Parfit acknowledges, following Williams, that the Reductionist claim that survival questions in the … — Derek Parfit

Parfit acknowledges, following Williams, that the Reductionist claim that survival questions in the middle of the Psychological Spectrum are 'empty' seems incredible from the first‑person perspective: most of us are deeply inclined to think that our identity must always be determinate, that in any case of a future sufferer either it is simply me or simply not me, and we cannot make sense of a third alternative such as being 'partly me'.

By Derek Parfit, from Les raisons et les personnes

Key Arguments

He grants the phenomenological force of Williams’s objection: 'As Williams claims, when applied to our own existence, such remarks seem incredible.'
He asks us to imagine facing an operation in a middle case: 'Suppose that I am about to undergo an operation in the middle of this Spectrum. I know that the resulting person will be in agony.'
In such a case, the Reductionist’s 'empty question' verdict feels deeply unsatisfactory: 'If I do not know whether or not I shall be the person in agony, and I do not even know whether I shall still be alive, how can I believe that I do know exactly what will happen? I do not know the answer to the most important questions. It is very hard to believe that these are empty questions.'
Parfit notes a widespread conviction: 'Most of us believe that we are not like heaps, because our identity must be determinate. We believe that, even in such “borderline cases”, the question “Am I about to die?” must have an answer.'
He cites Williams’s insistence on bivalence: 'And, as Williams claims, we believe that the answer must be either, and quite simply, Yes or No. If someone will be alive, and will be suffering agony, this person either will or will not be me. One of these must be true.'
He further remarks that 'we cannot make sense of any third alternative, such as that the person in agony will be partly me.'
He illustrates the difficulty: 'I can imagine being only partly in agony, because I am drifting in and out of consciousness. But if someone will be fully conscious of the agony, this person cannot be partly me.'
Thus, although the Reductionist response is available in theory, Parfit underscores the psychological and intuitive resistance to treating identity in survival questions as indeterminate or merely a matter of description.

Source Quotes

Even without answering the question, we know everything. As Williams claims, when applied to our own existence, such remarks seem incredible. Suppose that I am about to undergo an operation in the middle of this Spectrum.

As Williams claims, when applied to our own existence, such remarks seem incredible. Suppose that I am about to undergo an operation in the middle of this Spectrum. I know that the resulting person will be in agony. If I do not know whether or not I shall be the person in agony, and I do not even know whether I shall still be alive, how can I believe that I do know exactly what will happen?

I know that the resulting person will be in agony. If I do not know whether or not I shall be the person in agony, and I do not even know whether I shall still be alive, how can I believe that I do know exactly what will happen? I do not know the answer to the most important questions.

It is very hard to believe that these are empty questions. Most of us believe that we are not like heaps, because our identity must be determinate. We believe that, even in such ‘borderline cases’, the question ‘Am I about to die?’ must have an answer.

Most of us believe that we are not like heaps, because our identity must be determinate. We believe that, even in such ‘borderline cases’, the question ‘Am I about to die?’ must have an answer. And, as Williams claims, we believe that the answer must be either, and quite simply, Yes or No. If someone will be alive, and will be suffering agony, this person either will or will not be me.

We believe that, even in such ‘borderline cases’, the question ‘Am I about to die?’ must have an answer. And, as Williams claims, we believe that the answer must be either, and quite simply, Yes or No. If someone will be alive, and will be suffering agony, this person either will or will not be me. One of these must be true.

One of these must be true. And we cannot make sense of any third alternative, such as that the person in agony will be partly me. I can imagine being only partly in agony, because I am drifting in and out of consciousness.

I can imagine being only partly in agony, because I am drifting in and out of consciousness. But if someone will be fully conscious of the agony, this person cannot be partly me. The Reductionist View would provide an answer to Williams’s argument.

Key Concepts

As Williams claims, when applied to our own existence, such remarks seem incredible.
Suppose that I am about to undergo an operation in the middle of this Spectrum. I know that the resulting person will be in agony.
If I do not know whether or not I shall be the person in agony, and I do not even know whether I shall still be alive, how can I believe that I do know exactly what will happen?
Most of us believe that we are not like heaps, because our identity must be determinate.
We believe that, even in such ‘borderline cases’, the question ‘Am I about to die?’ must have an answer.
And, as Williams claims, we believe that the answer must be either, and quite simply, Yes or No.
we cannot make sense of any third alternative, such as that the person in agony will be partly me.
But if someone will be fully conscious of the agony, this person cannot be partly me.

Context

Later part of Section 84, after presenting the Reductionist’s 'empty question' reply, Parfit emphasizes, in line with Williams, how strongly our ordinary attitudes about death and future agony rebel against the idea that identity could be indeterminate in such cases.