Key Arguments

• Parfit asks explicitly whether becoming Reductionists would support one of the competing positions about whether 'who' matters, and answers: 'I claim that it would. On the Reductionist View, it is more plausible to compare the question ‘Who?’ to the question ‘When?’, and to describe the moral data in the impersonal way.'
• He invokes Hume’s comparison with nations: 'Most of us believe that the existence of a nation does not involve anything more than the existence of a number of associated people. We do not deny the reality of nations. But we do deny that they are separately, or independently, real.'
• From this Reductionist view about nations he draws a moral lesson: 'If there is nothing more to a nation than its citizens, it is less plausible to regard the nation as itself a primary object of duties, or possessor of rights. It is more plausible to focus upon the citizens, and to regard them less as citizens, more as people. We may therefore, on this view, think a person’s nationality less morally important.'
• He then applies an analogous Reductionism to persons: 'We believe the existence of a person to involve nothing more than the occurrence of interrelated mental and physical events. We do not deny that people exist. And we agree that we are not series of events—that we are not thoughts and actions, but thinkers and agents. But this is true only because we describe our lives by ascribing thoughts and actions to people.'
• Parfit insists that 'we could give a complete description of our lives that was impersonal: that did not claim that persons exist', and denies that 'a person is an entity whose existence is separate from the existence of his brain and body, and the occurrence of his experiences', or that 'a person’s continued existence is a deep further fact' beyond physical and psychological continuity.
• These Reductionist beliefs 'support certain moral claims': 'It becomes more plausible, when thinking morally, to focus less upon the person, the subject of experiences, and instead to focus more upon the experiences themselves.'
• He concludes that on this view 'it becomes more plausible to claim that, just as we are right to ignore whether people come from the same or different nations, we are right to ignore whether experiences come within the same or different lives.'
• This undermines the special moral status of the boundaries between persons that underlies the Principle of Equality, making it more reasonable (relative to Non‑Reductionism) to treat distributions between lives in an impersonal, Utilitarian way.

Source Quotes

There are many different arguments for and against these two positions. I am asking: would becoming Reductionists support one of these positions? I claim that it would.

I am asking: would becoming Reductionists support one of these positions? I claim that it would. On the Reductionist View, it is more plausible to compare the question ‘Who?’ to the question ‘When?’, and to describe the moral data in the impersonal way. This is more plausible than it would be if the Non-Reductionist View was true.

Return to Hume’s comparison. Most of us believe that the existence of a nation does not involve anything more than the existence of a number of associated people. We do not deny the reality of nations.

Most of us believe that the existence of a nation does not involve anything more than the existence of a number of associated people. We do not deny the reality of nations. But we do deny that they are separately, or independently, real. Their existence just involves the existence of their citizens, living together in certain ways, on their territories.

This belief supports certain moral claims. If there is nothing more to a nation than its citizens, it is less plausible to regard the nation as itself a primary object of duties, or possessor of rights. It is more plausible to focus upon the citizens, and to regard them less as citizens, more as people.

On the Reductionist View, we hold similar beliefs. We believe the existence of a person to involve nothing more than the occurrence of interrelated mental and physical events. We do not deny that people exist.

But this is true only because we describe our lives by ascribing thoughts and actions to people. As I have argued, we could give a complete description of our lives that was impersonal: that did not claim that persons exist. We deny that we are not just conceptually distinct from our bodies, actions, and experiences, but also separately real.

We deny that we are not just conceptually distinct from our bodies, actions, and experiences, but also separately real. We deny that a person is an entity whose existence is separate from the existence of his brain and body, and the occurrence of his experiences. And we deny that a person’s continued existence is a deep further fact, that must be all-or-nothing, and that is different from the facts of physical and psychological continuity.

We deny that a person is an entity whose existence is separate from the existence of his brain and body, and the occurrence of his experiences. And we deny that a person’s continued existence is a deep further fact, that must be all-or-nothing, and that is different from the facts of physical and psychological continuity. These beliefs support certain moral claims.

These beliefs support certain moral claims. It becomes more plausible, when thinking morally, to focus less upon the person, the subject of experiences, and instead to focus more upon the experiences themselves. It becomes more plausible to claim that, just as we are right to ignore whether people come from the same or different nations, we are right to ignore whether experiences come within the same or different lives.

It becomes more plausible, when thinking morally, to focus less upon the person, the subject of experiences, and instead to focus more upon the experiences themselves. It becomes more plausible to claim that, just as we are right to ignore whether people come from the same or different nations, we are right to ignore whether experiences come within the same or different lives. Consider the relief of suffering.

Key Concepts

• I am asking: would becoming Reductionists support one of these positions?
• I claim that it would. On the Reductionist View, it is more plausible to compare the question ‘Who?’ to the question ‘When?’, and to describe the moral data in the impersonal way.
• Most of us believe that the existence of a nation does not involve anything more than the existence of a number of associated people.
• We do not deny the reality of nations. But we do deny that they are separately, or independently, real.
• If there is nothing more to a nation than its citizens, it is less plausible to regard the nation as itself a primary object of duties, or possessor of rights.
• We believe the existence of a person to involve nothing more than the occurrence of interrelated mental and physical events.
• we could give a complete description of our lives that was impersonal: that did not claim that persons exist.
• We deny that a person is an entity whose existence is separate from the existence of his brain and body, and the occurrence of his experiences.
• And we deny that a person’s continued existence is a deep further fact, that must be all-or-nothing, and that is different from the facts of physical and psychological continuity.
• It becomes more plausible, when thinking morally, to focus less upon the person, the subject of experiences, and instead to focus more upon the experiences themselves.
• just as we are right to ignore whether people come from the same or different nations, we are right to ignore whether experiences come within the same or different lives.

Context

Central portion of Section 116, where Parfit explicitly connects his metaphysical Reductionism about persons to an impersonal moral outlook that diminishes the foundational role of 'who' receives benefits and burdens, thereby indirectly supporting a Utilitarian de‑emphasis on equality between individuals.