Key Arguments

• Husserl proposes, against speculative hypotheses, a "task of phenomenological explication" specifically indicated by the concept of the 'alter ego': "it might indeed be more fitting to undertake the task of phenomenological explication indicated in this connexion by the 'alter ego' and carry it through in concrete work."
• He defines the first requirement as gaining insight into the intentional structures within which the alter ego is manifested and confirmed in my transcendental ego: "We must, after all, obtain for ourselves insight into the explicit and implicit intentionality wherein the alter ego becomes evinced and verified in the realm of our transcendental ego;"
• He specifies that this involves discovering the intentionalities, syntheses, and motivations through which the sense ‘other ego’ is constituted in me and becomes verified in experience as another existing subject: "we must discover in what intentionalities, syntheses, motivations, the sense 'other ego' becomes fashioned in me1 and, under the title, harmonious experience of someone else, becomes verified as existing and even as itself there in its own manner."
• Husserl emphasizes that these experiences and their 'works' are factual data of his own phenomenological sphere, and thus are accessible to phenomenological analysis: "These experiences and their works are facts belonging to my2 phenomenological sphere."
• He concludes that only by examining these experiences can he explicate the problem at hand, implying that any account of other minds must be grounded in such intentional analysis: "How else than by examining them can I explicate" (the sentence continues beyond the excerpt, but clearly points to this method as the sole legitimate approach).

Source Quotes

But perhaps there is some mistake in thoughts like these. Before one decides in favor of them and the “self-understood” propositions they exploit, and then perchance embarks on dialectical argumentations and self-styled “metaphysical” hypotheses (whose supposed possibility may turn out to be complete absurdity), it might indeed be more fitting to undertake the task of phenomenological explication indicated in this connexion by the “alter ego” and carry it through in concrete work. We must, after all, obtain for ourselves insight into the explicit and implicit intentionality wherein the alter ego becomes evinced and verified in the realm of our transcendental ego; we must discover in what intentionalities, syntheses, motivations, the sense “other ego” becomes fashioned in me1 and, under the title, harmonious experience of someone else, becomes verified as existing and even as itself there in its own manner.

Before one decides in favor of them and the “self-understood” propositions they exploit, and then perchance embarks on dialectical argumentations and self-styled “metaphysical” hypotheses (whose supposed possibility may turn out to be complete absurdity), it might indeed be more fitting to undertake the task of phenomenological explication indicated in this connexion by the “alter ego” and carry it through in concrete work. We must, after all, obtain for ourselves insight into the explicit and implicit intentionality wherein the alter ego becomes evinced and verified in the realm of our transcendental ego; we must discover in what intentionalities, syntheses, motivations, the sense “other ego” becomes fashioned in me1 and, under the title, harmonious experience of someone else, becomes verified as existing and even as itself there in its own manner. These experiences and their works are facts belonging to my2 phenomenological sphere.

We must, after all, obtain for ourselves insight into the explicit and implicit intentionality wherein the alter ego becomes evinced and verified in the realm of our transcendental ego; we must discover in what intentionalities, syntheses, motivations, the sense “other ego” becomes fashioned in me1 and, under the title, harmonious experience of someone else, becomes verified as existing and even as itself there in its own manner. These experiences and their works are facts belonging to my2 phenomenological sphere. How else than by examining them can I explicate

These experiences and their works are facts belonging to my2 phenomenological sphere. How else than by examining them can I explicate

Key Concepts

• it might indeed be more fitting to undertake the task of phenomenological explication indicated in this connexion by the “alter ego” and carry it through in concrete work.
• We must, after all, obtain for ourselves insight into the explicit and implicit intentionality wherein the alter ego becomes evinced and verified in the realm of our transcendental ego;
• we must discover in what intentionalities, syntheses, motivations, the sense “other ego” becomes fashioned in me1 and, under the title, harmonious experience of someone else, becomes verified as existing and even as itself there in its own manner.
• These experiences and their works are facts belonging to my2 phenomenological sphere.
• How else than by examining them can I explicate

Context

Concluding part of the excerpt from §42, where Husserl indicates the proper phenomenological response to the solipsism objection: a concrete, intentional analysis of the constitution and verification of the ‘alter ego’ within the transcendental sphere, rather than speculative metaphysics.