Key Arguments

• Parfit notes that 'when this argument is advanced by believers in Common-Sense Morality, it back-fires. It does not refute S, but it does refute part of their own theory.'
• He points out the structural similarity: 'Like S, Common-Sense Morality is often directly collectively self-defeating.'
• He then marks a crucial difference: 'Unlike S, a moral theory must be collectively successful.' Since morality is meant as a collective code, direct collective self‑defeat is unacceptable for M in a way it is not for S.
• From this, he infers that 'These M-believers must therefore revise their beliefs, moving from M to R.'
• He specifies what the revised theory must contain: 'Their Ideal Act Theory should include (Rl), and their Practical Act Theory should include (R2) and (R3).'
• He emphasizes that 'Unlike M, R is Consequentialist, giving to all of us common moral aims.', i.e., it is agent‑neutral in the relevant domain.
• Because 'Chapter 4 shows that M-believers must move to R', the distance between M and C is correspondingly reduced: the corrected version of Common‑Sense Morality is now a kind of consequentialism.

Source Quotes

Since S is a theory of individual rationality, it need not be successful at the collective level. When this argument is advanced by believers in Common-Sense Morality, it back-fires. It does not refute S, but it does refute part of their own theory. Like S, Common-Sense Morality is often directly collectively self-defeating.

It does not refute S, but it does refute part of their own theory. Like S, Common-Sense Morality is often directly collectively self-defeating. Unlike S, a moral theory must be collectively successful. These M-believers must therefore revise their beliefs, moving from M to R.

Unlike S, a moral theory must be collectively successful. These M-believers must therefore revise their beliefs, moving from M to R. Their Ideal Act Theory should include (Rl), and their Practical Act Theory should include (R2) and (R3).

These M-believers must therefore revise their beliefs, moving from M to R. Their Ideal Act Theory should include (Rl), and their Practical Act Theory should include (R2) and (R3). Unlike M, R is Consequentialist, giving to all of us common moral aims. Since Chapter 4 shows that M-believers must move to R, this reduces the disagreement between Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism.

Unlike M, R is Consequentialist, giving to all of us common moral aims. Since Chapter 4 shows that M-believers must move to R, this reduces the disagreement between Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism. Chapter 1 also reduces this disagreement.

Key Concepts

• When this argument is advanced by believers in Common-Sense Morality, it back-fires. It does not refute S, but it does refute part of their own theory.
• Like S, Common-Sense Morality is often directly collectively self-defeating. Unlike S, a moral theory must be collectively successful.
• These M-believers must therefore revise their beliefs, moving from M to R.
• Their Ideal Act Theory should include (Rl), and their Practical Act Theory should include (R2) and (R3). Unlike M, R is Consequentialist, giving to all of us common moral aims.
• Since Chapter 4 shows that M-believers must move to R, this reduces the disagreement between Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism.

Context

Same paragraph in Section 41, where Parfit applies his earlier analysis of collective self‑defeat to show that, dialectically, adherents of Common‑Sense Morality are pushed toward his consequentialist revision R, narrowing the gap with C.