The best argument against the bias towards the near—that mere temporal distance does not affect how painful an experience will be when it occurs—cannot be used by the Self‑interest Theorist, because the same form of argument undermines his own practice of giving lesser weight to others’ pains based solely on who feels them.

By Derek Parfit, from Les raisons et les personnes

Key Arguments

  • Parfit offers what he calls the S‑Theorist’s strongest line of support for temporal neutrality: 'He might say: A mere difference in when something happens is not a difference in its quality. The fact that a pain is further in the future will not make it, when it comes, any the less painful.'
  • Parfit endorses the strength of this: 'This is an excellent argument. It is by far the best objection to the bias towards the near.'
  • However, he immediately notes that 'the S-Theorist cannot use this argument. It is a two-edged sword. The same argument can be used against the Self-interest Theory.'
  • The structural parallel is that 'Just as Proximus takes into account when a pain is felt, the S-Theorist takes into account who will feel it. And a mere difference in who feels a pain is not a difference in its quality. The fact that a pain is someone else’s does not make it any the less painful.'
  • Thus, if the S‑Theorist says timing is rationally irrelevant because it doesn’t alter painfulness, consistency would force him to accept that personal identity is also rationally irrelevant, since 'Nor are differences in personal identity' differences in painfulness; yet S is defined by giving special weight to pains that are his.
  • Therefore, the S‑Theorist cannot appeal to that 'obvious and best argument' without at the same time undercutting his own theory’s central egoistic asymmetry.

Source Quotes

Why should time not be taken into account? He might say: A mere difference in when something happens is not a difference in its quality. The fact that a pain is further in the future will not make it, when it comes, any the less painful. This is an excellent argument.
The fact that a pain is further in the future will not make it, when it comes, any the less painful. This is an excellent argument. It is by far the best objection to the bias towards the near. But the S-Theorist cannot use this argument.
It is by far the best objection to the bias towards the near. But the S-Theorist cannot use this argument. It is a two-edged sword. The same argument can be used against the Self-interest Theory. Just as Proximus takes into account when a pain is felt, the S-Theorist takes into account who will feel it.
The same argument can be used against the Self-interest Theory. Just as Proximus takes into account when a pain is felt, the S-Theorist takes into account who will feel it. And a mere difference in who feels a pain is not a difference in its quality. The fact that a pain is someone else’s does not make it any the less painful. The S-Theorist takes into account (1) how bad pains would be, and (2) who would feel them.
In explaining why time cannot have rational significance, the S-Theorist cannot use the obvious and best argument. He cannot appeal to the fact that a pain is no less painful because it is less near. A pain is no less painful because it is someone else’s. The S-Theorist might say: You misunderstand my argument.

Key Concepts

  • He might say: A mere difference in when something happens is not a difference in its quality. The fact that a pain is further in the future will not make it, when it comes, any the less painful.
  • This is an excellent argument. It is by far the best objection to the bias towards the near.
  • But the S-Theorist cannot use this argument. It is a two-edged sword. The same argument can be used against the Self-interest Theory.
  • Just as Proximus takes into account when a pain is felt, the S-Theorist takes into account who will feel it. And a mere difference in who feels a pain is not a difference in its quality. The fact that a pain is someone else’s does not make it any the less painful.
  • He cannot appeal to the fact that a pain is no less painful because it is less near. A pain is no less painful because it is someone else’s.

Context

Middle of Section 63, where Parfit isolates the most powerful simple argument for temporal neutrality but shows that its structure applies equally against the Self-interest Theory’s person-based partiality, so that an S-theorist cannot consistently employ it against Proximus.