Key Arguments

• Parfit considers the empirical-psychological claim that if C 'sometimes broke the link between our belief that our act is wrong and our belief that we are bad, we would not in fact continue to regard morality with sufficient seriousness', and that our 'desire to avoid wrongdoing might be undermined if we believed that other desires should often be stronger'; if true, this would make it better that we preserve strong, overriding moral guilt and remorse dispositions.
• He notes that C instructs us to aim at having 'one of the best possible sets of desires and dispositions, in Consequentialist terms', and adds that it 'might make the outcome better if we did not merely have these desires and dispositions, but had corresponding moral emotions and beliefs', i.e. beliefs and emotions that present some acts as intrinsically wrong and always remorse-worthy.
• On some versions of C, theft is intrinsically bad; on others, 'theft is bad only when it makes the outcome worse. Avoiding theft is not part of our ultimate moral aim.' Yet even on the latter versions, it might still be true that 'it would make the outcome better if we were strongly disposed not to steal', and if 'we believed stealing to be intrinsically wrong, and would feel remorse when we do steal.'
• Parfit generalizes that 'Similar claims might be made about many other kinds of act.' If such claims are true across a range of moral domains, then C would direct us to cultivate non-consequentialist moral beliefs and emotions as the best way to promote good outcomes.
• He draws the explicit consequence: 'If these claims were true, C would be self-effacing. It would tell us that we should try to believe, not itself, but some other theory. We should try to believe the theory which is such that, if we believed it, the outcome would be best.'
• Parfit suggests that 'On the claims made above, this theory might not be C. It might be some version of what Sidgwick called Common-Sense Morality', though not as currently held but as an 'improved version', including, for example, far more demanding obligations on the rich; this shows that C could systematically direct us away from believing C and toward believing a suitably outcome-optimizing alternative moral theory.

Source Quotes

17. HOW C MIGHT BE SELF-EFFACING It might be claimed that, if Consequentialism sometimes broke the link between our belief that our act is wrong and our belief that we are bad, we would not in fact continue to regard morality with sufficient seriousness. Similarly, our desire to avoid wrongdoing might be undermined if we believed that other desires should often be stronger.

HOW C MIGHT BE SELF-EFFACING It might be claimed that, if Consequentialism sometimes broke the link between our belief that our act is wrong and our belief that we are bad, we would not in fact continue to regard morality with sufficient seriousness. Similarly, our desire to avoid wrongdoing might be undermined if we believed that other desires should often be stronger. This desire may survive only if we believe that it should always be overriding, and feel remorse when it is not. It might be claimed, on these or other grounds, that it would make the outcome better if we always kept the link between our moral beliefs and our intentions and emotions.

But it is worth considering what they would imply. According to C, each of us should try to have one of the best possible sets of desires and dispositions, in Consequentialist terms. It might make the outcome better if we did not merely have these desires and dispositions, but had corresponding moral emotions and beliefs. Consider, for example, theft.

On some versions of C, it is intrinsically bad if property is stolen. On other versions of C, this is not so. On these versions, theft is bad only when it makes the outcome worse. Avoiding theft is not part of our ultimate moral aim. But it might be true that it would make the outcome better if we were strongly disposed not to steal. And it might make the outcome better if we believed stealing to be intrinsically wrong, and would feel remorse when we do steal. Similar claims might be made about many other kinds of act.

Similar claims might be made about many other kinds of act. If these claims were true, C would be self-effacing. It would tell us that we should try to believe, not itself, but some other theory. We should try to believe the theory which is such that, if we believed it, the outcome would be best. On the claims made above, this theory might not be C.

We should try to believe the theory which is such that, if we believed it, the outcome would be best. On the claims made above, this theory might not be C. It might be some version of what Sidgwick called Common-Sense Morality. If C told us to believe some version of this morality, this would not be Common-Sense Morality as it is now, but an improved version.

If C told us to believe some version of this morality, this would not be Common-Sense Morality as it is now, but an improved version. Common-Sense Morality is not the moral theory belief in which would make the outcome best. Such a theory would, for example, demand much more from the rich. It might make the outcome best if those in the richer nations gave to the poor at least a quarter or even half of their incomes every year. The rich now give, and seem to believe that they are justified in giving, less than one per cent.

Key Concepts

• It might be claimed that, if Consequentialism sometimes broke the link between our belief that our act is wrong and our belief that we are bad, we would not in fact continue to regard morality with sufficient seriousness.
• our desire to avoid wrongdoing might be undermined if we believed that other desires should often be stronger. This desire may survive only if we believe that it should always be overriding, and feel remorse when it is not.
• According to C, each of us should try to have one of the best possible sets of desires and dispositions, in Consequentialist terms. It might make the outcome better if we did not merely have these desires and dispositions, but had corresponding moral emotions and beliefs.
• On other versions of C, this is not so. On these versions, theft is bad only when it makes the outcome worse. Avoiding theft is not part of our ultimate moral aim. But it might be true that it would make the outcome better if we were strongly disposed not to steal. And it might make the outcome better if we believed stealing to be intrinsically wrong, and would feel remorse when we do steal.
• If these claims were true, C would be self-effacing. It would tell us that we should try to believe, not itself, but some other theory. We should try to believe the theory which is such that, if we believed it, the outcome would be best.
• On the claims made above, this theory might not be C. It might be some version of what Sidgwick called Common-Sense Morality.
• Common-Sense Morality is not the moral theory belief in which would make the outcome best. Such a theory would, for example, demand much more from the rich. It might make the outcome best if those in the richer nations gave to the poor at least a quarter or even half of their incomes every year.

Context

Opening paragraphs of section 17 ('HOW C MIGHT BE SELF-EFFACING'), where Parfit entertains the hypothesis that certain psychological facts about moral seriousness, guilt, and dispositions could make it outcome‑best for us to believe a different, more common‑sense moral theory, with intrinsic wrongness beliefs, rather than Consequentialism itself.