Key Arguments

• Parfit explicitly redescribes the 'interesting way' S can be indirectly self-defeating as the case where 'if someone is never self-denying, this will be worse for him than it would be if he had some other disposition.'
• He emphasizes that even full success in never choosing worse options does not guarantee that one’s life goes best for oneself; it 'may be worse for him that he is never self-denying.'
• He argues that an alternative disposition that sometimes leads to self-denying acts can still be overall better for the person, because 'the costs to him of acting in this way might be less than the benefits of having this other disposition.'
• He claims these structural points can be true 'on all of the different theories about self-interest', so the argument does not depend on a specific prudential theory.

Source Quotes

If this is true, it will be clearer to call me, not self-interested, but never self denying. I shall now redescribe the interesting way in which, for any individual, S may be indirectly self-defeating. This is true when, if someone is never self-denying, this will be worse for him than it would be if he had some other disposition.

I shall now redescribe the interesting way in which, for any individual, S may be indirectly self-defeating. This is true when, if someone is never self-denying, this will be worse for him than it would be if he had some other disposition. Even if someone succeeds in never doing what would be worse for him, it may be worse for him that he is never self-denying.

This is true when, if someone is never self-denying, this will be worse for him than it would be if he had some other disposition. Even if someone succeeds in never doing what would be worse for him, it may be worse for him that he is never self-denying. It might be better for him if he had some other disposition.

It might be better for him if he had some other disposition. He might then sometimes do what would be worse for him. But the costs to him of acting in this way might be less than the benefits of having this other disposition. These claims can be true on all of the different theories about self-interest.

But the costs to him of acting in this way might be less than the benefits of having this other disposition. These claims can be true on all of the different theories about self-interest. Hedonists have long known that happiness, when aimed at, is harder to achieve.

Key Concepts

• I shall now redescribe the interesting way in which, for any individual, S may be indirectly self-defeating.
• This is true when, if someone is never self-denying, this will be worse for him than it would be if he had some other disposition.
• Even if someone succeeds in never doing what would be worse for him, it may be worse for him that he is never self-denying.
• He might then sometimes do what would be worse for him. But the costs to him of acting in this way might be less than the benefits of having this other disposition.
• These claims can be true on all of the different theories about self-interest.

Context

Central reformulation in section 2 of how S can be indirectly self-defeating for an individual, connecting the notion of 'never self-denying' with worse overall achievement of S’s aim.