Parfit introduces and labels the Moderate Claim: that Relation R does give each of us a reason to be… — Derek Parfit

Parfit introduces and labels the Moderate Claim: that Relation R does give each of us a reason to be specially concerned about his own future; he holds that both the Extreme and the Moderate Claims are defensible and that he knows of no argument showing that we ought to accept the Moderate rather than the Extreme view.

By Derek Parfit, from Les raisons et les personnes

Key Arguments

After describing how a former Non‑Reductionist might retain the Extreme Claim, Parfit asks: 'Could a Non-Reductionist defensibly change his view? Could he claim that Relation R gives us a reason for special concern? I call this the Moderate Claim.'
He immediately states his assessment: 'I believe that, like the Extreme Claim, this claim is defensible. I do not know of an argument to show that, of these two claims, it is the Moderate Claim that we ought to accept.'
This leaves open a genuine normative underdetermination: Reductionism itself does not dictate whether Relation R grounds special self-concern; both positions are, in his view, consistent and supportable.
He thereby frames the remainder of the discussion as a dialectic between Extremists (denying R-based special concern) and Moderates (affirming it).

Source Quotes

And we could defensibly accept this claim even if we have always been Reductionists. Could a Non-Reductionist defensibly change his view? Could he claim that Relation R gives us a reason for special concern? I call this the Moderate Claim. I believe that, like the Extreme Claim, this claim is defensible.

I call this the Moderate Claim. I believe that, like the Extreme Claim, this claim is defensible. I do not know of an argument to show that, of these two claims, it is the Moderate Claim that we ought to accept.

I believe that, like the Extreme Claim, this claim is defensible. I do not know of an argument to show that, of these two claims, it is the Moderate Claim that we ought to accept. It might be said Extremists are wrong to assume that only the deep further fact gives us a reason for special concern.

Key Concepts

Could a Non-Reductionist defensibly change his view? Could he claim that Relation R gives us a reason for special concern? I call this the Moderate Claim.
I believe that, like the Extreme Claim, this claim is defensible.
I do not know of an argument to show that, of these two claims, it is the Moderate Claim that we ought to accept.

Context

Transition point near the end of Section 102, where Parfit moves from defending the coherence of the Extreme Claim under Reductionism to introducing an alternative, the Moderate Claim, and explicitly states that both are, in his view, defensible without a decisive argument between them.