Key Arguments

• Parfit specifies the structural conditions under which any theory I produces Each‑We Dilemmas: '(a) some theory I is agent-relative, giving to different agents different aims, (b) the achievement of each person’s T-given aims partly depends on what others do, and (c) what each does will not affect what these others do.' He then notes: 'These conditions often hold for Common-Sense Morality.'
• He characterizes Common‑Sense Morality as largely consisting of special obligations to particular others: 'Most of us believe that there are certain people to whom we have special obligations. These are the people to whom we stand in certain relations—such as our children, parents, friends, benefactors, pupils, patients, clients, colleagues, members of our own trade union, those whom we represent, or our fellow-citizens. We believe that we ought to try to save these people from certain kinds of harm, and ought to try to give them certain kinds of benefit. Common-Sense Morality largely consists in such obligations.'
• He emphasizes that these special obligations are given priority over aid to strangers: 'Carrying out these obligations has priority over helping strangers.', and this priority is only limited, not overridden whenever greater good could be done elsewhere.
• By tying these special, relational duties to cases where what each does does not affect what others do (no communication), Parfit shows how each parent, lawyer, or government can rationally prioritize their own dependants according to Common‑Sense Morality, yet if all do so the outcome is worse for everyone’s dependants, thus making the morality directly self‑defeating in its own terms.
• He later generalizes beyond parental duties: 'Similar remarks apply to all similar obligations—such as those to pupils, patients, clients, or constituents. With all such obligations, there are countless many-person versions like my three Parent’s Dilemmas. They are as common, and as varied, as Many-Person Prisoner’s Dilemmas.' This extends the self‑defeating pattern across the core of Common‑Sense Morality.

Source Quotes

36. HOW COMMON-SENSE MORALITY IS DIRECTLY SELF-DEFEATING As I implied in Section 22, the Self-interest Theory is not the only theory that can produce Each-We Dilemmas. Such cases may occur when (a) some theory I is agent-relative, giving to different agents different aims, (b) the achievement of each person’s T-given aims partly depends on what others do, and (c) what each does will not affect what these others do. These conditions often hold for Common-Sense Morality. Most of us believe that there are certain people to whom we have special obligations.

These conditions often hold for Common-Sense Morality. Most of us believe that there are certain people to whom we have special obligations. These are the people to whom we stand in certain relations—such as our children, parents, friends, benefactors, pupils, patients, clients, colleagues, members of our own trade union, those whom we represent, or our fellow-citizens. We believe that we ought to try to save these people from certain kinds of harm, and ought to try to give them certain kinds of benefit. Common-Sense Morality largely consists in such obligations. Carrying out these obligations has priority over helping strangers.

Common-Sense Morality largely consists in such obligations. Carrying out these obligations has priority over helping strangers. This priority is not absolute.

There are many others. Similar remarks apply to all similar obligations—such as those to pupils, patients, clients, or constituents. With all such obligations, there are countless many-person versions like my three Parent’s Dilemmas. They are as common, and as varied, as Many-Person Prisoner’s Dilemmas. As we have just seen, they will often have the same cause.

There are several ways in which, if all governments rather than none give priority to their own citizens, this will be worse for all their citizens. The problem comes from the giving of priority. It makes no difference whether this is given to oneself or others. My examples all involve harms or benefits.

Key Concepts

• the Self-interest Theory is not the only theory that can produce Each-We Dilemmas. Such cases may occur when (a) some theory I is agent-relative, giving to different agents different aims, (b) the achievement of each person’s T-given aims partly depends on what others do, and (c) what each does will not affect what these others do. These conditions often hold for Common-Sense Morality.
• Most of us believe that there are certain people to whom we have special obligations. These are the people to whom we stand in certain relations—such as our children, parents, friends, benefactors, pupils, patients, clients, colleagues, members of our own trade union, those whom we represent, or our fellow-citizens. We believe that we ought to try to save these people from certain kinds of harm, and ought to try to give them certain kinds of benefit. Common-Sense Morality largely consists in such obligations.
• Carrying out these obligations has priority over helping strangers.
• Similar remarks apply to all similar obligations—such as those to pupils, patients, clients, or constituents. With all such obligations, there are countless many-person versions like my three Parent’s Dilemmas. They are as common, and as varied, as Many-Person Prisoner’s Dilemmas.
• The problem comes from the giving of priority. It makes no difference whether this is given to oneself or others.

Context

Opening and closing parts of Section 36, where Parfit extends his earlier discussion of Each‑We Dilemmas to Common‑Sense Morality by noting its agent‑relative special obligations and showing that when everyone acts on these, we often get structurally the same collective self‑defeating patterns as in Prisoner’s Dilemmas.