Key Arguments

• Parfit describes the case: 'The 14- Year-Old Girl. This girl chooses to have a child. Because she is so young, she gives her child a bad start in life. Though this will have bad effects throughout this child’s life, his life will, predictably, be worth living. If this girl had waited for several years, she would have had a different child, to whom she would have given a better start in life.'
• He notes its real‑world importance: 'Since such cases are becoming common, they raise a practical problem.8 They also raise a theoretical problem.'
• He reconstructs our attempted persuasion: 'We replied: ‘This is not entirely your affair. You should think not only of yourself, but also of your child. It will be worse for him if you have him now. If you have him later, you will give him a better start in life.’'
• He highlights the identity fact: 'If she had waited, this particular child would never have existed. And, despite its bad start, his life is worth living.'
• He analyzes first under the 'cannot benefit' view: 'Suppose first that we do not believe that causing to exist can benefit. We should ask, ‘If someone lives a life that is worth living, is this worse for this person than if he had never existed?’ Our answer must be No.'
• Then under the 'can benefit' view: 'Suppose next that we believe that causing to exist can benefit. On this view, this girl’s decision benefits her child. On both views, this girl’s decision was not worse for her child.'
• He stresses the tension: 'When we see this, do we change our mind about this decision? Do we cease to believe that it would have been better if this girl had waited, so that she could give to her first child a better start in life? I continue to have this belief, as do most of those who consider this case. But we cannot defend this belief in the natural way that I suggested. We cannot claim that this girl’s decision was worse for her child.'
• He explicitly names the problem: 'What is the objection to her decision? This question arises because, in the different outcomes, different people would be born. I shall therefore call this the Non-Identity Problem?'

Source Quotes

Since I believe that it is defensible both to claim and to deny that causing to exist can benefit, I shall discuss the implications of both views. Consider The 14- Year-Old Girl. This girl chooses to have a child. Because she is so young, she gives her child a bad start in life. Though this will have bad effects throughout this child’s life, his life will, predictably, be worth living. If this girl had waited for several years, she would have had a different child, to whom she would have given a better start in life.

Though this will have bad effects throughout this child’s life, his life will, predictably, be worth living. If this girl had waited for several years, she would have had a different child, to whom she would have given a better start in life. Since such cases are becoming common, they raise a practical problem.8 They also raise a theoretical problem.

If this girl had waited for several years, she would have had a different child, to whom she would have given a better start in life. Since such cases are becoming common, they raise a practical problem.8 They also raise a theoretical problem. Suppose that we tried to persuade this girl that she ought to wait.

Were we right to claim that her decision was worse for her child? If she had waited, this particular child would never have existed. And, despite its bad start, his life is worth living. Suppose first that we do not believe that causing to exist can benefit.

On this view, this girl’s decision benefits her child. On both views, this girl’s decision was not worse for her child. When we see this, do we change our mind about this decision?

But we cannot defend this belief in the natural way that I suggested. We cannot claim that this girl’s decision was worse for her child. What is the objection to her decision?

What is the objection to her decision? This question arises because, in the different outcomes, different people would be born. I shall therefore call this the Non-Identity Problem? It may be said: In one sense, this girl’s decision was worse for her child.

Key Concepts

• The 14- Year-Old Girl. This girl chooses to have a child. Because she is so young, she gives her child a bad start in life. Though this will have bad effects throughout this child’s life, his life will, predictably, be worth living.
• If this girl had waited for several years, she would have had a different child, to whom she would have given a better start in life.
• Since such cases are becoming common, they raise a practical problem.8 They also raise a theoretical problem.
• If she had waited, this particular child would never have existed. And, despite its bad start, his life is worth living.
• On both views, this girl’s decision was not worse for her child.
• We cannot claim that this girl’s decision was worse for her child.
• This question arises because, in the different outcomes, different people would be born. I shall therefore call this the Non-Identity Problem?

Context

Central narrative of Section 122, where Parfit uses the 14‑Year‑Old Girl to demonstrate how identity‑affecting procreation choices undermine the usual person‑affecting way of criticizing decisions and to introduce the Non‑Identity Problem.