Key Arguments

• Husserl notes that when a type is raised into the eidetic sphere, its intentional horizons do not disappear but are themselves eidetically transformed: "Though each singly selected type is thus elevated from its milieu within the empirically factual transcendental ego into the pure eidetic sphere, the intentional outer horizons pointing to its uncoverable connexus within the ego do not vanish; only this nexus-horizon itself becomes eidetic.", indicating that the ego-relation implicit in the type also becomes a matter of pure possibility.
• He draws the conclusion that with each eidetically pure type we now stand within a pure ego-essence: "In other words: With each eidetically pure type we find ourselves, not indeed inside the de facto ego, but inside an eidos ego; and constitution of one actually pure possibility among others carries with it implicitly, as its outer horizon, a purely possible ego, a pure possibility-variant of my de facto ego.", explicitly introducing the notion of an eidos ego and pure possibility-variants of the ego.
• He remarks that we could just as well have begun by freely varying the ego itself: "We could have started out by imagining this ego to be freely varied, and could set the problem of exploring eidetically the explicit constitution of any transcendental ego whatever.", which generalizes the method from particular acts to the ego as such.
• He then asserts that a fully eidetic phenomenology would amount to an uncovering of the comprehensive eidos of the transcendental ego: "Therefore, if we think of a phenomenology developed as an intuitively apriori science purely according to the eidetic method, all its eidetic researches are nothing else but uncoverings of the / all-embracing eidos, transcendental ego as such, which comprises all pure possibility-variants of my de facto ego and this ego itself qua possibility.", explicitly identifying the ultimate eidetic theme as the all-embracing eidos of transcendental egoity.

Source Quotes

It is prior to all “concepts”, in the sense of verbal significations; indeed, as pure concepts, these must be made to fit the eidos. Though each singly selected type is thus elevated from its milieu within the empirically factual transcendental ego into the pure eidetic sphere, the intentional outer horizons pointing to its uncoverable connexus within the ego do not vanish; only this nexus-horizon itself becomes eidetic. In other words: With each eidetically pure type we find ourselves, not indeed inside the de facto ego, but inside an eidos ego; and constitution of one actually pure possibility among others carries with it implicitly, as its outer horizon, a purely possible ego, a pure possibility-variant of my de facto ego.

Though each singly selected type is thus elevated from its milieu within the empirically factual transcendental ego into the pure eidetic sphere, the intentional outer horizons pointing to its uncoverable connexus within the ego do not vanish; only this nexus-horizon itself becomes eidetic. In other words: With each eidetically pure type we find ourselves, not indeed inside the de facto ego, but inside an eidos ego; and constitution of one actually pure possibility among others carries with it implicitly, as its outer horizon, a purely possible ego, a pure possibility-variant of my de facto ego. We could have started out by imagining this ego to be freely varied, and could set the problem of exploring eidetically the explicit constitution of any transcendental ego whatever.

In other words: With each eidetically pure type we find ourselves, not indeed inside the de facto ego, but inside an eidos ego; and constitution of one actually pure possibility among others carries with it implicitly, as its outer horizon, a purely possible ego, a pure possibility-variant of my de facto ego. We could have started out by imagining this ego to be freely varied, and could set the problem of exploring eidetically the explicit constitution of any transcendental ego whatever. The new phenomenology did so from the beginning; and accordingly all the descriptions and all the problem-delimitations treated by us up to now have in fact been translations from the original eidetic form back into that of an empirical description of types.

We could have started out by imagining this ego to be freely varied, and could set the problem of exploring eidetically the explicit constitution of any transcendental ego whatever. The new phenomenology did so from the beginning; and accordingly all the descriptions and all the problem-delimitations treated by us up to now have in fact been translations from the original eidetic form back into that of an empirical description of types. Therefore, if we think of a phenomenology developed as an intuitively apriori science purely according to the eidetic method, all its eidetic researches are nothing else but uncoverings of the / all-embracing eidos, transcendental ego as such, which comprises all pure possibility-variants of my de facto ego and this ego itself qua possibility.

The new phenomenology did so from the beginning; and accordingly all the descriptions and all the problem-delimitations treated by us up to now have in fact been translations from the original eidetic form back into that of an empirical description of types. Therefore, if we think of a phenomenology developed as an intuitively apriori science purely according to the eidetic method, all its eidetic researches are nothing else but uncoverings of the / all-embracing eidos, transcendental ego as such, which comprises all pure possibility-variants of my de facto ego and this ego itself qua possibility. Eidetic phenomenology, accordingly, explores the universal Apriori without which neither I nor1 any transcendental Ego whatever is “imaginable”; or, since every eidetic universality has the value of an unbreakable law, eidetic phenomenology explores the all-embracing laws that prescribe for every factual statement about something transcendental the possible sense (as opposed to the absurdity or inconsistency) of that statement.

Key Concepts

• Though each singly selected type is thus elevated from its milieu within the empirically factual transcendental ego into the pure eidetic sphere, the intentional outer horizons pointing to its uncoverable connexus within the ego do not vanish; only this nexus-horizon itself becomes eidetic.
• In other words: With each eidetically pure type we find ourselves, not indeed inside the de facto ego, but inside an eidos ego; and constitution of one actually pure possibility among others carries with it implicitly, as its outer horizon, a purely possible ego, a pure possibility-variant of my de facto ego.
• We could have started out by imagining this ego to be freely varied, and could set the problem of exploring eidetically the explicit constitution of any transcendental ego whatever.
• all the descriptions and all the problem-delimitations treated by us up to now have in fact been translations from the original eidetic form back into that of an empirical description of types.
• all its eidetic researches are nothing else but uncoverings of the / all-embracing eidos, transcendental ego as such, which comprises all pure possibility-variants of my de facto ego and this ego itself qua possibility.

Context

Later part of §34, where Husserl extends the method of free variation from particular intentional types to the ego itself, introducing the notion of an eidos ego and framing a full eidetic phenomenology as an uncovering of the all‑embracing eidos 'transcendental ego as such'.