the strictest one is that of spatial magnitudes in things that have movement and position, where harmony consists in their being positioned together' and, derivatively, 'the ratio of the things that are mixed together'—and concludes, 'Neither of the two, though, makes the doctrine reasonable.'
• If harmony is taken as 'the composition of the parts of the body, it makes it very easy to criticize. For the compositions of the parts are many and various. Of what, then, and in what way should we suppose the understanding to be a composition? Or the perceptual part or the desiring part?', showing that different powers would require different, conflicting 'compositions'.
• If harmony is taken as 'the ratio of the mixture', then 'the mixture of the elements is not in the same ratio in flesh as in bone. It will follow, then, that there are many souls and that they are found throughout the whole body', an absurd proliferation of souls wherever there are different mixtures.
• He turns the same problem against Empedocles: 'since he says that each of the parts exists by virtue of some ratio. Is the soul, then, the ratio, or rather a distinct thing that comes about in the parts?', pressing the dilemma whether soul is just the ratio or a distinct principle.
• He also asks of Empedocles: 'is love the cause of any random mixture, or the one that is in accord with the ratio, and is love the ratio or a distinct thing beyond the ratio?', showing that even Empedocles implicitly needs a cause beyond a mere proportion.

Source Quotes

I 4 There is also another doctrine handed down about the soul, which many find no less plausible than those we have mentioned, and which has given an account of itself under examination even in the common accounts. 97 For its supporters say that the soul is a sort of harmony.

97 For its supporters say that the soul is a sort of harmony. For, they say, a harmony | 407 b 30 | is a blend and a composition of contraries, and the body consists of a combination of contraries. 98 [1] A harmony, however, is a sort of ratio or combination of the things that are mixed together, and the soul cannot possibly be either of these.

For, they say, a harmony | 407 b 30 | is a blend and a composition of contraries, and the body consists of a combination of contraries. 98 [1] A harmony, however, is a sort of ratio or combination of the things that are mixed together, and the soul cannot possibly be either of these. [2] Further, a harmony cannot move anything, yet everyone assigns this to the soul as—one might almost say—its chief characteristic.

98 [1] A harmony, however, is a sort of ratio or combination of the things that are mixed together, and the soul cannot possibly be either of these. [2] Further, a harmony cannot move anything, yet everyone assigns this to the soul as—one might almost say—its chief characteristic. It is more in harmony with the facts | 408 a 1 | to speak of harmony in connection with health and bodily virtues as a whole than in connection with the soul.

[2] Further, a harmony cannot move anything, yet everyone assigns this to the soul as—one might almost say—its chief characteristic. It is more in harmony with the facts | 408 a 1 | to speak of harmony in connection with health and bodily virtues as a whole than in connection with the soul. This becomes most evident if we try to assign the affections and functions of the soul to some sort of harmony, since it is difficult to make them “harmonize” with it.

It is more in harmony with the facts | 408 a 1 | to speak of harmony in connection with health and bodily virtues as a whole than in connection with the soul. This becomes most evident if we try to assign the affections and functions of the soul to some sort of harmony, since it is difficult to make them “harmonize” with it. [3] Further, if we speak of | 408 a 5 | harmony, we may have two cases in mind: the strictest one is that of spatial magnitudes in things that have movement and position, where harmony consists in their being positioned together, whenever they so fit together that nothing of the same kind (genos) can intervene.

99 Derivatively, we may have in mind the ratio of the things that are mixed together. Neither of the two, though, makes the doctrine reasonable. And if the harmony is the composition of the parts of the body, it makes it very easy to criticize. | 408 a 10 | For the compositions of the parts are many and various.

Neither of the two, though, makes the doctrine reasonable. And if the harmony is the composition of the parts of the body, it makes it very easy to criticize. | 408 a 10 | For the compositions of the parts are many and various. Of what, then, and in what way should we suppose the understanding to be a composition? Or the perceptual part or the desiring part? It is similarly absurd, however, for the soul to be the ratio of the mixture.

Or the perceptual part or the desiring part? It is similarly absurd, however, for the soul to be the ratio of the mixture. For the mixture of the elements is not in the same ratio in flesh as in bone. | 408 a 15 | It will follow, then, that there are many souls and that they are found throughout the whole body, if indeed all [its parts] result from mixtures of the elements, and the ratio in the mixture is a harmony—that is, a soul. (We might ask the same question of Empedocles, since he says that each of the parts exists by virtue of some ratio.

It is similarly absurd, however, for the soul to be the ratio of the mixture. For the mixture of the elements is not in the same ratio in flesh as in bone. | 408 a 15 | It will follow, then, that there are many souls and that they are found throughout the whole body, if indeed all [its parts] result from mixtures of the elements, and the ratio in the mixture is a harmony—that is, a soul. (We might ask the same question of Empedocles, since he says that each of the parts exists by virtue of some ratio.

Key Concepts

• There is also another doctrine handed down about the soul, which many find no less plausible than those we have mentioned, and which has given an account of itself under examination even in the common accounts.
• For, they say, a harmony | 407 b 30 | is a blend and a composition of contraries, and the body consists of a combination of contraries.
• A harmony, however, is a sort of ratio or combination of the things that are mixed together, and the soul cannot possibly be either of these.
• Further, a harmony cannot move anything, yet everyone assigns this to the soul as—one might almost say—its chief characteristic.
• It is more in harmony with the facts | 408 a 1 | to speak of harmony in connection with health and bodily virtues as a whole than in connection with the soul.
• This becomes most evident if we try to assign the affections and functions of the soul to some sort of harmony, since it is difficult to make them “harmonize” with it.
• Neither of the two, though, makes the doctrine reasonable.
• For the compositions of the parts are many and various. Of what, then, and in what way should we suppose the understanding to be a composition? Or the perceptual part or the desiring part?
• It is similarly absurd, however, for the soul to be the ratio of the mixture. For the mixture of the elements is not in the same ratio in flesh as in bone.
• It will follow, then, that there are many souls and that they are found throughout the whole body, if indeed all [its parts] result from mixtures of the elements, and the ratio in the mixture is a harmony—that is, a soul.

Context

Beginning and middle of I.4 (407b30–408a25), where Aristotle takes up the popular 'harmony' theory of soul (associated with Plato’s Phaedo tradition and Empedoclean ratio-talk) and subjects it to detailed criticism on causal and structural grounds.