Parfit distinguishes the Self-interest Theory (a theory of rational rationality) from ‘theories about self-interest’ (substantive accounts of what makes a life go best), and claims that there are three plausible such theories: the Hedonistic Theory, the Desire-Fulfilment Theory (including the Success Theory), and the Objective List Theory.
By Derek Parfit, from Les raisons et les personnes
Key Arguments
- He explicitly classifies S as not itself a theory about what benefits a person, but as a higher-level theory about rationality: "Much of this book discusses the Self-interest Theory. As I have said, this is not one of the theories about self-interest. It is a theory about rationality."
- He introduces ‘theories about self-interest’ as answers to the question of what best achieves the self-interest aim: "To apply S, we must ask what would best achieve this aim. Answers to this question I call theories about self-interest."
- He asserts that, as explained more fully in Appendix I, there are three plausible such theories: "As Appendix I explains, there are three plausible theories."
- He lists them in turn: the Hedonistic Theory, the Desire-Fulfilment Theory (with its variant, the Success Theory), and the Objective List Theory, each as a candidate account of what is ‘best for someone’ or ‘good or bad for us’: "On the Hedonistic Theory, what would be best for someone is what would give him most happiness."; "On the Desire-Fulfilment Theory, what would be best for someone is what would best fulfil his desires throughout his life. ... Thus the Success Theory appeals only to a person’s desires about his own life."; "On the Objective List Theory, certain things are good or bad for us, even if we would not want to have the good things or avoid the bad things."
- He remarks that deciding between these self-interest theories would require a separate, major inquiry, and signals that his current book will only discuss some differences without resolving the dispute: "It would take at least a book to decide between the different theories about self-interest. This book discusses some of the differences between these theories, but does not try to decide between them."
Source Quotes
Answers to this question I call theories about self-interest. As Appendix I explains, there are three plausible theories. On the Hedonistic Theory, what would be best for someone is what would give him most happiness.
As Appendix I explains, there are three plausible theories. On the Hedonistic Theory, what would be best for someone is what would give him most happiness. Different versions of this theory make different claims about what happiness involves, and how it should be measured.
Different versions of this theory make different claims about what happiness involves, and how it should be measured. On the Desire-Fulfilment Theory, what would be best for someone is what would best fulfil his desires throughout his life. Here again, there are different versions of this theory.
Here again, there are different versions of this theory. Thus the Success Theory appeals only to a person’s desires about his own life. On the Objective List Theory, certain things are good or bad for us, even if we would not want to have the good things or avoid the bad things.
Thus the Success Theory appeals only to a person’s desires about his own life. On the Objective List Theory, certain things are good or bad for us, even if we would not want to have the good things or avoid the bad things. Here again, there are different versions.
Key Concepts
- As Appendix I explains, there are three plausible theories.
- On the Hedonistic Theory, what would be best for someone is what would give him most happiness.
- On the Desire-Fulfilment Theory, what would be best for someone is what would best fulfil his desires throughout his life.
- Thus the Success Theory appeals only to a person’s desires about his own life.
- On the Objective List Theory, certain things are good or bad for us, even if we would not want to have the good things or avoid the bad things.
Context
Still in section 1, Parfit situates S relative to more specific theories about prudential value, setting up a two-level structure: a rationality claim (S) and competing accounts of self-interest that S presupposes but does not resolve between.