Key Arguments

• Parfit shifts the focus from specifically moral reasons to 'all kinds of reasons for acting' to pursue the question of objectivity: 'The question of objectivity can best be pursued if we consider, not just moral reasons, but all kinds of reasons for acting.'
• He notes there are some claims about reasons that are universally accepted: 'There are some claims which all of us accept.'
• He gives a paradigmatic case: 'Suppose that, unless I move, I shall be killed by a falling rock, and that what I most want is to survive. Do I have a reason to move? It is undeniable that I do.'
• He emphasizes the cross‑cultural, timeless acceptance of this claim to support its objectivity: 'This claim would have been accepted in all civilizations, at all times. This claim is true.'
• From this he infers that there are true claims about reasons for acting: 'Since there are some true claims about reasons for acting, we can deny what some sceptics claim.'
• He targets a familiar sceptical metaphysical objection that objective values are 'queer' entities: 'It is sometimes claimed that, unlike rocks or stars, there cannot be objective moral values. Such entities cannot exist. They are too queer to be part of “the fabric of the Universe”.'
• He counters that in the rock case there plainly is a reason, whether or not it is moral: 'But, in the case just described, I do have a reason to move. This may not be a moral reason. But, since there is this reason, there can be reasons.'
• He concludes that reasons for acting 'exist' in the only relevant sense, undermining the claim that such entities are metaphysically impossible: 'Reasons for acting can, in the only relevant sense, “exist”.'
• Given that reasons exist, he says the remaining issue is whether some of them are moral reasons, leaving that as an open, not settled, question: 'Since there are some reasons for acting, it is an open question whether some of these are moral reasons.'

Source Quotes

Many people are Moral Sceptics, but are not sceptics about rationality. The question of objectivity can best be pursued if we consider, not just moral reasons, but all kinds of reasons for acting. There are some claims which all of us accept.

There are some claims which all of us accept. Suppose that, unless I move, I shall be killed by a falling rock, and that what I most want is to survive. Do I have a reason to move? It is undeniable that I do. This claim would have been accepted in all civilizations, at all times.

It is undeniable that I do. This claim would have been accepted in all civilizations, at all times. This claim is true. Since there are some true claims about reasons for acting, we can deny what some sceptics claim.

This claim is true. Since there are some true claims about reasons for acting, we can deny what some sceptics claim. It is sometimes claimed that, unlike rocks or stars, there cannot be objective moral values.

Since there are some true claims about reasons for acting, we can deny what some sceptics claim. It is sometimes claimed that, unlike rocks or stars, there cannot be objective moral values. Such entities cannot exist. They are too queer to be part of ‘the fabric of the Universe’. But, in the case just described, I do have a reason to move.

They are too queer to be part of ‘the fabric of the Universe’. But, in the case just described, I do have a reason to move. This may not be a moral reason. But, since there is this reason, there can be reasons. Reasons for acting can, in the only relevant sense, ‘exist’.

But, since there is this reason, there can be reasons. Reasons for acting can, in the only relevant sense, ‘exist’. Since there are some reasons for acting, it is an open question whether some of these are moral reasons.2 There is another ground for doubting Moral Scepticism.

Reasons for acting can, in the only relevant sense, ‘exist’. Since there are some reasons for acting, it is an open question whether some of these are moral reasons.2 There is another ground for doubting Moral Scepticism. We should not assume that the objectivity of Ethics must be all-or-nothing.

Key Concepts

• The question of objectivity can best be pursued if we consider, not just moral reasons, but all kinds of reasons for acting.
• Suppose that, unless I move, I shall be killed by a falling rock, and that what I most want is to survive. Do I have a reason to move? It is undeniable that I do.
• This claim would have been accepted in all civilizations, at all times. This claim is true.
• Since there are some true claims about reasons for acting, we can deny what some sceptics claim.
• It is sometimes claimed that, unlike rocks or stars, there cannot be objective moral values. Such entities cannot exist. They are too queer to be part of ‘the fabric of the Universe’.
• But, in the case just described, I do have a reason to move. This may not be a moral reason. But, since there is this reason, there can be reasons.
• Reasons for acting can, in the only relevant sense, ‘exist’.
• Since there are some reasons for acting, it is an open question whether some of these are moral reasons.

Context

First of two anti‑sceptical strategies in Section 153, where Parfit uses an uncontroversial practical example to argue for the existence of objective reasons for action, thereby blocking global value scepticism and leaving open, rather than excluding, the possibility of objective moral reasons.