Key Arguments

• Parfit reconstructs Bentham’s principle: 'If we take his claim strictly, it tells us to prefer nearer pleasures just because they are nearer. It commits Bentham to the view that, “although we should be rationally concerned about the future, we should be less concerned about it according as it is more remote—and this quite independently of any doubt which attaches to the more remote”.'
• He notes that Lewis dubs this 'the principle of fractional prudence' and that 'it expresses an attitude which humans do tend to take', though Lewis dismisses it as irrational.
• Parfit names it: 'I call this attitude the bias towards the near.'
• Using Hume, he illustrates how this bias shows up as we approach a decision point: 'on a nearer approach ... a new inclination to the present good springs up, and makes it difficult for me to adhere inflexibly to my first purpose and resolution.'
• Parfit gives concrete examples: changing one’s mind about removing a plaster or about accepting a tedious early career post for later advancement—cases where 'viewed from a distance, something bad seems worth undergoing for the sake of the good that follows. But, when both are closer, the scale tips the other way.'
• He formalises this with a discount‑curve diagram: 'I care less about the further future; and the amount by which I care less is greater in the nearer future. This is shown by the fact that these curves are steepest just before I get these rewards.'
• He restates the behavioural implications: 'If one of two similar events will occur a month later, I now care about it less. My concern will be some proportion of my concern about the other event one month earlier... And the proportionate difference will be greatest when the earlier event is in the immediate future.'
• These properties 'explain why, in my diagram, the two curves cross. When they cross, my preference changes. Judging from March, I prefer the greater reward in June to the lesser reward in May. Judging from the end of April, I prefer the lesser reward in May.'

Source Quotes

But he regards it as so clearly irrational as to be not worth discussing. I call this attitude the bias towards the near. Hume describes one of the ways in which this bias is revealed: ‘In reflecting upon any action which I am to perform a twelvemonth hence, I always resolve to prefer the greater good, whether at that time it will be contiguous or remote ....

But a more accurate description is this. We have a discount rate with respect to time, and we discount the nearer future at a greater rate. This is why we do not ‘adhere’ to our ‘resolutions’. Here are two examples.

But when the time comes I again reverse my decision. In both these cases, viewed from a distance, something bad seems worth undergoing for the sake of the good that follows. But, when both are closer, the scale tips the other way. Another case is shown below.

Another case is shown below. The height of each curve shows how much I care at any time about one of two possible future rewards. I care less about the further future; and the amount by which I care less is greater in the nearer future. This is shown by the fact that these curves are steepest just before I get these rewards.

These claims explain why, in my diagram, the two curves cross. When they cross, my preference changes. Judging from March, I prefer the greater reward in June to the lesser reward in May. Judging from the end of April, I prefer the lesser reward in May.25 Consider next someone with a different kind of discount rate: one that is exponential. Such a person discounts the future at a constant rate of n per cent per month.

Key Concepts

• I call this attitude the bias towards the near.
• We have a discount rate with respect to time, and we discount the nearer future at a greater rate. This is why we do not ‘adhere’ to our ‘resolutions’.
• In both these cases, viewed from a distance, something bad seems worth undergoing for the sake of the good that follows. But, when both are closer, the scale tips the other way.
• The height of each curve shows how much I care at any time about one of two possible future rewards. I care less about the further future; and the amount by which I care less is greater in the nearer future.
• When they cross, my preference changes. Judging from March, I prefer the greater reward in June to the lesser reward in May. Judging from the end of April, I prefer the lesser reward in May.

Context

Early–middle of Section 62, where Parfit characterises the temporal bias he will later compare with self‑bias, using both historical references (Bentham, Hume) and his own examples and diagrams.