From the preliminary clarifications about evidence and the idea of science, Husserl derives a first … — Edmund Husserl

From the preliminary clarifications about evidence and the idea of science, Husserl derives a first methodological principle for the beginning philosopher: no judgment may be accepted as scientific unless it is derived from evidence in which the relevant affairs are given ‘themselves,’ and even such judgments must be continuously examined in regard to the range and perfection of their evidence, being treated as merely intermediate where full givenness is lacking.

By Edmund Husserl, from Cartesian Meditations

Key Arguments

Husserl says that the preceding work permits him to fix a first methodological principle: “By this / preliminary work, here roughly indicated rather than done explicitly, we have gained a measure of clarity sufficient to let us fix, for our whole further procedure, a first methodological principle.”
He formulates the core requirement of this principle: “It is plain that I, as someone beginning philosophically, since I am striving toward the presumptive end, genuine science, must neither make nor go on accepting any judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence, from ‘experiences’ in which the affairs and affair-complexes in question are present to me as ‘they themselves’.”
He adds a demand for ongoing critical reflection on the evidence of even such judgments: “Indeed, even then I must at all times reflect on the pertinent evidence; I must examine its ‘range’ and make evident to myself how far that evidence, how far its ‘perfection’, the actual giving of the affairs themselves, extends.”
Where evidence is incomplete, the judgment cannot claim final validity but only a provisional status: “Where this is still wanting, I must not claim any final validity, but must account my judgment as, at best, a possible intermediate stage on the way to final validity.”

Source Quotes

Everything that makes a philosophical beginning possible we must first acquire by ourselves.1 Whether, later on, a genuine science similar to traditional logic will accrue to us is an eventuality about which we can at present know nothing. By this / preliminary work, here roughly indicated rather than done explicitly, we have gained a measure of clarity sufficient to let us fix, for our whole further procedure, a first methodological principle. It is plain that I, as someone beginning philosophically, since I am striving toward the presumptive end, genuine science, must neither make nor go on accepting any judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence, from “experiences” in which the affairs and affair-complexes in question are present to me as “they themselves”.

By this / preliminary work, here roughly indicated rather than done explicitly, we have gained a measure of clarity sufficient to let us fix, for our whole further procedure, a first methodological principle. It is plain that I, as someone beginning philosophically, since I am striving toward the presumptive end, genuine science, must neither make nor go on accepting any judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence, from “experiences” in which the affairs and affair-complexes in question are present to me as “they themselves”. Indeed, even then I must at all times reflect on the pertinent evidence; I must examine its “range” and make evident to myself how far that evidence, how far its “perfection”, the actual giving of the affairs themselves, extends.

It is plain that I, as someone beginning philosophically, since I am striving toward the presumptive end, genuine science, must neither make nor go on accepting any judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence, from “experiences” in which the affairs and affair-complexes in question are present to me as “they themselves”. Indeed, even then I must at all times reflect on the pertinent evidence; I must examine its “range” and make evident to myself how far that evidence, how far its “perfection”, the actual giving of the affairs themselves, extends. Where this is still wanting, I must not claim any final validity, but must account my judgment as, at best, a possible intermediate stage on the way to final validity.

Indeed, even then I must at all times reflect on the pertinent evidence; I must examine its “range” and make evident to myself how far that evidence, how far its “perfection”, the actual giving of the affairs themselves, extends. Where this is still wanting, I must not claim any final validity, but must account my judgment as, at best, a possible intermediate stage on the way to final validity. Because the sciences aim at predications that express completely and with evident fitness what is beheld pre-predicatively, it is obvious that I must be careful also about this aspect of scientific evidence.

Key Concepts

we have gained a measure of clarity sufficient to let us fix, for our whole further procedure, a first methodological principle.
It is plain that I, as someone beginning philosophically, since I am striving toward the presumptive end, genuine science, must neither make nor go on accepting any judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence, from “experiences” in which the affairs and affair-complexes in question are present to me as “they themselves”.
Indeed, even then I must at all times reflect on the pertinent evidence; I must examine its “range” and make evident to myself how far that evidence, how far its “perfection”, the actual giving of the affairs themselves, extends.
Where this is still wanting, I must not claim any final validity, but must account my judgment as, at best, a possible intermediate stage on the way to final validity.

Context

Later portion of §5, where Husserl translates his phenomenological analysis of evidence and scientific striving into a concrete normative principle governing what the beginning transcendental philosopher may count as scientific judgment.