Key Arguments

• Husserl first characterizes the horizon of an external perception as a reference from genuinely perceived sides to sides ‘also meant’—not yet perceived but anticipated in a continuous protention, which changes its sense with each phase: “there belongs to every external perception its reference from the ‘genuinely perceived’ sides of the object of perception to the sides ‘also meant’ — not yet perceived, but only anticipated and, at first, with a non-intuitional emptiness (as the sides that are ‘coming’ now perceptually): a continuous protention, which, with each phase of the perception, has a new sense.”
• Beyond merely anticipated sides, each perception has further horizons made up of other possible perceptions we could have if we actively directed our perceptual activity differently (e.g., moving eyes or body): “Furthermore, the perception has horizons made up of other possibilities of perception, as perceptions that we could have, if we actively directed the course of perception otherwise: if, for example, we turned our eyes that way instead of this, or if we were to step forward or to one side, and so forth.”
• He extends the same horizon-structure to recollection: in memory there recurs, in modified form, the consciousness that, instead of the sides then actually seen, we could have seen others if we had acted differently: “In the corresponding memory this recurs in modified form, perhaps in the consciousness that, instead of the sides then visible in fact, I could have seen others — naturally, if I had directed my perceptual activity in a suitably different manner.”
• To every perception there belongs a horizon of the past as a potentiality of awakenable recollections, and to every recollection a horizon of further possible recollections up to the present: “Moreover, as might have been said earlier, to every perception there always belongs a horizon of the past, as a potentiality of awakenable recollections; and to every recollection there belongs, as a horizon, the continuous intervening intentionality of possible recollections (to be actualized on my initiative, actively), up to the actual Now of perception.”
• He synthesizes these structures under the motif of freedom: everywhere in this connection there operates an ‘I can and do, but I can also do otherwise than I am doing’, though such freedom is always exposed to possible hindrances: “Everywhere in this connexion an ‘I can and do, but I can also do otherwise than I am doing’ plays its part — without detriment to the fact that this ‘freedom’, like every other, is always open to possible hindrances.”

Source Quotes

Every subjective process has a process2 “horizon”, which changes with the alteration of the nexus of consciousness to which the process belongs and with the alteration of the process itself from phase to phase of its flow — an intentional horizon of reference to potentialities of consciousness that belong to the process itself. For example, there belongs to every external perception its reference from the “genuinely perceived” sides of the object of perception to the sides “also meant” — not yet perceived, but only anticipated and, at first, with a non-intuitional emptiness (as the sides that are “coming” now perceptually): a continuous protention, which, with each phase of the perception, has a new sense. Furthermore, the perception has horizons made up of other possibilities of perception, as perceptions that we could have, if we actively directed the course of perception otherwise: if, for example, we turned our eyes that way instead of this, or if we were to step forward or to one side, and so forth.

For example, there belongs to every external perception its reference from the “genuinely perceived” sides of the object of perception to the sides “also meant” — not yet perceived, but only anticipated and, at first, with a non-intuitional emptiness (as the sides that are “coming” now perceptually): a continuous protention, which, with each phase of the perception, has a new sense. Furthermore, the perception has horizons made up of other possibilities of perception, as perceptions that we could have, if we actively directed the course of perception otherwise: if, for example, we turned our eyes that way instead of this, or if we were to step forward or to one side, and so forth. In the corresponding memory this recurs in modified form, perhaps in the consciousness that, instead of the sides then visible in fact, I could have seen others — naturally, if I had directed my perceptual activity in a suitably different manner.

Furthermore, the perception has horizons made up of other possibilities of perception, as perceptions that we could have, if we actively directed the course of perception otherwise: if, for example, we turned our eyes that way instead of this, or if we were to step forward or to one side, and so forth. In the corresponding memory this recurs in modified form, perhaps in the consciousness that, instead of the sides then visible in fact, I could have seen others — naturally, if I had directed my perceptual activity in a suitably different manner. Moreover, as might have been said earlier, to every perception there always belongs a horizon of the past, as a potentiality of awakenable recollections; and to every recollection there belongs, as a horizon, the continuous intervening intentionality of possible recollections (to be actualized on my initiative, actively), up to the actual Now of perception.

In the corresponding memory this recurs in modified form, perhaps in the consciousness that, instead of the sides then visible in fact, I could have seen others — naturally, if I had directed my perceptual activity in a suitably different manner. Moreover, as might have been said earlier, to every perception there always belongs a horizon of the past, as a potentiality of awakenable recollections; and to every recollection there belongs, as a horizon, the continuous intervening intentionality of possible recollections (to be actualized on my initiative, actively), up to the actual Now of perception. Everywhere in this connexion an “I can and do, but I can also do otherwise than I am doing” plays its part — without detriment to the fact that this “freedom”, like every other, is always open to possible hindrances.

Moreover, as might have been said earlier, to every perception there always belongs a horizon of the past, as a potentiality of awakenable recollections; and to every recollection there belongs, as a horizon, the continuous intervening intentionality of possible recollections (to be actualized on my initiative, actively), up to the actual Now of perception. Everywhere in this connexion an “I can and do, but I can also do otherwise than I am doing” plays its part — without detriment to the fact that this “freedom”, like every other, is always open to possible hindrances. The horizons are “predelineated” potentialities.

Key Concepts

• For example, there belongs to every external perception its reference from the “genuinely perceived” sides of the object of perception to the sides “also meant” — not yet perceived, but only anticipated and, at first, with a non-intuitional emptiness (as the sides that are “coming” now perceptually): a continuous protention, which, with each phase of the perception, has a new sense.
• Furthermore, the perception has horizons made up of other possibilities of perception, as perceptions that we could have, if we actively directed the course of perception otherwise: if, for example, we turned our eyes that way instead of this, or if we were to step forward or to one side, and so forth.
• In the corresponding memory this recurs in modified form, perhaps in the consciousness that, instead of the sides then visible in fact, I could have seen others — naturally, if I had directed my perceptual activity in a suitably different manner.
• to every perception there always belongs a horizon of the past, as a potentiality of awakenable recollections; and to every recollection there belongs, as a horizon, the continuous intervening intentionality of possible recollections (to be actualized on my initiative, actively), up to the actual Now of perception.
• Everywhere in this connexion an “I can and do, but I can also do otherwise than I am doing” plays its part — without detriment to the fact that this “freedom”, like every other, is always open to possible hindrances.

Context

Middle of §19, where Husserl concretely analyzes horizons in perception and recollection and ties horizon-structure to the Ego’s practical and cognitive ‘I can’—a fundamental yet conditional freedom within intentional life.