Key Arguments

• Husserl explicitly names identification as the fundamental form of synthesis and immediately characterizes it as a passively flowing synthesis in internal time: "If we consider the fundamental form of synthesis, namely identification, we encounter it first of all as an all-ruling, passively flowing synthesis, in the form of the continuous consciousness of internal time."
• In the example of perceiving a die, the appearing ‘flows away’ in temporal phases that are continually changing appearances of the one identical object: "This appearing 'flows away' with its temporal extents and phases, which, for their part, are continually changing appearances of the one identical die."
• The unity at stake is not mere external connectedness but a unifying synthesis that constitutes ‘the same’ object across its appearances: "Their unity is a unity of synthesis: not merely a continuous connectedness of cogitationes (as it were, a being stuck to one another externally), but a connectedness that makes the unity of one consciousness, in which the unity of an intentional objectivity, as 'the same' objectivity / belonging to multiple modes of appearance, becomes 'constituted'."
• The same structure underlies cases where the same object is intended in different types of acts (perceptions, recollections, expectations, valuations): "Now the same die (the same for consciousness) can be intended in highly diverse modes of consciousness — simultaneously, or else successively in separated modes of consciousness — for example: in separate perceptions, recollections, expectations, valuations, and so forth. Again it is a synthesis that, as a unitary consciousness embracing these separated processes, gives rise to the consciousness of identity and thereby makes any knowing of identity possible."
• Husserl generalizes: every consciousness of a plurality or relational complex is likewise a synthesis that synthetically constitutes its own peculiar cogitatum: "But likewise every consciousness in which the non-identical is intended unitarily (every consciousness of a plurality, a relational complex, or the like) is ultimately a synthesis in this sense, constituting its peculiar cogitatum (the plurality, the relational complex, or whatever it is) synthetically or, as is also said here, syntactically."
• Even contradictions and incompatibilities are said to be ‘products of syntheses’, indicating the universality of synthesis as the form of intentional unity, even where the unity is a unity of conflict: "Even contradictions, incompatibilities, are products of 'syntheses' (to be sure, syntheses of another kind)."

Source Quotes

Identification as the fundamental form of synthesis. The all-embracing synthesis of transcendental time If we consider the fundamental form of synthesis, namely identification, we encounter it first of all as an all-ruling, passively flowing synthesis, in the form of the continuous consciousness of internal time. Every subjective process has its internal temporality.

If it is a conscious process in which (as in the perception of the die) a worldly Object appears as cogitatum, then we have to distinguish the Objective temporality that appears (for example: the temporality of this die) from the “internal” temporality of the appearing (for example: that of the die-perceiving). This appearing “flows away” with its temporal extents and phases, which, for their part, are continually changing appearances of the one identical die. Their unity is a unity of synthesis: not merely a continuous connectedness of cogitationes (as it were, a being stuck to one another externally), but a connectedness that makes the unity of one consciousness, in which the unity of an intentional objectivity, as “the same” objectivity / belonging to multiple modes of appearance, becomes “constituted”.

This appearing “flows away” with its temporal extents and phases, which, for their part, are continually changing appearances of the one identical die. Their unity is a unity of synthesis: not merely a continuous connectedness of cogitationes (as it were, a being stuck to one another externally), but a connectedness that makes the unity of one consciousness, in which the unity of an intentional objectivity, as “the same” objectivity / belonging to multiple modes of appearance, becomes “constituted”. The existence of a world and, accordingly, the existence of this die are “parenthesized” in consequence of my epoché; but the one identical, appearing die (as appearing)1 is continuously “immanent” in the flowing consciousness, descriptively “in” it; as is likewise the attribute “one identical”.

Now the same die (the same for consciousness) can be intended in highly diverse modes of consciousness — simultaneously, or else successively in separated modes of consciousness — for example: in separate perceptions, recollections, expectations, valuations, and so forth. Again it is a synthesis that, as a unitary consciousness embracing these separated processes, gives rise to the consciousness of identity and thereby makes any knowing of identity possible. But likewise every consciousness in which the non-identical is intended unitarily (every consciousness of a plurality, a relational complex, or the like) is ultimately a synthesis in this sense, constituting its peculiar cogitatum (the plurality, the relational complex, or whatever it is) synthetically or, as is also said here, syntactically — regardless, moreover, of whether this synthesis should be characterized as a pure passivity on the Ego’s part or as his activity.

Again it is a synthesis that, as a unitary consciousness embracing these separated processes, gives rise to the consciousness of identity and thereby makes any knowing of identity possible. But likewise every consciousness in which the non-identical is intended unitarily (every consciousness of a plurality, a relational complex, or the like) is ultimately a synthesis in this sense, constituting its peculiar cogitatum (the plurality, the relational complex, or whatever it is) synthetically or, as is also said here, syntactically — regardless, moreover, of whether this synthesis should be characterized as a pure passivity on the Ego’s part or as his activity. Even contradictions, incompatibilities, are products of “syntheses” (to be sure, syntheses of another kind).

But likewise every consciousness in which the non-identical is intended unitarily (every consciousness of a plurality, a relational complex, or the like) is ultimately a synthesis in this sense, constituting its peculiar cogitatum (the plurality, the relational complex, or whatever it is) synthetically or, as is also said here, syntactically — regardless, moreover, of whether this synthesis should be characterized as a pure passivity on the Ego’s part or as his activity. Even contradictions, incompatibilities, are products of “syntheses” (to be sure, syntheses of another kind). Synthesis, however, does not occur just in every particular conscious process, nor does it connect one particular conscious process with another only occasionally.

Key Concepts

• If we consider the fundamental form of synthesis, namely identification, we encounter it first of all as an all-ruling, passively flowing synthesis, in the form of the continuous consciousness of internal time.
• This appearing “flows away” with its temporal extents and phases, which, for their part, are continually changing appearances of the one identical die.
• Their unity is a unity of synthesis: not merely a continuous connectedness of cogitationes (as it were, a being stuck to one another externally), but a connectedness that makes the unity of one consciousness, in which the unity of an intentional objectivity, as “the same” objectivity / belonging to multiple modes of appearance, becomes “constituted”.
• Again it is a synthesis that, as a unitary consciousness embracing these separated processes, gives rise to the consciousness of identity and thereby makes any knowing of identity possible.
• every consciousness in which the non-identical is intended unitarily (every consciousness of a plurality, a relational complex, or the like) is ultimately a synthesis in this sense, constituting its peculiar cogitatum (the plurality, the relational complex, or whatever it is) synthetically or, as is also said here, syntactically
• Even contradictions, incompatibilities, are products of “syntheses” (to be sure, syntheses of another kind).

Context

Early and middle portions of §18, where Husserl deepens the account of synthesis introduced in §17 by specifying ‘identification’ as the basic form of synthesis and illustrating how it operates in temporal consciousness and in the constitution of identity and plurality.