Consequentialism evaluates not only acts but any features that can affect outcomes—including motives—and holds that the best possible motives are those such that, if we had them, the outcome would be best; therefore, by (C2) and (C3), we ought to try to give ourselves and others such motives and to change anything else in ways that improve outcomes.

By Derek Parfit, from Les raisons et les personnes

Key Arguments

  • Parfit says that 'Consequentialism covers, not just acts and outcomes, but also desires, dispositions, beliefs, emotions, the colour of our eyes, the climate, and everything else. More exactly, C covers anything that could make outcomes better or worse.'
  • He formulates (C5): 'The best possible motives are those of which it is true that, if we have them, the outcome will be best.'
  • He clarifies 'possible' as 'causally possible' and notes that there can be 'many different sets of motives that would be in this sense best', i.e. no other possible set would lead to a better outcome.
  • He notes, 'I have described some of the ways in which we can change our motives.' On that basis, he applies (C2): 'implies that we ought to try to cause ourselves to have, or to keep, any of the best possible sets of motives.'
  • He generalizes further: 'More generally, we ought to change both ourselves, and anything else, in any way that would make the outcome better. If we believe that we could make such a change, (C3) implies that failing to do so would be wrong.'

Source Quotes

According to (C4), I ought to go West, since the expected number of lives saved would be greater. Consequentialism covers, not just acts and outcomes, but also desires, dispositions, beliefs, emotions, the colour of our eyes, the climate, and everything else. More exactly, C covers anything that could make outcomes better or worse. According to C, the best possible climate is the one that would make outcomes best.
More exactly, C covers anything that could make outcomes better or worse. According to C, the best possible climate is the one that would make outcomes best. I shall again use ‘motives’ to cover both desires and dispositions.
I shall again use ‘motives’ to cover both desires and dispositions. C claims (C5) The best possible motives are those of which it is true that, if we have them, the outcome will be best. As before, ‘possible’ means ‘causally possible’.
I have described some of the ways in which we can change our motives. (C2) implies that we ought to try to cause ourselves to have, or to keep, any of the best possible sets of motives. More generally, we ought to change both ourselves, and anything else, in any way that would make the outcome better.
(C2) implies that we ought to try to cause ourselves to have, or to keep, any of the best possible sets of motives. More generally, we ought to change both ourselves, and anything else, in any way that would make the outcome better. If we believe that we could make such a change, (C3) implies that failing to do so would be wrong.9 To apply C, we must ask what makes outcomes better or worse. The simplest answer is given by Utilitarianism.

Key Concepts

  • Consequentialism covers, not just acts and outcomes, but also desires, dispositions, beliefs, emotions, the colour of our eyes, the climate, and everything else. More exactly, C covers anything that could make outcomes better or worse.
  • According to C, the best possible climate is the one that would make outcomes best.
  • C claims (C5) The best possible motives are those of which it is true that, if we have them, the outcome will be best.
  • (C2) implies that we ought to try to cause ourselves to have, or to keep, any of the best possible sets of motives.
  • More generally, we ought to change both ourselves, and anything else, in any way that would make the outcome better. If we believe that we could make such a change, (C3) implies that failing to do so would be wrong.

Context

Middle of section 10, where Parfit extends C beyond single acts to motives and other features of agents and the world, as a prelude to his later claim that some consequentialist dispositions are indirectly collectively self-defeating.