Key Arguments

• Parfit notes that 'Many people would deny even this last claim', i.e., they deny that 'It would merely be morally better if they had such a child', pushing beyond the weaker view that there is a non‑obligatory moral reason.
• He characterizes their position: 'These people believe that, while it would be wrong to have the Wretched Child, my couple have no moral reason to have the Happy Child', which asserts a complete absence of moral reason on the procreation side in the good case.
• He reports that 'This view has been called the Asymmetry', labelling the doctrine that combines a strong duty against creating very badly off lives with a total absence of moral reason to create additional happy lives.

Source Quotes

It would merely be morally better if they had such a child. Many people would deny even this last claim. These people believe that, while it would be wrong to have the Wretched Child, my couple have no moral reason to have the Happy Child.25 This view has been called the Asymmetry.26

Many people would deny even this last claim. These people believe that, while it would be wrong to have the Wretched Child, my couple have no moral reason to have the Happy Child.25 This view has been called the Asymmetry.26

Key Concepts

• Many people would deny even this last claim.
• These people believe that, while it would be wrong to have the Wretched Child, my couple have no moral reason to have the Happy Child.25
• This view has been called the Asymmetry.26

Context

End of the quoted passage from Section 132, where Parfit identifies and names the 'Asymmetry' as a widely held view: an alleged normative asymmetry between our reasons not to bring into existence very badly off people and our reasons to bring into existence additional well‑off people.