Key Arguments

• By definition of the Bad Level, if people’s lives are above this level, 'we cannot honestly claim to believe that it would have been in itself better if they had never existed', so we 'cannot believe that New A is worse than A + because the existence of these extra people is in itself bad.'
• New A is strictly better than A+ for the best-off groups: 'In New A there are twenty billion people, all of whom have a higher quality of life than anyone in A+.'
• Inequality between the two best-off groups present in A+ disappears in New A: 'There is no longer inequality between the two best-off groups.'
• The remaining inequality (between the best-off twenty billion and the many extra, near‑Bad‑Level groups) is 'produced by Mere Addition', and Parfit has previously argued that 'when it is produced in this way, inequality does not make the outcome worse.'
• Because the inequality no longer exists between the best-off groups, and the only remaining inequality is Mere‑Addition inequality that does not worsen outcomes, 'New A is better than A + in egalitarian terms.'
• Parfit claims 'There is no other feature that might be claimed to make New A worse than A +. Since New A is in two ways better than A +, and in no way worse, New A is better than A +.'
• He concedes that someone might deny his inequality claims and regard inequality in New A as worse, but he argues 'it cannot be claimed to be much worse', and even if there is 'one way in which New A is worse than A +, there is the other way in which New A is better: the fact that the best-off people have a higher quality of life.'
• Given these offsetting considerations, he concludes we 'cannot plausibly claim that New A is worse than A +', and that even those who deny it is better 'must at least admit that New A is not worse than A +.'

Source Quotes

In this version of A +, even the worse-off group have an extremely high quality of life. In New A there exist extremely many extra groups of people. Assume that these groups live on planets in other solar systems.

Though these groups all came from the Earth, they cannot now easily communicate. All of the people in these extra groups have lives that are not much above the Bad Level. Their lives are such that we cannot honestly claim to believe that it would have been in itself better if they had never existed.

All of the people in these extra groups have lives that are not much above the Bad Level. Their lives are such that we cannot honestly claim to believe that it would have been in itself better if they had never existed. This follows from my definition of the Bad Level. We therefore cannot believe that New A is worse than A + because the existence of these extra people is in itself bad.

This follows from my definition of the Bad Level. We therefore cannot believe that New A is worse than A + because the existence of these extra people is in itself bad. There is at least one way in which New A is better than A +.

There is at least one way in which New A is better than A +. In New A there are twenty billion people, all of whom have a higher quality of life than anyone in A+. Is the inequality in New A worse than the inequality in A+?

I believe that it is better. There is no longer inequality between the two best-off groups. And the remaining inequality is produced by Mere Addition. As I argued, when it is produced in this way, inequality does not make the outcome worse. Because this inequality does not make the outcome worse, and there is no longer inequality between the best-off groups, New A is better than A + in egalitarian terms.

As I argued, when it is produced in this way, inequality does not make the outcome worse. Because this inequality does not make the outcome worse, and there is no longer inequality between the best-off groups, New A is better than A + in egalitarian terms. There is no other feature that might be claimed to make New A worse than A +.

There is no other feature that might be claimed to make New A worse than A +. Since New A is in two ways better than A +, and in no way worse, New A is better than A +. My claims about inequality might be denied.

When we compare these two features, we cannot plausibly claim that New A is worse than A +. If we deny that New A is better, we must at least admit that New A is not worse than A +.53 Now compare New A with New B. This is like the comparison between A + and B, except for the additional groups who are unaffected.

Key Concepts

• In New A there exist extremely many extra groups of people.
• All of the people in these extra groups have lives that are not much above the Bad Level.
• Their lives are such that we cannot honestly claim to believe that it would have been in itself better if they had never existed. This follows from my definition of the Bad Level.
• We therefore cannot believe that New A is worse than A + because the existence of these extra people is in itself bad.
• In New A there are twenty billion people, all of whom have a higher quality of life than anyone in A+.
• There is no longer inequality between the two best-off groups. And the remaining inequality is produced by Mere Addition. As I argued, when it is produced in this way, inequality does not make the outcome worse.
• Because this inequality does not make the outcome worse, and there is no longer inequality between the best-off groups, New A is better than A + in egalitarian terms.
• Since New A is in two ways better than A +, and in no way worse, New A is better than A +.
• If we deny that New A is better, we must at least admit that New A is not worse than A +.

Context

Early part of Section 148 ('THE SECOND VERSION OF THE PARADOX'), where Parfit constructs the outcome New A and argues, using his Bad Level and Mere Addition machinery plus equality and beneficence considerations, that New A is better than (or at least not worse than) A+.