Key Arguments

• Parfit notes that 'If a moral theory can be quite straightforwardly true, it is clear that, if it is self-effacing, this does not show that it cannot be true.' On such moral realism, self-effacement is compatible with truth.
• He contrasts this with views that 'regard morality as a social product, either actually or in some "ideal constructivist" way.' On these views, acceptability conditions are partly built into what counts as the correct moral theory.
• On these constructivist or social-product views, 'we may then claim that, to be acceptable, a moral theory must fulfil what Rawls calls "the publicity condition": it must be a theory that everyone ought to accept, and publicly acknowledge to each other.' This condition directly conflicts with self-effacement.
• He infers: 'On these meta-ethical views, a moral theory cannot be self-effacing. On other views, it can be.' The meta-ethical framework thus determines whether self-effacement is a decisive objection.
• Parfit then remarks, 'It would take at least a book to decide between these different views. I must therefore, in this book, leave this question open. This does not matter', signalling that he is bracketing the deeper dispute about the nature of morality and publicity, even though it bears on the status of self-effacing theories like C.

Source Quotes

Our answer to this question will depend in part on our beliefs about the nature of moral reasoning. If a moral theory can be quite straightforwardly true, it is clear that, if it is self-effacing, this does not show that it cannot be true. But we may instead regard morality as a social product, either actually or in some ‘ideal constructivist’ way.

If a moral theory can be quite straightforwardly true, it is clear that, if it is self-effacing, this does not show that it cannot be true. But we may instead regard morality as a social product, either actually or in some ‘ideal constructivist’ way. We may then claim that, to be acceptable, a moral theory must fulfil what Rawls calls ‘the publicity condition’: it must be a theory that everyone ought to accept, and publicly acknowledge to each other.23 On these meta-ethical views, a moral theory cannot be self-effacing.

But we may instead regard morality as a social product, either actually or in some ‘ideal constructivist’ way. We may then claim that, to be acceptable, a moral theory must fulfil what Rawls calls ‘the publicity condition’: it must be a theory that everyone ought to accept, and publicly acknowledge to each other.23 On these meta-ethical views, a moral theory cannot be self-effacing. On other views, it can be.

But we may instead regard morality as a social product, either actually or in some ‘ideal constructivist’ way. We may then claim that, to be acceptable, a moral theory must fulfil what Rawls calls ‘the publicity condition’: it must be a theory that everyone ought to accept, and publicly acknowledge to each other.23 On these meta-ethical views, a moral theory cannot be self-effacing. On other views, it can be. It would take at least a book to decide between these different views.

On other views, it can be. It would take at least a book to decide between these different views. I must therefore, in this book, leave this question open. This does not matter

Key Concepts

• If a moral theory can be quite straightforwardly true, it is clear that, if it is self-effacing, this does not show that it cannot be true.
• But we may instead regard morality as a social product, either actually or in some ‘ideal constructivist’ way.
• We may then claim that, to be acceptable, a moral theory must fulfil what Rawls calls ‘the publicity condition’: it must be a theory that everyone ought to accept, and publicly acknowledge to each other.
• On these meta-ethical views, a moral theory cannot be self-effacing. On other views, it can be.
• It would take at least a book to decide between these different views. I must therefore, in this book, leave this question open. This does not matter

Context

Final paragraph of section 17, where Parfit connects the discussion of self-effacement in Consequentialism to broader meta-ethical debates about realism vs. constructivism and Rawls’s publicity condition, and explicitly declines to settle these issues within this book.