Key Arguments

• Parfit grants, for the sake of argument, that 'it is irrational to care less about our further future', but stresses: 'This does not show that we should accept S. We could accept the Critical version of the Present-aim Theory. And CP can claim that we are rationally required to be concerned about our own self-interest, in a temporally neutral way. This claim is not what distinguishes these two theories.'
• He states S’s stronger requirement: 'S requires us to accept a much bolder claim. It is not enough that we have this temporally neutral bias in our own favour. We must always be governed by this bias, whatever the costs to others, and even if we neither have nor want to have this bias.'
• He ties this back to his First Argument: 'According to my First Argument, this claim requires the assumption that this bias is supremely rational. It requires the assumption that it is irrational to care more about anything else, such as morality, or the interests of other people. We should reject this assumption.'
• He holds that, absent further replies beyond the two appeals already discussed, S should be rejected: 'If the S-Theorist has no other reply, we should reject S.'
• He notes that the S‑Theorist’s remaining moves—the Appeal to Later Regrets and the Appeal to Inconsistency—'do not provide replies to my First Argument.'

Source Quotes

This is another objection to S. For the purposes of argument, I assumed that this objection can be met. I assumed that it is irrational to care less about our further future. This does not show that we should accept S. We could accept the Critical version of the Present-aim Theory.

This does not show that we should accept S. We could accept the Critical version of the Present-aim Theory. And CP can claim that we are rationally required to be concerned about our own self-interest, in a temporally neutral way. This claim is not what distinguishes these two theories. S requires us to accept a much bolder claim.

This claim is not what distinguishes these two theories. S requires us to accept a much bolder claim. It is not enough that we have this temporally neutral bias in our own favour. We must always be governed by this bias, whatever the costs to others, and even if we neither have nor want to have this bias. This claim takes us back to the central question.

This claim takes us back to the central question. According to my First Argument, this claim requires the assumption that this bias is supremely rational. It requires the assumption that it is irrational to care more about anything else, such as morality, or the interests of other people.

According to my First Argument, this claim requires the assumption that this bias is supremely rational. It requires the assumption that it is irrational to care more about anything else, such as morality, or the interests of other people. We should reject this assumption. If the S-Theorist has no other reply, we should reject S.

We should reject this assumption. If the S-Theorist has no other reply, we should reject S. The S-Theorist has two other arguments: the Appeal to Later Regrets, and the Appeal to Inconsistency.

If the S-Theorist has no other reply, we should reject S. The S-Theorist has two other arguments: the Appeal to Later Regrets, and the Appeal to Inconsistency. Though these arguments have some intuitive appeal, they do not provide replies to my First Argument. I conclude that we should reject S. As I predicted, the Self-interest Theory cannot survive a combined attack by both its rivals: both the Present-aim Theory and morality.

Key Concepts

• For the purposes of argument, I assumed that this objection can be met. I assumed that it is irrational to care less about our further future. This does not show that we should accept S.
• We could accept the Critical version of the Present-aim Theory. And CP can claim that we are rationally required to be concerned about our own self-interest, in a temporally neutral way. This claim is not what distinguishes these two theories.
• S requires us to accept a much bolder claim. It is not enough that we have this temporally neutral bias in our own favour. We must always be governed by this bias, whatever the costs to others, and even if we neither have nor want to have this bias.
• According to my First Argument, this claim requires the assumption that this bias is supremely rational.
• It requires the assumption that it is irrational to care more about anything else, such as morality, or the interests of other people. We should reject this assumption.
• If the S-Theorist has no other reply, we should reject S.
• The S-Theorist has two other arguments: the Appeal to Later Regrets, and the Appeal to Inconsistency. Though these arguments have some intuitive appeal, they do not provide replies to my First Argument. I conclude that we should reject S.

Context

Later middle part of Section 74, where Parfit sharpens the contrast between S and CP, shows that temporal neutrality about one’s own future is compatible with rejecting S, and reiterates the force of his First Argument against the claim that self‑bias is uniquely rational.