Key Arguments

• Parfit notes that 'there are degrees of psychological connectedness' and considers cases where 'between some convict now, and himself when he committed some crime, there are only weak psychological connections', whether because of long time intervals or radical transformations (e.g., 'the conversion of a pleasure-seeking Italian youth into St. Francis').
• He observes that some grounds for detention (reform, preventive detention) depend only on the convict’s 'present state, not on his relation to the criminal', and deterrence depends on whether 'potential criminals care about such later selves.'
• Turning specifically to desert, he recalls that Locke thought forgetting one’s crimes removes desert, and Geach’s protest that this is 'morally repugnant', then notes that changes of character and their causes complicate the issue and leave room for varied arguments about desert.
• Parfit then offers his general thesis: 'When some convict is now less closely connected to himself at the time of his crime, he deserves less punishment. If the connections are very weak, he may deserve none. This claim seems plausible.'
• He suggests this may partly explain 'why we have Statutes of Limitations, fixing periods of time after which we cannot be punished for our crimes', and illustrates with a vivid example: a ninety‑year‑old Nobel Peace Prize laureate confessing to seriously injuring a policeman in a drunken brawl at twenty, where 'this man may not now deserve to be punished.'
• He stresses that this is not a case of diminished responsibility via mental illness but a structural point about later‑self desert: 'It does not appeal to mental illness, but instead treats a criminal’s later self as like a sane accomplice.'

Source Quotes

But I have not yet found this argument. Consider next the fact that there are degrees of psychological connectedness. Suppose that, between some convict now, and himself when he committed some crime, there are only weak psychological connections.

Consider next the fact that there are degrees of psychological connectedness. Suppose that, between some convict now, and himself when he committed some crime, there are only weak psychological connections. This will usually be true only when someone is convicted many years after committing his crime.

But it might be true when there is some great discontinuity, such as the conversion of a pleasure-seeking Italian youth into St. Francis. We can imply the weakness of the psychological connections by calling the convict the criminal’s later self. Two grounds for detaining him would be unaffected.

But I shall make one general claim. When some convict is now less closely connected to himself at the time of his crime, he deserves less punishment. If the connections are very weak, he may deserve none. This claim seems plausible. It may give one of the reasons why we have Statutes of Limitations, fixing periods of time after which we cannot be punished for our crimes.

This claim seems plausible. It may give one of the reasons why we have Statutes of Limitations, fixing periods of time after which we cannot be punished for our crimes. (Suppose that a man aged ninety, one of the few rightful holders of the Nobel Peace Prize, confesses that it was he who, at the age of twenty, injured a policeman in a drunken brawl.

It may give one of the reasons why we have Statutes of Limitations, fixing periods of time after which we cannot be punished for our crimes. (Suppose that a man aged ninety, one of the few rightful holders of the Nobel Peace Prize, confesses that it was he who, at the age of twenty, injured a policeman in a drunken brawl. Though this was a serious crime, this man may not now deserve to be punished.) This claim should be distinguished from the idea of diminished responsibility. It does not appeal to mental illness, but instead treats a criminal’s later self as like a sane accomplice.

(Suppose that a man aged ninety, one of the few rightful holders of the Nobel Peace Prize, confesses that it was he who, at the age of twenty, injured a policeman in a drunken brawl. Though this was a serious crime, this man may not now deserve to be punished.) This claim should be distinguished from the idea of diminished responsibility. It does not appeal to mental illness, but instead treats a criminal’s later self as like a sane accomplice. Just as someone’s deserts correspond to the degree of his complicity with some criminal, so his deserts now, for some past crime, corrrespond to the degree of psychological connectedness between himself now and himself when committing that crime.

Key Concepts

• Consider next the fact that there are degrees of psychological connectedness.
• Suppose that, between some convict now, and himself when he committed some crime, there are only weak psychological connections.
• We can imply the weakness of the psychological connections by calling the convict the criminal’s later self.
• When some convict is now less closely connected to himself at the time of his crime, he deserves less punishment. If the connections are very weak, he may deserve none. This claim seems plausible.
• It may give one of the reasons why we have Statutes of Limitations, fixing periods of time after which we cannot be punished for our crimes.
• Suppose that a man aged ninety, one of the few rightful holders of the Nobel Peace Prize, confesses that it was he who, at the age of twenty, injured a policeman in a drunken brawl. Though this was a serious crime, this man may not now deserve to be punished.
• This claim should be distinguished from the idea of diminished responsibility. It does not appeal to mental illness, but instead treats a criminal’s later self as like a sane accomplice.

Context

Later in Section 109, after discussing the general question of whether Reductionism is compatible with any desert, Parfit applies the Reductionist emphasis on degrees of psychological connectedness to argue for graded desert and to connect this to legal practices like statutes of limitations and transformations of character over a lifetime.