Key Arguments

• After stressing that every conscious process is consciousness-of something, Husserl says the transcendental heading ‘ego cogito’ must be broadened by adding a further member: “The transcendental heading, ego cogito, must therefore be broadened by adding one more member.”
• He states that each conscious process ‘means’ something and thereby contains its cogitatum: “Each cogito, each conscious process, we may also say, “means” something or other and bears in itself, in this manner peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum.”
• He explains that each type of act has its own specific way of meaning its object: “Each does this, moreover, in its own fashion. The house-perception means a house — more precisely, as this individual house — and means it in the fashion peculiar to perception; a house-memory means a house in the fashion peculiar to memory; a house-phantasy, in the fashion peculiar to phantasy.”
• He extends this to predicative judging and valuing, showing that different act-types confer different manners of object-meaning: “A predicative judging about a house, which perhaps is “there” perceptually, means it in just the fashion peculiar to judging; a / valuing that supervenes means it in yet another fashion; and so forth.”
• He then names this universal structural feature ‘intentionality’ and defines it as nothing but this property of being consciousness-of something: “Conscious processes are also called intentional; but then the word intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something; as a cogito, to bear”.

Source Quotes

In this manner, without exception, every conscious process is, in itself, consciousness of such and such, regardless of what the rightful actuality-status of this objective such-and-such may be, and regardless of the circumstance that I, as standing in the transcendental attitude, abstain from acceptance of this object as well as from all my other natural acceptances. The transcendental heading, ego cogito, must therefore be broadened by adding one more member. Each cogito, each conscious process, we may also say, “means” something or other and bears in itself, in this manner peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum.

The transcendental heading, ego cogito, must therefore be broadened by adding one more member. Each cogito, each conscious process, we may also say, “means” something or other and bears in itself, in this manner peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum. Each does this, moreover, in its own fashion.

Each cogito, each conscious process, we may also say, “means” something or other and bears in itself, in this manner peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum. Each does this, moreover, in its own fashion. The house-perception means a house — more precisely, as this individual house — and means it in the fashion peculiar to perception; a house-memory means a house in the fashion peculiar to memory; a house-phantasy, in the fashion peculiar to phantasy. A predicative judging about a house, which perhaps is “there” perceptually, means it in just the fashion peculiar to judging; a / valuing that supervenes means it in yet another fashion; and so forth.

The house-perception means a house — more precisely, as this individual house — and means it in the fashion peculiar to perception; a house-memory means a house in the fashion peculiar to memory; a house-phantasy, in the fashion peculiar to phantasy. A predicative judging about a house, which perhaps is “there” perceptually, means it in just the fashion peculiar to judging; a / valuing that supervenes means it in yet another fashion; and so forth. Conscious processes are also called intentional; but then the word intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something; as a cogito, to bear

A predicative judging about a house, which perhaps is “there” perceptually, means it in just the fashion peculiar to judging; a / valuing that supervenes means it in yet another fashion; and so forth. Conscious processes are also called intentional; but then the word intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something; as a cogito, to bear

Key Concepts

• The transcendental heading, ego cogito, must therefore be broadened by adding one more member.
• Each cogito, each conscious process, we may also say, “means” something or other and bears in itself, in this manner peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum.
• Each does this, moreover, in its own fashion. The house-perception means a house — more precisely, as this individual house — and means it in the fashion peculiar to perception; a house-memory means a house in the fashion peculiar to memory; a house-phantasy, in the fashion peculiar to phantasy.
• A predicative judging about a house, which perhaps is “there” perceptually, means it in just the fashion peculiar to judging; a / valuing that supervenes means it in yet another fashion; and so forth.
• Conscious processes are also called intentional; but then the word intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something; as a cogito, to bear

Context

Final sentences of § 14 (as given in the excerpt), where Husserl articulates the cogito–cogitatum correlation and explicitly defines ‘intentionality’ as the universal feature that every conscious act is consciousness-of something in its own specific manner.