Key Arguments

• He introduces the view: 'It remains, though, to investigate what it means to say that the soul is composed of the elements. For they say this in order that it may perceive the beings and know each of them. But many impossibilities necessarily follow for this account.'
• On the like‑by‑like assumption, if the soul is the elements, it would at best know the elements; but there are 'many other things, or perhaps rather an unlimited number, composed of them', such as 'god, human, flesh, or bone', which are not just elements but specific ratios and combinations.
• He stresses that compounds like bone are defined not by bare elements but by a 'certain ratio and combination', citing Empedocles’ verse on bone to show that what makes bone bone is a determinate mixture ('two parts of glittering water... and four of fire; and so white bones were formed').
• Having the bare elements in the soul is useless 'if the ratios and the combination will not also be present', because otherwise there is 'nothing to know bone or human', forcing the absurd hypothesis that such compounds themselves are literally present in the soul.
• He generalizes across categories: 'things are said to be in many ways… this something… quantity, quality, or some other of the categories', and asks whether the soul is composed of all, only substance-elements, or special elements of each genos, showing that none of these options can coherently explain how the soul knows items in all the categories.
• He argues that 'it is impossible from the elements of quantity to compose a substance and not a quantity', so making the soul out of elements of different categories would wrongly generate a soul that is itself quantity, quality, and substance.
• He raises a universality problem: if everything is 'either an element or composed of one element, or of several, or of all', then on this account it is 'necessary for one, or some, or all of them to have knowledge', making it inexplicable why not every being has a soul.
• He insists that elements are 'like matter', and that some 'most controlling factor' must hold them together; positing such a superior ruler over the soul is unacceptable, especially 'in the case of the understanding', which ought to be 'by nature the most primordial thing and a ruler', not ruled by elements.
• He concludes later that 'it is evident, then, from what has been said that knowledge does not belong to the soul because it is composed of the elements', explicitly rejecting the like‑by‑like elemental composition as the basis of cognition.

Source Quotes

We have pretty much gone through the puzzles and inconsistencies that these involve. It remains, though, to investigate what it means to say that the soul is composed of the elements. For they say this in order that it may perceive the beings and know each of them. But many impossibilities necessarily follow | 409 b 25 | for this account. For they posit that knowing is of like by like, as if positing that the soul is the things [it knows].

For they posit that knowing is of like by like, as if positing that the soul is the things [it knows]. But there are not only these [elements] but also many other things, or perhaps rather an unlimited number, composed of them. Granted, then, that the soul knows and perceives {17} the things from which each of these is composed, | 409 b 30 | with what will it know or perceive a compound—for example, what god, human, flesh, or bone is?

But there are not only these [elements] but also many other things, or perhaps rather an unlimited number, composed of them. Granted, then, that the soul knows and perceives {17} the things from which each of these is composed, | 409 b 30 | with what will it know or perceive a compound—for example, what god, human, flesh, or bone is? And similarly for any other composite thing.

And similarly for any other composite thing. For it is not in any state whatsoever that the | 410 a 1 | elements are each of these but rather in a certain ratio and combination, as Empedocles says of bone: The pleasant Earth in its well-wrought melting pots got two parts of glittering water, out of its eight parts, | 410 a 5 | and four of fire; and so white bones were formed. 119 Hence there is no benefit in the elements being in the soul, if the ratios and the combination will not also be present.

For it is not in any state whatsoever that the | 410 a 1 | elements are each of these but rather in a certain ratio and combination, as Empedocles says of bone: The pleasant Earth in its well-wrought melting pots got two parts of glittering water, out of its eight parts, | 410 a 5 | and four of fire; and so white bones were formed. 119 Hence there is no benefit in the elements being in the soul, if the ratios and the combination will not also be present. For each [element] will know its like, but there will be nothing to know bone or human, if these will not also be present.

119 Hence there is no benefit in the elements being in the soul, if the ratios and the combination will not also be present. For each [element] will know its like, but there will be nothing to know bone or human, if these will not also be present. But that this is impossible there is no need to say.

Likewise with the good and the not good, and in the same way other things. 120 Further, things are said to be in many ways, since on the one hand it signifies the this something and on the other, quantity, quality, or some other of the categories that have been distinguished. 121 Will the soul be composed of | 410 a 15 | all these or not?

A consequence for Empedocles at any {18} rate is that the god will be the least wise thing of all, since he alone | 410 b 5 | will not know one of the elements, namely, strife, whereas mortals will know everything, for each is composed of all the elements. 125 In general too what is the cause due to which not every being has a soul, since every one is either an element or composed of one element, or of several, or of all? For it is necessary for one, or some, or all of them to have knowledge.

We may also raise a puzzle, though, as to what | 410 b 10 | it is that makes these one [soul]. For the elements seem to be like matter; the most controlling factor, whatever it is, seems to be what holds them together. 126 But it is impossible that anything should be stronger than the soul and a ruler of it—and yet more impossible in the case of the understanding.

134 Hence, it is necessary either for the soul to be homoeomerous or for it not to be present in any and every part of the universe. It is evident, then, from what has been said that knowledge does not belong to the soul because it is composed of the elements, | 411 a 25 | and that it is not correctly or truly said, either, that it is in movement. Since, however, knowing belongs to the soul, as well as perceiving and also believing, and furthermore having an appetite for things, wishing, and desires as a whole, and since movement with respect to place comes about in animals by virtue of the soul, as, furthermore, do growth, prime of life, and withering, we must ask whether each of these belongs to every part of the soul—that is, is it with the whole | 411 a 30 | soul that we understand and also | 411 b 1 | perceive and are moved, and, in the case of each of the others, are affected or do things, or distinct ones with distinct parts?

122 It will then be quantity, quality, and substance. But it is impossible from | 410 a 20 | the elements of quantity to compose a substance and not a quantity. For those, then, who say that the soul is composed of all the elements, these, and others like them, are the difficulties that follow.

Key Concepts

• It remains, though, to investigate what it means to say that the soul is composed of the elements. For they say this in order that it may perceive the beings and know each of them. But many impossibilities necessarily follow
• there are not only these [elements] but also many other things, or perhaps rather an unlimited number, composed of them.
• with what will it know or perceive a compound—for example, what god, human, flesh, or bone is?
• For it is not in any state whatsoever that the | 410 a 1 | elements are each of these but rather in a certain ratio and combination, as Empedocles says of bone: The pleasant Earth in its well-wrought melting pots got two parts of glittering water, out of its eight parts, | 410 a 5 | and four of fire; and so white bones were formed.
• Hence there is no benefit in the elements being in the soul, if the ratios and the combination will not also be present.
• For each [element] will know its like, but there will be nothing to know bone or human, if these will not also be present.
• Further, things are said to be in many ways, since on the one hand it signifies the this something and on the other, quantity, quality, or some other of the categories that have been distinguished.
• In general too what is the cause due to which not every being has a soul, since every one is either an element or composed of one element, or of several, or of all?
• For the elements seem to be like matter; the most controlling factor, whatever it is, seems to be what holds them together.
• it is evident, then, from what has been said that knowledge does not belong to the soul because it is composed of the elements
• But it is impossible from | 410 a 20 | the elements of quantity to compose a substance and not a quantity.

Context

Main middle section of I.5 (409b20–410b15, 411a25), in which Aristotle systematically examines and criticizes the view (associated with Empedocles and others) that the soul’s cognition is explained by its being a compound of all the elements, so that like is known by like.