Key Arguments

• In Case One, Parfit stipulates that 'It is either true that I did suffer for ten hours, or true that I shall suffer for one hour.' He reports his own clear preference: 'While she is away, it is clear to me which I prefer to be true. If I learn that the first is true, I shall be greatly relieved.'
• He notes that this is due to bias towards the future: 'My bias towards the future makes me relieved here that my pain is in the past.' This bias can mirror the bias towards the near, as both can lead one to prefer worse timing that increases total pain.
• He points out the structural similarity: 'My bias towards the near might, in the same way, make me relieved that some pain has been postponed. In either case, I might prefer some different timing for my ordeal even if, with the different timing, the ordeal would be much worse.'
• He explicitly compares trade‑offs: 'Compared with an hour of pain later today, I might, like Proximus, prefer ten hours of pain next year. Or, as in this example, I might prefer ten hours of pain yesterday.' This highlights willingness to choose ten hours rather than one, solely based on timing.
• Parfit restates the central question: 'Is this second preference irrational? Ought I instead to hope that I am the second patient, whose pain is still to come?' indicating that the case is meant to test rational requirements, not just describe psychology.
• In Case Two, he removes amnesia to show it does not change the verdict: 'Either I suffered for five hours and have no more pain to come, or I suffered for two hours and have another hour of pain to come. I would again prefer the first to be true. I would prefer my life to contain more hours of pain, if that means that none of this pain is still to come.'
• He claims that these preferences are widely shared: 'If we imagine ourselves in my place in these two cases, most of us would have my preference. If we did not know whether we have suffered for several hours, or shall later suffer for one hour, most of us would strongly prefer the first to be true.'
• He underlines their strength by invoking religious imagery: 'If we could make it true, we would undoubtedly do so. If we are religious we might pray that it be true.'
• He even notes a theological possibility where backward‑looking prayers could causally affect the past: 'On some accounts, this is the one conceivable way of affecting the past. God may have made some past event happen only because, at the time, He had foreknowledge of our later backward-looking prayer, and He chose to grant this prayer.' This is used to dramatise how strongly we might wish our pain to be already over.
• Parfit generalises: 'Even if we do not believe that we could in this way, through God’s grace, cause our pain to be in the past, we would strongly prefer it to be in the past, even at the cost of its lasting ten times as long.'
• He asks again: 'Is this preference irrational? Most of us would answer No.' This common‑sense judgement becomes the premise of his argument against the S-theorist’s temporal neutrality claim.
• He then states the upshot for S: 'If he accepts this answer, the S-Theorist must abandon his claim that the question ‘When?’ has no rational significance. He cannot claim that a mere difference in the timing of a pain, or in its relation to the present moment, ‘is not in itself a rational ground for having more or less regard for it’.'
• Parfit clarifies the kind of difference involved: 'Whether a pain is in the past or future is a mere difference in its relation to the present moment.' Thus, if this difference can rationally matter, the S-theorist’s attempted restriction on what counts as a rational ground fails.
• Finally, Parfit drives home the connection to the bias towards the near: 'And, if it is not irrational to care more about pains that are in the future, why is it irrational to care more about pains that are in the nearer future?' This makes it difficult for the S-theorist to accept future‑over‑past partiality while condemning near‑over‑far future partiality as irrational.
• Collectively, these points show that once we recognise the rational permissibility of caring more about future than past suffering, we must concede that temporal location ('when') has rational significance, undermining a central plank of the Self-interest Theory’s attack on temporal biases like Proximus’s.

Source Quotes

I may instead be the patient who is to have a short operation later today. It is either true that I did suffer for ten hours, or true that I shall suffer for one hour. I ask the nurse to find out which is true.

I ask the nurse to find out which is true. While she is away, it is clear to me which I prefer to be true. If I learn that the first is true, I shall be greatly relieved. My bias towards the future makes me relieved here that my pain is in the past.

If I learn that the first is true, I shall be greatly relieved. My bias towards the future makes me relieved here that my pain is in the past. My bias towards the near might, in the same way, make me relieved that some pain has been postponed.

My bias towards the near might, in the same way, make me relieved that some pain has been postponed. In either case, I might prefer some different timing for my ordeal even if, with the different timing, the ordeal would be much worse. Compared with an hour of pain later today, I might, like Proximus, prefer ten hours of pain next year.

In either case, I might prefer some different timing for my ordeal even if, with the different timing, the ordeal would be much worse. Compared with an hour of pain later today, I might, like Proximus, prefer ten hours of pain next year. Or, as in this example, I might prefer ten hours of pain yesterday. Is this second preference irrational?

Or, as in this example, I might prefer ten hours of pain yesterday. Is this second preference irrational? Ought I instead to hope that I am the second patient, whose pain is still to come? Before I discuss this question, I should explain one feature of the case: the induced amnesia.

If I am the second patient, I had two hours of pain yesterday, and I shall have another hour of pain later today.33 In Case Two there is no amnesia; but this makes no difference. Either I suffered for five hours and have no more pain to come, or I suffered for two hours and have another hour of pain to come. I would again prefer the first to be true. I would prefer my life to contain more hours of pain, if that means that none of this pain is still to come. If we imagine ourselves in my place in these two cases, most of us would have my preference.

I would prefer my life to contain more hours of pain, if that means that none of this pain is still to come. If we imagine ourselves in my place in these two cases, most of us would have my preference. If we did not know whether we have suffered for several hours, or shall later suffer for one hour, most of us would strongly prefer the first to be true.

If we imagine ourselves in my place in these two cases, most of us would have my preference. If we did not know whether we have suffered for several hours, or shall later suffer for one hour, most of us would strongly prefer the first to be true. If we could make it true, we would undoubtedly do so.

If we did not know whether we have suffered for several hours, or shall later suffer for one hour, most of us would strongly prefer the first to be true. If we could make it true, we would undoubtedly do so. If we are religious we might pray that it be true. On some accounts, this is the one conceivable way of affecting the past.

God may have made some past event happen only because, at the time, He had foreknowledge of our later backward-looking prayer, and He chose to grant this prayer. Even if we do not believe that we could in this way, through God’s grace, cause our pain to be in the past, we would strongly prefer it to be in the past, even at the cost of its lasting ten times as long. Is this preference irrational?

Even if we do not believe that we could in this way, through God’s grace, cause our pain to be in the past, we would strongly prefer it to be in the past, even at the cost of its lasting ten times as long. Is this preference irrational? Most of us would answer No. If he accepts this answer, the S-Theorist must abandon his claim that the question ‘When?’ has no rational significance. He cannot claim that a mere difference in the timing of a pain, or in its relation to the present moment, ‘is not in itself a rational ground for having more or less regard for it’.34 Whether a pain is in the past or future is a mere difference in its relation to the present moment.

Is this preference irrational? Most of us would answer No. If he accepts this answer, the S-Theorist must abandon his claim that the question ‘When?’ has no rational significance. He cannot claim that a mere difference in the timing of a pain, or in its relation to the present moment, ‘is not in itself a rational ground for having more or less regard for it’.34 Whether a pain is in the past or future is a mere difference in its relation to the present moment.

Most of us would answer No. If he accepts this answer, the S-Theorist must abandon his claim that the question ‘When?’ has no rational significance. He cannot claim that a mere difference in the timing of a pain, or in its relation to the present moment, ‘is not in itself a rational ground for having more or less regard for it’.34 Whether a pain is in the past or future is a mere difference in its relation to the present moment. And, if it is not irrational to care more about pains that are in the future, why is it irrational to care more about pains that are in the nearer future?

He cannot claim that a mere difference in the timing of a pain, or in its relation to the present moment, ‘is not in itself a rational ground for having more or less regard for it’.34 Whether a pain is in the past or future is a mere difference in its relation to the present moment. And, if it is not irrational to care more about pains that are in the future, why is it irrational to care more about pains that are in the nearer future? If the S-Theorist admits

Key Concepts

• It is either true that I did suffer for ten hours, or true that I shall suffer for one hour.
• While she is away, it is clear to me which I prefer to be true. If I learn that the first is true, I shall be greatly relieved.
• My bias towards the future makes me relieved here that my pain is in the past.
• In either case, I might prefer some different timing for my ordeal even if, with the different timing, the ordeal would be much worse.
• Compared with an hour of pain later today, I might, like Proximus, prefer ten hours of pain next year. Or, as in this example, I might prefer ten hours of pain yesterday.
• Is this second preference irrational? Ought I instead to hope that I am the second patient, whose pain is still to come?
• Either I suffered for five hours and have no more pain to come, or I suffered for two hours and have another hour of pain to come. I would again prefer the first to be true. I would prefer my life to contain more hours of pain, if that means that none of this pain is still to come.
• If we imagine ourselves in my place in these two cases, most of us would have my preference.
• If we did not know whether we have suffered for several hours, or shall later suffer for one hour, most of us would strongly prefer the first to be true.
• If we could make it true, we would undoubtedly do so. If we are religious we might pray that it be true.
• Even if we do not believe that we could in this way, through God’s grace, cause our pain to be in the past, we would strongly prefer it to be in the past, even at the cost of its lasting ten times as long.
• Is this preference irrational? Most of us would answer No.
• If he accepts this answer, the S-Theorist must abandon his claim that the question ‘When?’ has no rational significance.
• He cannot claim that a mere difference in the timing of a pain, or in its relation to the present moment, ‘is not in itself a rational ground for having more or less regard for it’.
• Whether a pain is in the past or future is a mere difference in its relation to the present moment.
• And, if it is not irrational to care more about pains that are in the future, why is it irrational to care more about pains that are in the nearer future?

Context

Rest of Section 64, where Parfit develops 'My Past or Future Operations' Case One (with induced amnesia) and Case Two (without amnesia) to elicit and defend the intuitive preference for more past pain over less future pain, and then uses this to argue that temporal location, especially the past–future distinction, can be a rational ground for differential concern, thereby weakening the Self-interest Theorist’s claim that 'when' is normatively irrelevant and destabilising his rejection of the bias towards the near.