Key Arguments

• Husserl poses a question about the conceivability of multiple, absolutely separate monadic totalities: ‘Is it conceivable (to me, the subject who asks this, or, starting from me, any conceivable subject who might ask it) — is it, I ask, conceivable that two or more separate pluralities of monads, i.e. pluralities not in communion, co-exist, each of which accordingly constitutes a world of its own, so that together they constitute two / worlds that are separate ad infinitum, two infinite spaces and space-times?’
• He answers that such a scenario is not merely false but conceptually incoherent: ‘Manifestly, instead of being a conceivability, that is a pure absurdity.’
• He acknowledges that each intersubjectivity can have its ‘own’ world, but only as a surrounding‑world aspect of a higher unity: ‘A priori, as the unity of an intersubjectivity (an intersubjectivity, moreover, that possibly lacks every actual relation of community with the other intersubjectivity), each of two such groups of monads has, to be sure, its possibly quite different looking “world”. But the two worlds are then necessarily mere “surrounding worlds”, belonging to these two intersubjectivities respectively, and mere aspects of a single Objective world, which is common to them.’
• The reason for their non‑isolation is that both groups are necessarily related to the constituting ‘I’: ‘For indeed the two intersubjectivities are not absolutely isolated. As imagined by me, each of them is in necessary communion with me (or with me in respect of a possible variant of myself) as the constitutive primal monad relative to them.’
• From this he infers a single universal monadic community: ‘Accordingly they belong in truth to a single universal community, which includes me and comprises unitarily all the monads and groups of monads that can be conceived as co-existent. Actually, therefore, there can exist only a single community of monads, the community of all co-existing monads.’
• He draws the parallel conclusion about the world: ‘Hence there can exist only one Objective world, only one Objective time, only one Objective space, only one Objective Nature.’
• He adds a transcendental necessity claim: ‘Moreover this one Nature must exist, if there are any structures in me that involve the co-existence of other monads.’ Thus, the very intentional structures that give me others presuppose one Nature as the correlatum.

Source Quotes

But that entails further extremely important metaphysical results. Is it conceivable (to me, the subject who asks this, or, starting from me, any conceivable subject who might ask it) — is it, I ask, conceivable that two or more separate pluralities of monads, i.e. pluralities not in communion, co-exist, each of which accordingly constitutes a world of its own, so that together they constitute two / worlds that are separate ad infinitum, two infinite spaces and space-times? Manifestly, instead of being a conceivability, that is a pure absurdity.

Is it conceivable (to me, the subject who asks this, or, starting from me, any conceivable subject who might ask it) — is it, I ask, conceivable that two or more separate pluralities of monads, i.e. pluralities not in communion, co-exist, each of which accordingly constitutes a world of its own, so that together they constitute two / worlds that are separate ad infinitum, two infinite spaces and space-times? Manifestly, instead of being a conceivability, that is a pure absurdity. A priori, as the unity of an intersubjectivity (an intersubjectivity, moreover, that possibly lacks every actual relation of community with the other intersubjectivity), each of two such groups of monads has, to be sure, its possibly quite different looking “world”.

Manifestly, instead of being a conceivability, that is a pure absurdity. A priori, as the unity of an intersubjectivity (an intersubjectivity, moreover, that possibly lacks every actual relation of community with the other intersubjectivity), each of two such groups of monads has, to be sure, its possibly quite different looking “world”. But the two worlds are then necessarily mere “surrounding worlds”, belonging to these two intersubjectivities respectively, and mere aspects of a single Objective world, which is common to them. For indeed the two intersubjectivities are not absolutely isolated.

For indeed the two intersubjectivities are not absolutely isolated. As imagined by me, each of them is in necessary communion with me (or with me in respect of a possible variant of myself) as the constitutive primal monad relative to them. Accordingly they belong in truth to a single universal community, which includes me and comprises unitarily all the monads and groups of monads that can be conceived as co-existent.

Accordingly they belong in truth to a single universal community, which includes me and comprises unitarily all the monads and groups of monads that can be conceived as co-existent. Actually, therefore, there can exist only a single community of monads, the community of all co-existing monads. Hence there can exist only one Objective world, only one Objective time, only one Objective space, only one Objective Nature.

Actually, therefore, there can exist only a single community of monads, the community of all co-existing monads. Hence there can exist only one Objective world, only one Objective time, only one Objective space, only one Objective Nature. Moreover this one Nature must exist, if there are any structures in me that involve the co-existence of other monads.

Hence there can exist only one Objective world, only one Objective time, only one Objective space, only one Objective Nature. Moreover this one Nature must exist, if there are any structures in me that involve the co-existence of other monads. This alone is possible: that different groups of monads and different worlds are related to one another as those that may belong to stellar worlds we cannot see are related to us — that is, with animalia who lack all actual connexion with us.

Key Concepts

• Is it conceivable (to me, the subject who asks this, or, starting from me, any conceivable subject who might ask it) — is it, I ask, conceivable that two or more separate pluralities of monads, i.e. pluralities not in communion, co-exist, each of which accordingly constitutes a world of its own, so that together they constitute two / worlds that are separate ad infinitum, two infinite spaces and space-times?
• Manifestly, instead of being a conceivability, that is a pure absurdity.
• each of two such groups of monads has, to be sure, its possibly quite different looking “world”. But the two worlds are then necessarily mere “surrounding worlds”, belonging to these two intersubjectivities respectively, and mere aspects of a single Objective world, which is common to them.
• each of them is in necessary communion with me (or with me in respect of a possible variant of myself) as the constitutive primal monad relative to them.
• Actually, therefore, there can exist only a single community of monads, the community of all co-existing monads.
• Hence there can exist only one Objective world, only one Objective time, only one Objective space, only one Objective Nature.
• Moreover this one Nature must exist, if there are any structures in me that involve the co-existence of other monads.

Context

Central part of §60, where Husserl applies his monadological analysis to rule out the possibility of multiple, absolutely separate worlds of monads and to argue for the necessary uniqueness of the monadic community and the Objective world.