Key Arguments

• Husserl explicitly states that a transcendental-descriptive egology and a descriptive ‘purely inner psychology’ based exclusively on internal experience "can start with nothing other than the ego cogito."
• He links this to the failure of modern attempts to distinguish psychological from philosophical theories of consciousness, claiming that access to both is "barred" if one follows the still dominant sensualist tradition and begins with a theory of sensation.
• Beginning with sensation means, in advance and as if it were obvious, misinterpreting conscious life as a complex of data of external and internal sensuousness, and then appealing to 'form-qualities' to combine these data into wholes, thereby importing an atomistic and configurational model into the very starting point.
• He further critiques non-atomistic variants that try to save wholes by claiming they are prior to parts but still founded on sensuous data, indicating that these remain within the same misguided framework established by starting from sensation.
• In contrast, he insists that a radically begun descriptive theory of consciousness does not yet have before it such 'data and wholes' except as prejudices; it must begin instead from pure, as yet 'dumb' psychological experience and let it articulate itself.

Source Quotes

As already mentioned, the parallel to this transcendental uncovering is the psychological uncovering of myself, i.e., my purely psychic being and, first of all, my psychic life, apperceived in the natural manner, namely as a component of my psychophysical (animal) reality and thus as a component of the world I naturally accept. Manifestly a transcendental-descriptive egology, and likewise a descriptive “purely inner psychology” actually derived quite exclusively from internal experience (a psychology that, as the fundamental psychological discipline, must be developed), can start with nothing other than the ego cogito. What with the failure of all modern attempts to distinguish between a psychological and a philosophical theory of consciousness, this remark is of the greatest importance.

Manifestly a transcendental-descriptive egology, and likewise a descriptive “purely inner psychology” actually derived quite exclusively from internal experience (a psychology that, as the fundamental psychological discipline, must be developed), can start with nothing other than the ego cogito. What with the failure of all modern attempts to distinguish between a psychological and a philosophical theory of consciousness, this remark is of the greatest importance. Access to both theories is barred, if one is misled by the still all-prevailing tradition of sensualism and starts with a theory of sensation.

What with the failure of all modern attempts to distinguish between a psychological and a philosophical theory of consciousness, this remark is of the greatest importance. Access to both theories is barred, if one is misled by the still all-prevailing tradition of sensualism and starts with a theory of sensation. To do so involves the following: In advance, as though this were obviously correct, one misinterprets conscious life as a complex of data of “external” and (at best) “internal sensuousness”; then one lets / form-qualities take care of combining such data into wholes.

Access to both theories is barred, if one is misled by the still all-prevailing tradition of sensualism and starts with a theory of sensation. To do so involves the following: In advance, as though this were obviously correct, one misinterprets conscious life as a complex of data of “external” and (at best) “internal sensuousness”; then one lets / form-qualities take care of combining such data into wholes. To get rid of “atomism”, one adds the theory that the forms or configurations are founded on these data necessarily and the wholes are therefore prior in themselves to the parts.

To do so involves the following: In advance, as though this were obviously correct, one misinterprets conscious life as a complex of data of “external” and (at best) “internal sensuousness”; then one lets / form-qualities take care of combining such data into wholes. To get rid of “atomism”, one adds the theory that the forms or configurations are founded on these data necessarily and the wholes are therefore prior in themselves to the parts. But, when descriptive theory of consciousness begins radically, it has before it no such data and wholes, except perhaps as prejudices.

Key Concepts

• Manifestly a transcendental-descriptive egology, and likewise a descriptive “purely inner psychology” actually derived quite exclusively from internal experience (a psychology that, as the fundamental psychological discipline, must be developed), can start with nothing other than the ego cogito.
• What with the failure of all modern attempts to distinguish between a psychological and a philosophical theory of consciousness, this remark is of the greatest importance.
• Access to both theories is barred, if one is misled by the still all-prevailing tradition of sensualism and starts with a theory of sensation.
• In advance, as though this were obviously correct, one misinterprets conscious life as a complex of data of “external” and (at best) “internal sensuousness”; then one lets / form-qualities take care of combining such data into wholes.
• To get rid of “atomism”, one adds the theory that the forms or configurations are founded on these data necessarily and the wholes are therefore prior in themselves to the parts.

Context

Middle of §16, where Husserl broadens his methodological point: the same proper starting point (ego cogito) is required both for transcendental phenomenology and for a non‑transcendental but pure descriptive psychology, and he criticizes sensualist-atomist approaches for blocking that start.