Key Arguments

• Parfit introduces 'a certain hedonist' who 'cares greatly about the quality of his future experiences. With one exception, he cares equally about all the parts of his future. The exception is that he has Future-Tuesday-Indifference.'
• He explains the pattern: 'Throughout every Tuesday he cares in the normal way about what is happening to him. But he never cares about possible pains or pleasures on a future Tuesday. Thus he would choose a painful operation on the following Tuesday rather than a much less painful operation on the following Wednesday.'
• Parfit emphasizes that this choice 'would not be the result of any false beliefs. This man knows that the operation will be much more painful if it is on Tuesday. Nor does he have false beliefs about personal identity. He agrees that it will be just as much him who will be suffering on Tuesday.'
• He further insists 'Nor does he have false beliefs about time. He knows that Tuesday is merely part of a conventional calendar, with an arbitrary name taken from a false religion. Nor has he any other beliefs that might help to justify his indifference to pain on future Tuesdays. This indifference is a bare fact.'
• Summing up, 'When he is planning his future, it is simply true that he always prefers the prospect of great suffering on a Tuesday to the mildest pain on any other day.'
• Parfit’s verdict is categorical: 'This man’s pattern of concern is irrational. Why does he prefer agony on Tuesday to mild pain on any other day? Simply because the agony will be on a Tuesday. This is no reason.'
• He generalizes the criterion: 'If someone must choose between suffering agony on Tuesday or mild pain on Wednesday, the fact that the agony will be on a Tuesday is no reason for preferring it. Preferring the worse of two pains, for no reason, is irrational.'

Source Quotes

Consider next this imaginary case. A certain hedonist cares greatly about the quality of his future experiences. With one exception, he cares equally about all the parts of his future.

With one exception, he cares equally about all the parts of his future. The exception is that he has Future-Tuesday-Indifference. Throughout every Tuesday he cares in the normal way about what is happening to him.

The exception is that he has Future-Tuesday-Indifference. Throughout every Tuesday he cares in the normal way about what is happening to him. But he never cares about possible pains or pleasures on a future Tuesday. Thus he would choose a painful operation on the following Tuesday rather than a much less painful operation on the following Wednesday.

But he never cares about possible pains or pleasures on a future Tuesday. Thus he would choose a painful operation on the following Tuesday rather than a much less painful operation on the following Wednesday. This choice would not be the result of any false beliefs.

Thus he would choose a painful operation on the following Tuesday rather than a much less painful operation on the following Wednesday. This choice would not be the result of any false beliefs. This man knows that the operation will be much more painful if it is on Tuesday.

Nor has he any other beliefs that might help to justify his indifference to pain on future Tuesdays. This indifference is a bare fact. When he is planning his future, it is simply true that he always prefers the prospect of great suffering on a Tuesday to the mildest pain on any other day.

This indifference is a bare fact. When he is planning his future, it is simply true that he always prefers the prospect of great suffering on a Tuesday to the mildest pain on any other day. This man’s pattern of concern is irrational.

When he is planning his future, it is simply true that he always prefers the prospect of great suffering on a Tuesday to the mildest pain on any other day. This man’s pattern of concern is irrational. Why does he prefer agony on Tuesday to mild pain on any other day?

Why does he prefer agony on Tuesday to mild pain on any other day? Simply because the agony will be on a Tuesday. This is no reason. If someone must choose between suffering agony on Tuesday or mild pain on Wednesday, the fact that the agony will be on a Tuesday is no reason for preferring it.

If someone must choose between suffering agony on Tuesday or mild pain on Wednesday, the fact that the agony will be on a Tuesday is no reason for preferring it. Preferring the worse of two pains, for no reason, is irrational. It may be objected that, because this man’s preference is purely imaginary, and so bizarre, we cannot usefully discuss whether it is irrational.

Key Concepts

• A certain hedonist cares greatly about the quality of his future experiences.
• The exception is that he has Future-Tuesday-Indifference.
• Throughout every Tuesday he cares in the normal way about what is happening to him. But he never cares about possible pains or pleasures on a future Tuesday.
• Thus he would choose a painful operation on the following Tuesday rather than a much less painful operation on the following Wednesday.
• This choice would not be the result of any false beliefs.
• This indifference is a bare fact.
• it is simply true that he always prefers the prospect of great suffering on a Tuesday to the mildest pain on any other day.
• This man’s pattern of concern is irrational.
• Simply because the agony will be on a Tuesday. This is no reason.
• Preferring the worse of two pains, for no reason, is irrational.

Context

Toward the end of Section 46, Parfit presents the Future‑Tuesday‑Indifference thought experiment as a paradigmatic case of a desire pattern that is intrinsically irrational by his CP criterion.