Every act of evidence institutes for the ego an abiding possession by founding a horizon of possible return—‘I can always do so again’—through which the same actuality can be re‑given in new evidences, and this habitual-potential structure is essential for the constitution of fixed and abiding being.

By Edmund Husserl, from Cartesian Meditations

Key Arguments

  • Husserl states that ‘Every evidence “sets up” or “institutes” for me an abiding possession’, directly claiming that an evidential act has a founding role: it leaves behind something abiding for the subject.
  • He explains this abiding character through the possibility of repetition: ‘I can “always return” to the itself-beheld actuality, in a series of new evidences as restitutions of the first evidence’, thus tying abiding possession to a horizon of possible re-experiences of the same object.
  • In the case of immanent data, this return takes the form of ‘a series of intuitive recollections that has the open endlessness which the “I can always do so again” (as a horizon of potentiality) creates’, indicating that habitual evidence consists in an open-ended potential for re-actualization.
  • He then asserts a dependence of enduring being on these potentialities: ‘Without such “possibilities” there would be for us no fixed and abiding being, no real and no ideal world’, showing that stable being for-us is constituted through the habitual-potential reperformance of evidences rather than through isolated, one-off acts.

Source Quotes

But we have here an ideal immanence, which refers us to further complexes of possible syntheses, as complexes that play an essential role in this connexion. Every evidence “sets up” or “institutes” for me an abiding possession. I can “always return” to the itself-beheld actuality, in a series of new evidences as restitutions of the first evidence.
Every evidence “sets up” or “institutes” for me an abiding possession. I can “always return” to the itself-beheld actuality, in a series of new evidences as restitutions of the first evidence. Thus, in the case of evidence of immanent data, I can return to them in a series of intuitive recollections that has the open endlessness which the “I can always do so again” (as a horizon of potentiality)2 creates. / Without such “possibilities” there would be for us no fixed and abiding being, no real and no ideal world.
I can “always return” to the itself-beheld actuality, in a series of new evidences as restitutions of the first evidence. Thus, in the case of evidence of immanent data, I can return to them in a series of intuitive recollections that has the open endlessness which the “I can always do so again” (as a horizon of potentiality)2 creates. / Without such “possibilities” there would be for us no fixed and abiding being, no real and no ideal world. Both of these exist for us thanks to evidence or the presumption of being able to make evident and to repeat acquired evidence.

Key Concepts

  • Every evidence “sets up” or “institutes” for me an abiding possession.
  • I can “always return” to the itself-beheld actuality, in a series of new evidences as restitutions of the first evidence.
  • Thus, in the case of evidence of immanent data, I can return to them in a series of intuitive recollections that has the open endlessness which the “I can always do so again” (as a horizon of potentiality)2 creates.
  • Without such “possibilities” there would be for us no fixed and abiding being, no real and no ideal world.

Context

Middle of §27, where Husserl introduces the notions of habitual and potential evidence: how each evidential act founds an abiding horizon of ‘I can return’ that underlies the constitution of enduring objects and worlds.