Key Arguments

• The S‑Theorist’s objection is: 'You do not now regret your bias towards the near. But you will. When you pay the price—when you suffer the pain that you postponed at the cost of making it worse—you will wish that you did not care more about your nearer future. You will regret that you have this bias. It is irrational to do what you know that you will regret.'
• Parfit responds that this is 'inaccurate': 'When Proximus pays the price, he may regret that in the past he had his bias towards the near. But this does not show that he must regret having this bias now.' The temporal location of the regret (about a past state) does not entail present regret about the current bias.
• He draws an interpersonal analogy: 'A similar claim applies to those who are self-interested. When a self-interested man pays the price imposed on him by the self-interested acts of others, he regrets the fact that these other people are self-interested. He regrets their bias in their own favour. But this does not lead him to regret this bias in himself.' Thus, regret directed at others’ similar bias does not undermine one’s own bias.
• He generalises this structural point: 'Truths about S at the interpersonal level apply to P at the intertemporal level. Just as a self-interested man regrets his bias, not in himself, but only in others, Proximus regrets his bias, not in himself now, but only in himself at other times.' So Proximus need not regret his current bias, even if he regrets having had it at other times.
• Parfit clarifies that his earlier assumption about Proximus’s non‑regret was only about the present: 'When I assumed that Proximus does not regret his bias, it was enough to assume that he does not regret his present bias. This is the bias on which he always acts.'
• Because the S‑Theorist’s argument conflates regretting having had a bias in the past with regretting having it now, it fails to establish that Proximus’s present bias is irrational.

Source Quotes

71. THE APPEAL TO LATER REGRETS The S-Theorist might appeal to a different objection. He might say, to Proximus: You do not now regret your bias towards the near. But you will. When you pay the price—when you suffer the pain that you postponed at the cost of making it worse—you will wish that you did not care more about your nearer future. You will regret that you have this bias. It is irrational to do what you know that you will regret. As stated, this objection is inaccurate.

It is irrational to do what you know that you will regret. As stated, this objection is inaccurate. When Proximus pays the price, he may regret that in the past he had his bias towards the near. But this does not show that he must regret having this bias now. A similar claim applies to those who are self-interested.

But this does not show that he must regret having this bias now. A similar claim applies to those who are self-interested. When a self-interested man pays the price imposed on him by the self-interested acts of others, he regrets the fact that these other people are self-interested. He regrets their bias in their own favour. But this does not lead him to regret this bias in himself. Truths about S at the interpersonal level apply to P at the intertemporal level.

But this does not lead him to regret this bias in himself. Truths about S at the interpersonal level apply to P at the intertemporal level. Just as a self-interested man regrets his bias, not in himself, but only in others, Proximus regrets his bias, not in himself now, but only in himself at other times. When I assumed that Proximus does not regret his bias, it was enough to assume that he does not regret his present bias.

Just as a self-interested man regrets his bias, not in himself, but only in others, Proximus regrets his bias, not in himself now, but only in himself at other times. When I assumed that Proximus does not regret his bias, it was enough to assume that he does not regret his present bias. This is the bias on which he always acts. The objection given above does not show that Proximus must regret this bias.

Key Concepts

• The S-Theorist might appeal to a different objection. He might say, to Proximus: You do not now regret your bias towards the near. But you will. When you pay the price—when you suffer the pain that you postponed at the cost of making it worse—you will wish that you did not care more about your nearer future. You will regret that you have this bias. It is irrational to do what you know that you will regret.
• As stated, this objection is inaccurate. When Proximus pays the price, he may regret that in the past he had his bias towards the near. But this does not show that he must regret having this bias now.
• A similar claim applies to those who are self-interested. When a self-interested man pays the price imposed on him by the self-interested acts of others, he regrets the fact that these other people are self-interested. He regrets their bias in their own favour. But this does not lead him to regret this bias in himself.
• Truths about S at the interpersonal level apply to P at the intertemporal level. Just as a self-interested man regrets his bias, not in himself, but only in others, Proximus regrets his bias, not in himself now, but only in himself at other times.
• When I assumed that Proximus does not regret his bias, it was enough to assume that he does not regret his present bias. This is the bias on which he always acts.

Context

Beginning of Section 71 ('THE APPEAL TO LATER REGRETS'), where Parfit examines and rejects an S‑Theorist’s attempt to show that Proximus’s near‑bias is irrational by appealing to the fact that he will later regret it, using an analogy with interpersonal self‑interest to show the objection misfires.