Key Arguments

• Parfit notes that under the assumption of total self-effacement, 'It is clear that, on our last assumptions, no one ought morally to accept C. If anyone did accept C, it would itself tell him that he ought morally to try to reject C and instead believe some other theory.'
• He agrees with Williams that 'there are two questions. It is one question whether some theory is the one that we ought morally to try to believe. It is another question whether this is the theory that we ought intellectually or in truth-seeking terms to believe—whether this theory is the true or best justified theory.'
• He reminds the reader of an earlier parallel in rationality: 'I claimed earlier that, if a theory about rationality was self-effacing, this would not show that this theory cannot be the true or the best justified theory.' By analogy, moral self-effacement does not automatically undermine truth or justification.
• He asks, 'Can we make a similar claim about moral theories?' and suggests that the answer 'will depend in part on our beliefs about the nature of moral reasoning', thereby opening the door to the idea that, on some meta-ethical views, self-effacement is compatible with moral truth.
• Thus, even if C directs us morally to abandon belief in C, this 'would not show that it cannot be true' or best justified; the normative directive about what to believe and the epistemic property of truth come apart.

Source Quotes

There are two continuing facts that are the effects of our earlier belief in C: our new moral beliefs, and the fact that, because we have these beliefs, the outcome is as good as it can possibly be. Williams rightly claims that, if C was wholly self-effacing, it would not be clear what this shows. We would have to decide whether it showed that C ‘is unacceptable, or merely that no one ought to accept it.’22 It is clear that, on our last assumptions, no one ought morally to accept C. If anyone did accept C, it would itself tell him that he ought morally to try to reject C and instead believe some other theory.

Williams rightly claims that, if C was wholly self-effacing, it would not be clear what this shows. We would have to decide whether it showed that C ‘is unacceptable, or merely that no one ought to accept it.’22 It is clear that, on our last assumptions, no one ought morally to accept C. If anyone did accept C, it would itself tell him that he ought morally to try to reject C and instead believe some other theory. But, as Williams suggests, there are two questions.

If anyone did accept C, it would itself tell him that he ought morally to try to reject C and instead believe some other theory. But, as Williams suggests, there are two questions. It is one question whether some theory is the one that we ought morally to try to believe. It is another question whether this is the theory that we ought intellectually or in truth-seeking terms to believe—whether this theory is the true or best justified theory. I claimed earlier that, if a theory about rationality was self-effacing, this would not show that this theory cannot be the true or the best justified theory.

It is another question whether this is the theory that we ought intellectually or in truth-seeking terms to believe—whether this theory is the true or best justified theory. I claimed earlier that, if a theory about rationality was self-effacing, this would not show that this theory cannot be the true or the best justified theory. Can we make a similar claim about moral theories? Our answer to this question will depend in part on our beliefs about the nature of moral reasoning.

Can we make a similar claim about moral theories? Our answer to this question will depend in part on our beliefs about the nature of moral reasoning. If a moral theory can be quite straightforwardly true, it is clear that, if it is self-effacing, this does not show that it cannot be true.

Key Concepts

• Williams rightly claims that, if C was wholly self-effacing, it would not be clear what this shows. We would have to decide whether it showed that C ‘is unacceptable, or merely that no one ought to accept it.’
• It is clear that, on our last assumptions, no one ought morally to accept C. If anyone did accept C, it would itself tell him that he ought morally to try to reject C and instead believe some other theory.
• But, as Williams suggests, there are two questions. It is one question whether some theory is the one that we ought morally to try to believe. It is another question whether this is the theory that we ought intellectually or in truth-seeking terms to believe—whether this theory is the true or best justified theory.
• I claimed earlier that, if a theory about rationality was self-effacing, this would not show that this theory cannot be the true or the best justified theory. Can we make a similar claim about moral theories?
• Our answer to this question will depend in part on our beliefs about the nature of moral reasoning.

Context

Near the end of section 17, in Parfit’s explicit engagement with Williams’s worry about what self-effacement shows, where Parfit articulates a two-level distinction between moral obligation to believe and epistemic justification/truth and applies his earlier discussion of self-effacing rationality theories to the moral case.