Key Arguments

• He explicitly introduces 'A Reductionist' reply: 'A Reductionist might say: The argument assumes that, in each of these cases, the resulting person either would or would not be me. This is not so. The resulting person would be me in the first few cases. In the last case he would not be me. In many of the intervening cases, neither answer would be true.'
• The Reductionist allows that one can always frame the question: 'I can always ask, “Am I about to die? Will there be some person living who will be me?” But, in the cases in the middle of this Spectrum, there is no answer to this question.'
• He characterizes such survival questions as 'empty': 'Though there is no answer to this question, I could know exactly what will happen. This question is, here, empty.'
• On this view, what can be known is the full psychological continuity/connectedness profile: 'In each of these cases I could know to what degree I would be psychologically connected with the resulting person. And I could know which particular connections would or would not hold. If I knew these facts, I would know everything.'
• Identity talk here is merely descriptive choice, not a further fact: 'I can still ask whether the resulting person would be me, or would merely be someone else who is partly like me. In some cases, these are two different possibilities, one of which must be true. But, in these cases, these are not two different possibilities. They are merely two descriptions of the very same course of events.'
• Parfit notes that these remarks 'are analogous to remarks that we accept when applied to heaps', where 'We know that there are borderline cases' and 'We believe that, in these cases, this is an empty question. Even without answering the question, we know everything.'
• Thus the Reductionist treats identity in the Spectrum exactly like a vague predicate with borderline cases: determinacy is not required; all the real facts concern degrees and patterns of relation, not a further Yes/No identity fact.

Source Quotes

This criterion is one version of the Reductionist View. A Reductionist might say: The argument assumes that, in each of these cases, the resulting person either would or would not be me. This is not so. The resulting person would be me in the first few cases.

This is not so. The resulting person would be me in the first few cases. In the last case he would not be me. In many of the intervening cases, neither answer would be true. I can always ask, ‘Am I about to die?

In many of the intervening cases, neither answer would be true. I can always ask, ‘Am I about to die? Will there be some person living who will be me?’ But, in the cases in the middle of this Spectrum, there is no answer to this question. Though there is no answer to this question, I could know exactly what will happen.

But, in the cases in the middle of this Spectrum, there is no answer to this question. Though there is no answer to this question, I could know exactly what will happen. This question is, here, empty. In each of these cases I could know to what degree I would be psychologically connected with the resulting person.

This question is, here, empty. In each of these cases I could know to what degree I would be psychologically connected with the resulting person. And I could know which particular connections would or would not hold. If I knew these facts, I would know everything. I can still ask whether the resulting person would be me, or would merely be someone else who is partly like me.

But, in these cases, these are not two different possibilities. They are merely two descriptions of the very same course of events. These remarks are analogous to remarks that we accept when applied to heaps.

We know that there are borderline cases, where there is no obvious answer to the question ‘Is this still a heap?’ But we do not believe that, in these cases, there must be an answer, which must be either Yes or No. We believe that, in these cases, this is an empty question. Even without answering the question, we know everything. As Williams claims, when applied to our own existence, such remarks seem incredible.

Key Concepts

• A Reductionist might say: The argument assumes that, in each of these cases, the resulting person either would or would not be me. This is not so.
• The resulting person would be me in the first few cases. In the last case he would not be me. In many of the intervening cases, neither answer would be true.
• I can always ask, ‘Am I about to die? Will there be some person living who will be me?’ But, in the cases in the middle of this Spectrum, there is no answer to this question.
• Though there is no answer to this question, I could know exactly what will happen. This question is, here, empty.
• In each of these cases I could know to what degree I would be psychologically connected with the resulting person. And I could know which particular connections would or would not hold. If I knew these facts, I would know everything.
• they are merely two descriptions of the very same course of events.
• We believe that, in these cases, this is an empty question. Even without answering the question, we know everything.

Context

Central part of Section 84, where Parfit temporarily speaks in the voice of the Reductionist to show how one might answer the Psychological Spectrum without following Williams to the Physical Criterion—by allowing for indeterminate or 'empty' identity questions in borderline cases.