Key Arguments

• Parfit sums up his critical survey: 'I have discussed six arguments for the Social Discount Rate. None succeeds. The most that they could justify is the use of such a rate as a crude rule of thumb. But this rule would often go astray.'
• He allows that reduced concern for remote effects can sometimes be permissible, but insists the explanation is never mere remoteness: 'It may often be morally permissible to be less concerned about the more remote effects of our social policies. But this would never be because these effects are more remote.'
• Instead, legitimate reasons include probability, distributive facts, and compensation feasibility: 'Rather it would be because they are less likely to occur, or would be effects on people who are better off than us, or because it would be cheaper now to ensure compensation, or it would be for one of the other reasons I have given.'
• He insists that these reasons must be kept distinct: 'All these different reasons need to be stated and judged separately, on their merits. If we bundle them together in a Social Discount Rate, we make ourselves morally blind.'
• He notes that temporal remoteness correlates with many other morally relevant facts: 'Remoteness in time roughly correlates with a whole range of morally important facts. So does remoteness in space. Those to whom we have the greatest obligations, our own family, often live with us in the same building. We often live close to those to whom we have other special obligations, such as our clients, pupils, or patients. Most of our fellow-citizens live closer to us than most aliens.'
• Yet we rightly refuse to adopt a spatial analogue of a Social Discount Rate: 'But no one suggests that, because there are such correlations, we should adopt a Spatial Discount Rate. No one thinks that we would be morally justified if we cared less about the long-range effects of our acts, at some rate of n percent per yard.'
• Parfit concludes that temporal discounting is no more justified than spatial discounting: 'The Temporal Discount Rate is, I believe, as little justified.'

Source Quotes

We should take the same view about the harms that we impose on our remote successors. I have discussed six arguments for the Social Discount Rate. None succeeds. The most that they could justify is the use of such a rate as a crude rule of thumb.

None succeeds. The most that they could justify is the use of such a rate as a crude rule of thumb. But this rule would often go astray. It may often be morally permissible to be less concerned about the more remote effects of our social policies.

But this rule would often go astray. It may often be morally permissible to be less concerned about the more remote effects of our social policies. But this would never be because these effects are more remote. Rather it would be because they are less likely to occur, or would be effects on people who are better off than us, or because it would be cheaper now to ensure compensation, or it would be for one of the other reasons I have given.

But this would never be because these effects are more remote. Rather it would be because they are less likely to occur, or would be effects on people who are better off than us, or because it would be cheaper now to ensure compensation, or it would be for one of the other reasons I have given. All these different reasons need to be stated and judged separately, on their merits.

Rather it would be because they are less likely to occur, or would be effects on people who are better off than us, or because it would be cheaper now to ensure compensation, or it would be for one of the other reasons I have given. All these different reasons need to be stated and judged separately, on their merits. If we bundle them together in a Social Discount Rate, we make ourselves morally blind. Remoteness in time roughly correlates with a whole range of morally important facts.

If we bundle them together in a Social Discount Rate, we make ourselves morally blind. Remoteness in time roughly correlates with a whole range of morally important facts. So does remoteness in space. Those to whom we have the greatest obligations, our own family, often live with us in the same building.

Most of our fellow-citizens live closer to us than most aliens. But no one suggests that, because there are such correlations, we should adopt a Spatial Discount Rate. No one thinks that we would be morally justified if we cared less about the long-range effects of our acts, at some rate of n percent per yard.

But no one suggests that, because there are such correlations, we should adopt a Spatial Discount Rate. No one thinks that we would be morally justified if we cared less about the long-range effects of our acts, at some rate of n percent per yard. The Temporal Discount Rate is, I believe, as little justified.

No one thinks that we would be morally justified if we cared less about the long-range effects of our acts, at some rate of n percent per yard. The Temporal Discount Rate is, I believe, as little justified. When the other arguments do not apply, we ought to be equally concerned about the predictable effects of our acts whether these will occur in one, or a hundred, or a thousand years.

Key Concepts

• I have discussed six arguments for the Social Discount Rate. None succeeds.
• The most that they could justify is the use of such a rate as a crude rule of thumb. But this rule would often go astray.
• It may often be morally permissible to be less concerned about the more remote effects of our social policies. But this would never be because these effects are more remote.
• Rather it would be because they are less likely to occur, or would be effects on people who are better off than us, or because it would be cheaper now to ensure compensation, or it would be for one of the other reasons I have given.
• All these different reasons need to be stated and judged separately, on their merits. If we bundle them together in a Social Discount Rate, we make ourselves morally blind.
• Remoteness in time roughly correlates with a whole range of morally important facts. So does remoteness in space.
• no one suggests that, because there are such correlations, we should adopt a Spatial Discount Rate.
• No one thinks that we would be morally justified if we cared less about the long-range effects of our acts, at some rate of n percent per yard.
• The Temporal Discount Rate is, I believe, as little justified.

Context

General conclusion of Appendix F, where Parfit steps back from the individual arguments for a Social Discount Rate and articulates his overarching objection: temporal discounting bundles heterogeneous considerations into a single parameter, distorting moral judgement.