Key Arguments

• He says that anyone who will investigate the parts of soul 'must grasp what each of them is' and therefore 'we must further say first what understanding is and what perceiving is', indicating that the activity (understanding, perceiving) is prior in account to the corresponding capacity of soul.
• He explicitly lays down the priority: 'For activities and actions are prior in account to capacities.'
• He adds a further layer of priority: 'if prior to them we must get a theoretical grasp on the corresponding objects, then we must, due to same cause, make some determinations about these—for example, about nourishment and perceptible and intelligible objects', making clear that the objects of activities must be grasped before the capacities can be defined.
• He draws the methodological conclusion for the present inquiry: 'And so we must first speak about nourishment and generation. For the nutritive soul belongs to the others as well [as to plants], and it is the first and most common capacity of soul.'

Source Quotes

II 4 Anyone who is going to make an investigation into these parts must grasp what each of them is, and thus must inquire about the things that follow, | 415 a 15 | and about the others. 184 But if we have to say what each of {27} them is—for example, what the understanding part is, or the perceptual, or the nutritive, we must further say first what understanding is and what perceiving is.

II 4 Anyone who is going to make an investigation into these parts must grasp what each of them is, and thus must inquire about the things that follow, | 415 a 15 | and about the others. 184 But if we have to say what each of {27} them is—for example, what the understanding part is, or the perceptual, or the nutritive, we must further say first what understanding is and what perceiving is. For activities and actions are prior in account to capacities. 185 And if that is so, and further, if prior to them we must get a theoretical grasp on the corresponding objects, | 415 a 20 | then we must, due to same cause, make some determinations about these—for example, about nourishment and perceptible and intelligible objects.

For activities and actions are prior in account to capacities. 185 And if that is so, and further, if prior to them we must get a theoretical grasp on the corresponding objects, | 415 a 20 | then we must, due to same cause, make some determinations about these—for example, about nourishment and perceptible and intelligible objects. And so we must first speak about nourishment and generation.

185 And if that is so, and further, if prior to them we must get a theoretical grasp on the corresponding objects, | 415 a 20 | then we must, due to same cause, make some determinations about these—for example, about nourishment and perceptible and intelligible objects. And so we must first speak about nourishment and generation. For the nutritive soul belongs to the others as well [as to plants], and it is the first and most common capacity of soul, in virtue of which life belongs to every one. Its | 415 a 25 | functions are generation and the making use of nourishment.

Key Concepts

• Anyone who is going to make an investigation into these parts must grasp what each of them is, and thus must inquire about the things that follow, | 415 a 15 | and about the others.
• we must further say first what understanding is and what perceiving is. For activities and actions are prior in account to capacities.
• And if that is so, and further, if prior to them we must get a theoretical grasp on the corresponding objects, | 415 a 20 | then we must, due to same cause, make some determinations about these—for example, about nourishment and perceptible and intelligible objects.
• And so we must first speak about nourishment and generation. For the nutritive soul belongs to the others as well [as to plants], and it is the first and most common capacity of soul, in virtue of which life belongs to every one.

Context

Opening of II.4 (415a15–25), where Aristotle sets out a methodological order for studying the parts of soul, insisting on the explanatory priority of activities and their objects over capacities, and deciding to begin with nourishment and generation as belonging to the basic nutritive soul.