We need a new theory of beneficence that simultaneously solves the Non-Identity Problem, avoids both the Repugnant and Absurd Conclusions, and resolves the Mere Addition Paradox.

By Derek Parfit, from Les raisons et les personnes

Key Arguments

  • Parfit claims that his arguments in Part Four show that existing theories are inadequate: 'As I argued, we need a new theory about beneficence.'
  • He specifies four simultaneous constraints any adequate theory must meet: it 'must solve the Non-Identity Problem, avoid the Repugnant and Absurd Conclusions, and solve the Mere Addition Paradox.'
  • By listing these together at the end of the book, Parfit treats them as jointly non‑negotiable adequacy conditions on a satisfactory moral theory concerning beneficence and population ethics.

Source Quotes

This could have been the last word of my Part Four. As I argued, we need a new theory about beneficence. This must solve the Non-Identity Problem, avoid the Repugnant and Absurd Conclusions, and solve the Mere Addition Paradox.
As I argued, we need a new theory about beneficence. This must solve the Non-Identity Problem, avoid the Repugnant and Absurd Conclusions, and solve the Mere Addition Paradox. I failed to find a theory that can meet these four requirements.

Key Concepts

  • As I argued, we need a new theory about beneficence.
  • This must solve the Non-Identity Problem, avoid the Repugnant and Absurd Conclusions, and solve the Mere Addition Paradox.

Context

Concluding Chapter, where Parfit summarizes the upshot of Part Four and states the combined theoretical demands any satisfactory theory of beneficence must satisfy.