Key Arguments

• Parfit notes that some hold 'the view that what is bad must be bad for someone' and applies it to Depletion: since the choice is 'not worse for anyone who ever lives,' this view entails that 'there is no objection to our choice. Since it will be bad for no one, our choice cannot have a bad effect.'
• On this person-affecting view, 'The great lowering of the quality of life provides no moral reason not to choose Depletion.'
• He reports that 'Certain writers accept this conclusion', indicating that the implication is not merely hypothetical but actually endorsed in the literature.
• Parfit responds that 'it is very implausible' to deny any moral reason against Depletion, given that it causes 'a great lowering of the quality of life' for many centuries even though no individual is made worse off than they otherwise would have been.
• He states, 'Before we consider cases of this kind, we may accept the view that what is bad must be bad for someone. But the case of Depletion shows, I believe, that we must reject this view.'
• He then affirms what he takes to be the correct verdict: 'The great lowering of the quality of life must provide some moral reason not to choose Depletion. This is believed by most of those who consider cases of this kind.'

Source Quotes

There might be no objection to our choice, or some objection, or the objection may be just as strong. Some believe that what is bad must be bad for someone. On this view, there is no objection to our choice.

Some believe that what is bad must be bad for someone. On this view, there is no objection to our choice. Since it will be bad for no one, our choice cannot have a bad effect. The great lowering of the quality of life provides no moral reason not to choose Depletion.

Since it will be bad for no one, our choice cannot have a bad effect. The great lowering of the quality of life provides no moral reason not to choose Depletion. Certain writers accept this conclusion.11 But it is very implausible.

The great lowering of the quality of life provides no moral reason not to choose Depletion. Certain writers accept this conclusion.11 But it is very implausible. Before we consider cases of this kind, we may accept the view that what is bad must be bad for someone.

Certain writers accept this conclusion.11 But it is very implausible. Before we consider cases of this kind, we may accept the view that what is bad must be bad for someone. But the case of Depletion shows, I believe, that we must reject this view. The great lowering of the quality of life must provide some moral reason not to choose Depletion.

But the case of Depletion shows, I believe, that we must reject this view. The great lowering of the quality of life must provide some moral reason not to choose Depletion. This is believed by most of those who consider cases of this kind. If this is what we believe, we should ask two questions: (1) What is the moral reason not to choose Depletion?

Key Concepts

• Some believe that what is bad must be bad for someone.
• On this view, there is no objection to our choice. Since it will be bad for no one, our choice cannot have a bad effect.
• The great lowering of the quality of life provides no moral reason not to choose Depletion.
• Certain writers accept this conclusion.11 But it is very implausible.
• Before we consider cases of this kind, we may accept the view that what is bad must be bad for someone. But the case of Depletion shows, I believe, that we must reject this view.
• The great lowering of the quality of life must provide some moral reason not to choose Depletion. This is believed by most of those who consider cases of this kind.

Context

Middle of Section 123, after establishing that Depletion is not worse for anyone, Parfit examines and criticizes the person-affecting thesis that 'what is bad must be bad for someone', arguing that its implication of no objection to Depletion is unacceptable and that we must therefore reject the thesis.