Key Arguments

• Having argued that Depletion is not worse for anyone yet intuitively objectionable, Parfit poses two key questions: '(1) What is the moral reason not to choose Depletion? (2) Does it make a moral difference that this lowering of the quality of life will be worse for no one? Would this effect be worse, having greater moral weight, if it was worse for particular people?'
• He then defines the label: 'Our need to answer (1), and other similar questions, I call the Non-Identity Problem.'
• He explains the source of the problem: 'This problem arises because the identities of people in the further future can be very easily affected.' Policy choices alter who is conceived and when, so we cannot assume the same people will exist regardless of our actions.
• Anticipating dismissal, he notes that 'Some people believe that this problem is a mere quibble. This reaction is unjustified.'
• He concedes that the problem 'arises because of superficial facts about our reproductive system', but insists that 'though it arises in a superficial way, it is a real problem.'
• He underscores that when choosing between such policies, 'it is not true that, in the further future, the same people will exist whatever we choose. It is therefore not true that a choice like Depletion will be against the interests of future people. We cannot dismiss this problem with the pretence that this is true.' This shows why standard ways of objecting—by saying the choice is against the interests of future people—fail and why the problem must be faced.

Source Quotes

This is believed by most of those who consider cases of this kind. If this is what we believe, we should ask two questions: (1) What is the moral reason not to choose Depletion? (2) Does it make a moral difference that this lowering of the quality of life will be worse for no one? Would this effect be worse, having greater moral weight, if it was worse for particular people? Our need to answer (1), and other similar questions, I call the Non-Identity Problem.

Would this effect be worse, having greater moral weight, if it was worse for particular people? Our need to answer (1), and other similar questions, I call the Non-Identity Problem. This problem arises because the identities of people in the further future can be very easily affected.

Our need to answer (1), and other similar questions, I call the Non-Identity Problem. This problem arises because the identities of people in the further future can be very easily affected. Some people believe that this problem is a mere quibble.

This problem arises because the identities of people in the further future can be very easily affected. Some people believe that this problem is a mere quibble. This reaction is unjustified. The problem arises because of superficial facts about our reproductive system.

This reaction is unjustified. The problem arises because of superficial facts about our reproductive system. But, though it arises in a superficial way, it is a real problem. When we are choosing between two social or economic policies, of the kind that I described, it is not true that, in the further future, the same people will exist whatever we choose.

But, though it arises in a superficial way, it is a real problem. When we are choosing between two social or economic policies, of the kind that I described, it is not true that, in the further future, the same people will exist whatever we choose. It is therefore not true that a choice like Depletion will be against the interests of future people.

When we are choosing between two social or economic policies, of the kind that I described, it is not true that, in the further future, the same people will exist whatever we choose. It is therefore not true that a choice like Depletion will be against the interests of future people. We cannot dismiss this problem with the pretence that this is true. We partly answer question (1) if we appeal to Q.

Key Concepts

• We should ask two questions: (1) What is the moral reason not to choose Depletion? (2) Does it make a moral difference that this lowering of the quality of life will be worse for no one? Would this effect be worse, having greater moral weight, if it was worse for particular people?
• Our need to answer (1), and other similar questions, I call the Non-Identity Problem.
• This problem arises because the identities of people in the further future can be very easily affected.
• Some people believe that this problem is a mere quibble. This reaction is unjustified.
• The problem arises because of superficial facts about our reproductive system. But, though it arises in a superficial way, it is a real problem.
• When we are choosing between two social or economic policies, of the kind that I described, it is not true that, in the further future, the same people will exist whatever we choose.
• It is therefore not true that a choice like Depletion will be against the interests of future people. We cannot dismiss this problem with the pretence that this is true.

Context

Later in Section 123, after rejecting the person-affecting thesis, Parfit explicitly names and characterizes the 'Non-Identity Problem' as the challenge of explaining the wrongness (if any) of choices like Depletion, given that such choices are not against the interests of any particular future individuals whose identities are easily affected by our decisions.